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1 Introduction
This dissertation consists of three essays investigating the role of social networks in a labour
market with search and matching frictions. There is strong empirical evidence that 30 - 60% of
new employees find jobs through their social contacts1. Therefore, this topic has recently gained
a lot of attention as it extends the famous search and matching framework of Mortensen and
Pissarides to account for social networks making it even more realistic. In particular, there is
an ongoing discussion in both theoretical and empirical literature about the effect of referrals on
wages which is called a ”referral puzzle” (Pelizzari (2010))2. Thus, first of all, this thesis aims
to shed light on this issue and is even able to explain both effects - positive and negative in one
model (Chapter 3). In addition, the second objective of the thesis is to analyze the implications
of social networks on the equilibrium welfare and market efficiency.
The impact of social contacts is considered here in the sense of an opportunity of word-of-
mouth information transmission about job offers (social capital). Employees hear about vacan-
cies and refer to them their unemployed friends. This increases unemployed workers’ outside
options (reservation wage) in the search theory framework thus influencing equilibrium wages,
unemployment rates and the social welfare level in the decentralized economy. In particular,
with full information, this dissertation shows that the presence of social networks in the model
with workers heterogeneous in productivity may lead to the equilibrium inefficiency different
to that found in the literature which doesn’t account for social networks (Chapter 2). On the
contrary, the asymmetric information of firms with respect to the workers’ social capital may
neutralize the standard search externality and raise welfare which is different from the classical
view (Chapter 4).
It is easy to see the evolution of the dissertation exposition. The first two chapters consider
the workers’ productivity heterogeneity and assume its connection to the social capital. On the
contrary, Chapter 4 abstracts from this since workers here are assumed to be equally productive
and differ only in the amount of the social capital thus focusing purely on the effects of the latter.
In addition, in the Chapter 2 there are only two worker types: high and low ability, and only
professional contacts, while Chapter 3 allows for arbitrarily many worker types with different
productivity and adds family contacts as well. Chapter 4 accounts for all social contacts’ types
useful for job search without any restrictions.
Chapter 2 investigates the social welfare in a model with two types of workers differing in
their productivity (high and low ability). The main assumption is a positive correlation between
the ability of a worker and her number of professional contacts who can give a reference for
the job. It is justified by empirical findings of Hensvik and Skans (2013) who support the
original idea of Montgomery (1991) and report that incumbent workers with a high test score
1For example, Staiger (1990), Granovetter (1995), Pistaferri (1999), Kugler (2003), Pelizarri (2010), Bentolila
et. al. (2010), Delattre and Sabatier (2007) for different countries.
2For example, Staiger (1990), Simon and Warner (1992) and Granovetter (1995) report that referrals are asso-
ciated with wage premiums in the United States. The hypothesis of wage premiums is also supported by Margolis
and Simonnet (2003) and Goos and Salomons (2007) for France and the United Kingdom. In contrast, Bentolila
et al. (2010) report wage penalties in the United States and the European Union. This result is supported by
Delattre and Sabatier (2007), Pistaferri (1999) as well as Addison and Portugal (2002) for France, Italy and Por-
tugal respectively. Simon and Warner (1992), Montgomery (1991,1992, 1994), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994),
Kugler (2003), Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) and Galenianos (2014) provide theoretical models supporting wage
premiums due to referrals while Bentolila et al. (2010) and Ponzo and Scoppa (2010) argue in favor of wage
penalties. Tumen (2013) and Zaharieva (2015) explain both effects depending on parameters.
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are more likely to be linked to the new hires than low ability employees. For simplicity, high
ability workers are assumed to be linked in a network and have the same exogenous number
of professional contacts. In contrast, the number of professional contacts of low ability workers
is normalized to zero. There are two labour markets in the economy: regular and referral. As
wages are determined through the Nash bargaining, high-ability workers are better paid than
low ability workers. On the one hand, high ability workers are more productive which leads
to higher wages. On the other hand, their reservation wages are high due to the additional
possibility of finding jobs through the network of contacts.
High ability workers are more productive but they also bargain a higher wage. Which of these
two effects is dominating for profits depends on the productivity difference between workers and
the number of social contacts. If the productivity (wage) effect is dominating then the expected
profit of firms in the regular market is increasing (decreasing) in the proportion of high ability
workers. For realistic parameter values, the effect of higher wages is dominating already for a
small number of social contacts and therefore high ability workers impose a negative externality
on low ability workers. This effect generates an equilibrium wage dispersion which is inefficiently
large. The optimal policy in this case is associated with increasing (decreasing) the reservation
wage of low (high) ability workers through redistributional taxes and subsidies and reducing the
equilibrium inequality in wages. This finding questions the traditional view that social contacts
increase efficiency by mitigating the problem of adverse selection (see Montgomery (1991)). It
is also different from the literature on heterogeneous worker groups where wages are generally
compressed when two types of workers are simultaneously searching for jobs in the same labour
market (see Blazquez and Jansen (2008)). In addition, firms hiring through referrals do not
impose a negative search externality on other firms which is the case in the regular market.
Therefore, employment subsidies in the referral market should be imposed.
Chapter 3 of the thesis explains an empirically observed U-shape referral hiring pattern,
namely that referrals are mostly used by workers in the tails of the skill distribution, whereas
all other workers in the middle are more likely to use a formal channel of job search3. There
are arbitrarily many worker types different in their productivity and three job search channels
in the model: costly formal applications and two costless informal channels - through family
and professional networks. Every worker has the same small probability of hearing about job
openings through her family members, while the model is also robust to the endogenous job-
finding rate through family. However, the job-finding rate through the network of professional
contacts is productivity-specific. Every worker has a fixed number of professional contacts but
a strong degree of network homophily along the productivity dimension is assumed.
Workers choose the search intensity through the formal channel while firms choose the ad-
vertising intensity of open positions to their incumbent employees. The result of the model
is a strong self-selection of workers on productivity across the three channels: low (high) pro-
ductivity types rely more on family (professional) contacts while middle productivity workers
search rather formally. Moreover, as a wage bargained is a function of the worker’s productivity,
combining family and professional referrals into one informal channel may generate a spurious
result of wage premiums (penalties) if high (low) productivity workers are dominating in the
3It was found in empirical studies by Brown et al. (2012) for the US, Corak and Piraino (2011) for Canada,
Boxman et al. (1991) for the Netherlands
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empirical data. Thus, the novelty of the model is that it is able to explain both average effects
of referrals on wages: positive and negative, and the U-shape referral hiring pattern in a unified
framework.
The mechanism generating the U-shape is following. Low productivity workers expect low
wages thus it is not optimal for them to exert costly search effort. At the same time hiring
these workers is not profitable for firms, so that firms prefer to direct their search towards more
productive worker groups. Hence low productivity workers rely on family referrals as a method of
last resort. Average workers mostly use the formal channel: their expected wages are sufficiently
high and motivating to exert search effort but their outside opportunities in terms of professional
referrals are not yet too good. Finally, high productivity workers naturally tend to find their
jobs by means of professional referrals.
Chapter 4 of the dissertation presents a model in which firms are uncertain about the job
seekers’ number of friends, who can help them in the job search (or their outside options). All
workers have the same productivity and differ only in the social capital. For simplicity, there
are only two worker types in the model: low and high type. A firm offers a take-it-or-leave-it
wage contract to a worker after checking the worker’s profile and the non-fictitious number of
social contacts in the Social Network System (SNS) in the Internet (for example, Facebook,
LinkedIn or Xing) for the worker to accept. This number serves as a noisy signal of the social
capital for firms. Indeed, ”nearly 39 percent of firms use SNS to research job candidates, up
from 37 percent in 2012” (CarreerBuilder.com (2013)). Firms pay attention, whether the job
seeker has great communication skills and whether other people posted great references about
the candidate.
The model generates a positive relationship between the number of contacts in the Social
Network System and the wage offered by firms in the equilibrium. Thus, there will be a wage
dispersion between the equally productive workers with different number of contacts in the
Internet, which extends the classical result on wage dispersion with respect to the signal in the
literature on uncertainty about the workers productivity (for instance, Spence (1973)).
In addition, the comparative statics w.r.t. the firms’ uncertainty level increase was conducted.
Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes were compared numerically with the two extreme cases: the
case of perfect information, when workers’ social capital is observed perfectly, and the case of a
full information asymmetry, when firms don’t have any reliable signal to make inferences about
workers’ outside options. The overall social welfare turns out to be increasing with the increase
in the firms’ uncertainty level.
One of the reasons for this is that firms anticipate that expected profits from an open vacancy
will decrease due to more mismatched wages offered and open less vacancies thus decreasing their
overall cost and leading to the welfare increase. So the information asymmetry turns out to be
welfare improving as firms, by chance, will employ less workers which they would not like to
employ. In the standard search theory with perfect information (for example, Pissarides (2000)),
the social welfare is maximized when the workers’ bargaining power is equal to the elasticity
of the job-filling rate. This result is known as the Hosios condition. Otherwise, when their
bargaining power is too low (high), firms will open too many (few) vacancies due to low (high)
wages leading to more inefficiency. Since in the present model the wage is offered only by firms,
the workers’ wages are relatively low. This gives an intuition why the social welfare in the perfect
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information case is not the largest since the Hosios condition is not satisfied.
It is interesting to compare this finding to the conclusion of Montgomery (1991) that social
contacts use leads to a higher level of social welfare due to a lower mismatch between firms
and workers as referrals reveal the quality of the match. In the present paper, a higher level of
mismatched wages offered contributes to the increase in the welfare.
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2 Optimal policy and the role of social contacts in a search
model with heterogeneous workers
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate social welfare and optimal policy in a search model
with heterogeneous workers. In our model workers differ with respect to their productivity
(high and low ability workers) and the structure of social networks, in particular, there is a
positive correlation between ability and the number of professional contacts. In this setting,
when both types of workers are mixed in the regular labour market, the decentralized equilibrium
is inefficient as high ability workers congest the market for workers with low abilities. Moreover,
this inefficiency is increasing in the number of social contacts and is associated with a larger wage
gap between the two groups of workers. This finding questions the traditional view that social
contacts increase efficiency by mitigating the problem of adverse selection (see Montgomery
(1991)). It is also different from the literature on heterogeneous worker groups where wages are
generally compressed when two types of workers are simultaneously searching for jobs in the
same labour market (see Blazquez and Jansen (2008)).
There is strong empirical evidence that 30 − 60% of new hires find jobs through personal
contacts (see for example Staiger (1990), Granovetter (1995), Pistaferri (1999), Kugler (2003),
Pelizarri (2010), Bentolila et. al. (2010) for different countries). In addition, Hensvik and Skans
(2013) report that incumbent workers with a high test score are more likely to be linked to
the new hires than low ability employees. In particular, in their data firms rely on referrals
from high-ability workers in order to attract applicants with higher unobserved ability. To
incorporate these empirical findings into the model we assume that high ability workers are
linked in a network and have the same exogenous number of professional contacts who can give
a reference for the job. In contrast, low ability workers do not have professional contacts and are
restricted to search for jobs in the regular labour market. Therefore, there is a tight connection
in the model between the productivity of the worker and the amount of social capital.
The choice of search methods by firms is endogenous. When entering the labour market,
firms decide between a high cost vacancy in the regular job market and a low cost informal
job opening in the referral market. The pool of job applicants in the regular labour market is
mixed as both types of unemployed workers apply for the publicly advertised positions. On the
contrary, the pool of applicants in the referral market is limited to unemployed workers with
high ability as only these workers are connected in a network. This assumption is in line with the
original idea of Montgomery (1991) that workers hired through social networks are on average
more productive than job applicants hired through the formal channel of search.
To keep the model tractable we assume that the worker type is immediately observed by
the firm upon the match. Thus there is no asymmetric information in the model and wages
are negotiated ex-post between the firm and the applicant by means of the individual Nash-
bargaining. Depending on the parameters, there are two types of equilibria. If the number of
social contacts is low it is not optimal for firms to rely solely on referrals as the probability of
hiring in the referral market is relatively low. In this situation there exists a unique equilibrium
without referrals where both types of workers are mixed in the regular labour market. In contrast,
if the number of social contacts is sufficiently large, then some firms prefer to use referrals in
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the hiring process, so both search channels are active in the equilibrium. In the numerical part
of the paper we estimate the net welfare gain of referrals at 1.2%.
High-ability workers are better paid than low ability workers. On the one hand, high ability
workers are more productive which leads to higher wages. On the other hand, their reservation
wages are high due to the additional possibility of finding jobs through the network of contacts.
In this setting, the model predicts that a larger number of social contacts puts an upward
pressure on wages of high ability workers and reduces the equilibrium unemployment of these
workers. Low ability workers are negatively effected: their wages fall and the unemployment rate
is increased. This implies that a more intensive use of referrals is associated with an increased
wage dispersion between the two groups of workers. Thus a more important role of social
networks in the modern society may provide an additional explanation for the increased income
inequality in the United States in the recent decade. Some indirect support for this argument
can also be found in Dawid and Gemkow (2013). These authors find that an increase in network
density leads to a polarization of firms and a concentration of more productive workers at firms
with high productivities (and wages) thereby enlarging the wage dispersion.
Next our model predicts that the decision of firms to use referrals may be inefficient from
a social perspective. The job-filling rate in the referral market does not depend on the number
of other informal vacancies in this market. It is rather that the hiring probability depends
on the architecture of the social network. So firms hiring through referrals do not impose a
negative search externality on other firms which is the case in the regular market. From a social
perspective this means that vacancies in the referral market should be created up to the point
where the expected cost of an open position is equal to the expected surplus of a filled job.
In contrast, in the decentralized equilibrium firms start using referrals at the point where the
expected cost is equal to the expected profit. This means that the optimal threshold number
of contacts which is necessary for firms to use referrals is lower than the minimum number
of contacts in the decentralized economy. In the paper we show that this inefficiency may be
mitigated by means of employment subsidies in the referral market. In reality such subsidies
can take the form of referral bonuses which are reimbursed by the state.
Finally, we identify a pooling inefficiency in the regular labour market. High ability workers
are more productive but they also bargain a higher wage. Which of these two effects is dominat-
ing for profits strongly depends on the productivity difference between the two types of workers
and the number of social contacts. If the productivity (wage) effect is dominating then the
expected profit of firms in the regular market is increasing (decreasing) in the proportion of high
ability workers. In a numerical example we show that the effect of higher wages is dominating
already for a small number of social contacts and therefore high ability workers impose a negative
externality on low ability workers. This effect generates an equilibrium wage dispersion which is
inefficiently large. The optimal policy in this case is associated with increasing (decreasing) the
reservation wage of low (high) ability workers and reducing the equilibrium inequality in wages.
Moreover, we show that this pooling inefficiency is an artefact of referrals and does not exist
in the labour market without social contacts. Once the optimal policy is implemented the net
welfare gain of referrals rises to 1.8%.
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2.1.1 Related literature
This paper is closely related to the literature on heterogeneous workers and social networks.
Albrecht and Vroman (2002) is the first study analysing an economy with skill differences across
workers and varying skill requirements of firms. Gautier (2002) extends their framework to
allow for on-the-job search and Blazquez and Jansen (2008) analyse welfare in a model economy
of Albrecht and Vroman (2002). Our comparative static result is similar to the one reported
in Gautier (2002), namely that mixing two types of workers in the same labour market may
congest the market for low ability workers and their unemployment may increase with a higher
proportion of high ability workers. However, the channel of influence is different in our model. In
Gautier (2002) high-skilled workers employed in simple jobs continue searching on-the-job and
so the expected profit of firms in this market is reduced due to the lower job duration of high-
skilled workers. In contrast, in our model the average job duration is the same for both groups
of workers and the negative effect on profits is produced due to better outside opportunities
of high-skilled workers. This effect is absent in Gautier (2002) as outside opportunities do not
affect wages in his model.
From the perspective of welfare our paper is close to Blazquez and Jansen (2008) and Igarashi
(2013). The first two authors find that wage bargaining when agents are matched at random
compresses the wage distribution relative to workers’ shadow values and doesn’t lead to the
efficient outcome. This means that low (high) ability workers receive more (less) in the de-
centralized equilibrium than in the socially efficient allocation. We show that this situation is
a special case of our model when productivity differences are large and the number of social
contacts is small. However, in the opposite case when the number of social contacts is large
and output differences are small the direction of inefficiency is reversed and the gap in wages is
inefficiently large. This is a situation which is not considered by Blazquez and Jansen (2008).
Igarashi (2013) considers a search model with two groups of workers – networked and non-
networked workers – which is similar to our study. However, the primary research question
is different between the two papers. While Igarashi (2013) investigates the question whether
restricting the network search will have a positive or a negative effect on the welfare of non-
networked workers, having an additional channel of search is always beneficial in our model
for the aggregate social welfare. Therefore, the primary task of our paper is on designing the
optimal budget transfers to compensate the group of agents who is adversely affected by the
presence of networks. Besides that, our model has two dimensions of heterogeneity (productivity
and networks) and the network size is explicitly included as a parameter of the model, whereas
in the model of Igarashi (2013) all workers are identical with respect to their productivity and
every networked worker knows all other workers of this group.
From the perspective of social networks our study is most closely related to Cahuc and
Fontaine (2009) and Zaharieva (2013). Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) restrict workers to choose
between the two job search methods, so in their model, decentralized decisions by workers and
firms to use networks can suffer from a coordination failure. On the contrary, the choice of search
methods is not limited in our model and thus both search channels are simultaneously used by
high ability workers to find a job. Zaharieva (2013) considers a matching model with family
networks and wage posting and examines welfare in this model. Wage posting and directed
search lead to the ex-ante separation of unemployed workers in the regular labour market.
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Consequently the decentralized equilibrium with family contacts is constrained efficient.
Early economic studies on social contacts include Montgomery (1991, 1992, 1994) and
Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). The focus of Montgomery (1991) is on the effect of asymmet-
ric information on wage inequality in the presence of the ”inbreeding bias”, implying clustering
of workers with respect to their ability type. As a result the equilibrium is characterized by the
positive correlation between ability and wages. Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) consider the
population of workers differing with respect to the probability of receiving job offers through
personal contacts, they show that wages paid in jobs obtained through personal contacts are
more likely to be higher than wage offers obtained through a direct application. This conclusion
is questioned in the recent empirical literature, and moreover, ”both the models of Montgomery
(1991) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) ignore what may be the most important role for
network: to increase the job offer arrival rate.”(p. 7, Margolis and Simonnet (2003)).
Recent theoretical studies emphasizing the positive effect of referrals on wages include Kugler
(2003) and Galenianos (2014). Specifically, Kugler (2003) finds that the benefit of using referrals
for firms is that they lower monitoring costs, because workers can exert peer pressure on co-
workers. As a result, firms relying on referrals find it cheaper to elicit effort by paying efficiency
wages than firms using formal hiring methods. Galenianos (2014) extends the original idea of
Montgomery (1991) and shows a positive link between the intensity of referrals and the job
finding rate. Other studies investigating the link between referrals and the job-finding rate are
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007) as well as Fontaine (2004, 2007, 2008). A larger
overview of this literature can be found in Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 explains notation and the general economic
environment. Section 2.3 deals with the existence of the decentralized equilibrium. Section 2.4
contains welfare analysis of the decentralized equilibrium. Section 2.5 illustrates our theoretical
results by means of a numerical example, while section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a unit mass of infinitely
lived risk neutral workers and an endogenous number of firms, both workers and firms discount
the future at rate r. Workers are ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their ability and social
capital. Let µ denote the fraction of low ability workers, once employed these workers produce
the flow output y0. The fraction of high ability workers is 1−µ, these workers are more productive
and generate the flow output y1 ≥ y0 when employed. Output variables y0 and y1 are known
to workers and are immediately observable by firms upon the match. So there is no problem of
asymmetric information in the model.
From the perspective of social capital, high ability workers have an equal number of profes-
sional contacts l > 0. The network size of low ability workers is normalized to zero. Despite
simplifying the model, this assumption preserves the idea that worker’s ability and the number
of professional contacts are positively correlated. By professional contacts we mean connected
employees who are willing to refer a given unemployed worker to the potential employer. Work-
ers can be either employed and producing output or unemployed and searching for a job. Let
u1 and u0 denote the total numbers of unemployed workers with high and low ability, so that
u ≡ u0+u1. Unemployed workers enjoy the flow value of leisure ζ, but also search for jobs which
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is associated with a search cost h in the regular market. Workers do not incur search costs if
they find a job by recommendation in the referral market. In order to simplify the notation we
set z = ζ − h which is a net value of leisure for workers.
Every firm entering the labour market can choose between a public vacancy in the regular
submarket at cost c and a job opening in the referral submarket at cost c2. Following the
literature (for example, Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) and Zaharieva (2013)) we assume that referral
openings allow firms to save on the advertising costs so that c2 ≤ c. Let v and v2 be the numbers
of vacancies in the two submarkets respectively. Job information in the referral submarket is
exclusively transmitted by employees, therefore, due to the absence of professional contacts,
workers with low ability are restricted to search in the regular job market. On the contrary, high
ability workers can simultaneously search in both submarkets. The matching function in the
regular job market is then given by m(u, v), and the market tightness is θ = v/u. This matching
function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, unemployment and vacancies, concave,
and exhibiting constant returns to scale. Therefore, the job finding rate λ(θ) and the vacancy
filling rate q(θ) in the regular job market are given by:
q(θ) = m(u, v)/v = mθ−η λ(θ) = θq(θ) = mθ1−η
where 0 < η < 1 is the elasticity of the job filling rate with respect to the market tightness.
In the referral market firms with open positions contact high ability employees at an exoge-
nous rate a per unit time (see Cahuc and Fontaine (2009)). Every employee who was contacted
by the firm transmits vacancy information to exactly one randomly chosen unemployed social
contact out of a pool of l contacts. Here we assume that job information is only transmitted to
the direct social links, so the job offer is lost if all l contacts are employed. The matching func-
tion in the referral job market is therefore equal to m1(u1, v2) = av2[1− (1− u11−µ)l]. The term in
brackets is the probability to meet an employee with at least one unemployed social contact (as
(1− u11−µ)l is the probability that all l contacts are employed). Therefore this matching function
can be understood as the number of vacancies in the referral job market sent to the employees
with at least one unemployed contact at rate a. The job finding rate λ2 and the vacancy filling
rate q2 in the referral job market are given by:
q2 = m1(u1, v2)/v2 = a[1− (1− u1
1− µ)
l] λ2 = m1(u1, v2)/u1 = av2[1− (1− u1
1− µ)
l]/u1
The job-filling rate q2 doesn’t depend on the total number of vacancies v2 which means that
new job openings in the referral market don’t change the hiring probability of other firms. A
more general representation of the matching process between employees and open vacancies in
the referral market would be m1(u1, v2) = a(1− µ − u1)ψv1−ξ2 [1− (1− u11−µ)l] where 1− µ− u1
is a total number of high ability employees. Thus our specification corresponds to the case
ψ = ξ = 0. Even though ψ = 0 is a simplifying assumption1, ξ = 0 is a fundamental property of
1In a companion paper Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2015) we consider a more general case ψ > 0. We find that
this extension doesnt’t change the qualitative properties of the model, with the exception that it may give rise
to multiple equilibria. Note that the extended matching function with ψ > 0 is equal to zero for u1 = 0 and
u1 = 1−µ. It means that a larger number of unemployed agents raises the probability that a randomly contacted
employee will recommend his/her contact for the job ([1 − (1 − u1
1−µ
)l] is increasing). But when the number
of unemployed workers is increasing further, then there are fewer employees who can give a recommendation
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the referral process. If a firm in the referral market is in contact with some employee then the
probability of filling a vacancy depends on the number of contacts in the network of this employee
and on the probability of having at least one unemployed worker in the network. However, it
does not depend on the number of other vacancies in the referral market as these vacancies are
not observable by unemployed workers. This is different in the regular market with random
matching: vacancy information is public and observable in this submarket and therefore a new
posted vacancy will reduce the probability of getting an application for competing vacancies
(for a given fixed total number of unemployed workers). This search externality in the regular
market is a well documented empirical fact, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey.
Finally, note that firms have to make a decision whether to post a regular vacancy or fill the
opening through the informal channel of search. Moreover, when making this decision firms face
a trade off between the quality of the applicant pool and the total number of job applicants.
Since both types of workers are mixed in the regular job market the average productivity of
an applicant in this market is low but the total number of searching workers is large. On
the contrary, the total number of applicants having access to the referral market is low but
the average productivity is high since only high ability workers are recommended through this
channel. Finally, any job can be destroyed for exogenous reasons with a Poisson destruction rate
δ. Upon a separation the worker becomes unemployed and the firm may open a new job.
2.3 The decentralized equilibrium
2.3.1 Bellman equations
Let Ui, i = 0, 1 denote the present values of being unemployed and, similarly, Wi, i = 0, 1, 2 – the
present values of being employed. The subindex 0 refers to low ability workers. The subindex 1
refers to high ability workers obtaining jobs in the regular market, while the subindex 2 stands
for the present values of workers finding jobs in the referral market. The structure of the labour
market is illustrated in figure 2.1. In addition, let variables τ0 and τ1 denote the flow values of
transfers that unemployed workers receive from the public budget. The present values U0 and
U1 for the unemployed can be written as:
rU0 = z + τ0 + λ(θ)(W0 − U0) rU1 = z + τ1 + λ(θ)(W1 − U1) + λ2(W2 − U1) (2.1)
where the latter equation incorporates the fact that high ability workers can simultaneously
search for jobs in both submarkets. The present values Wi for the employed are given by:
rW0 = w0 − δ(W0 − U0) rWi = wi − δ(Wi − U1), i = 1, 2 (2.2)
Next consider firms and let Ji, i = 0, 1, 2 denote the present values of profits. Bellman equations
for filled jobs are then given by:
rJi = yi − wi − δJi, i = 0, 1 rJ2 = y1 − w2 − δJ2 (2.3)
(a(1−µ−u1)
ψv1−ξ2 is decreasing). Thus we can prove that in this extended economy there may be two equilibria
for the same parameter values; in the first one, the unemployment rate is low, in the second one, the unemployment
rate is high, but firms obtain the same profits and are indifferent between the two equilibria.
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Figure 2.1: Labour market flows
Further, we describe firms with open vacancies. In the regular labour market, let γ = u0/u
denote the probability of meeting a low ability unemployed worker, so that 1− γ = u1/u is the
probability of meeting a high ability unemployed worker. Besides, let s denote the flow values
of transfers that firms in the referral market obtain from the public budget. For example, these
transfers can cover the traveling expenses of job applicants and the costs of accommodation at
the place of the job interview. In the next section we consider the optimal policy of the social
planner, so the vector of policy instruments {τ0, τ1, s} will allow the social planner to affect
wages and the job creation. The present values of open vacancies V and V2 in the regular and
the referral market respectively can then be written as:
rV = −c+ q(θ)(γJ0 + (1− γ)J1 − V ) rV2 = −c2 + s+ q2(J2 − V2) (2.4)
where the term γJ0+(1−γ)J1 is the expected present value of firm profits in the regular labour
market. In the following we investigate the economy in the steady state. Hence, the equilibrium
unemployment for both types of workers reads:
u0λ(θ) = δ(µ − u0) u1(λ(θ) + λ2) = δ(1 − µ− u1) (2.5)
Each of these equations implies that the inflow of workers into unemployment (on the right-hand
side) is equal to the outflow of workers from this state (on the left-hand side). It is easy to see
therefore that u0 decreases in θ and that workers with low ability face a higher equilibrium
unemployment rate: u0/µ > u1/(1 − µ).
The steady state conditions (2.5) allow us to express the equilibrium probability of being in
contact with a low ability worker in the following way:
γ ≡ u0
u0 + u1
=
µ(δ + λ(θ) + λ2)
δ + λ(θ) + µλ2
=
δµ
δµ + (δ + λ(θ))u1
This means that γ(θ, u1) is decreasing in both θ and u1. Intuitively, a higher market tightness
θ reduces the equilibrium unemployment of low ability workers u0, so the probability that a
randomly chosen applicant is of low ability is decreasing in θ. Similarly, more high-skilled
unemployed workers u1 reduce the chances of meeting a low ability unemployed worker. Finally,
note that γ > µ in the presence of social contacts, while γ = µ otherwise. Networks reduce
unemployment of high ability workers, so in the equilibrium with social contacts firms are less
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likely to meet these workers in the regular market: (1− γ) < (1− µ). Next section investigates
existence and uniqueness of the decentralized equilibrium with social contacts.
2.3.2 Wage determination and the free-entry conditions
This section investigates the labour market without policy instruments (τ0 = τ1 = s = 0). Both
the efficient resource allocation and the optimal policy are later addressed in section 2.4.
The equilibrium wages are determined by means of Nash bargaining. When bargaining over
w0 unemployed low ability workers act to maximize the total job rent W0 − U0 which is an
increasing function of w0. Similarly, unemployed high ability workers act to maximize the rent
Wi − U1, where the subindex i takes values 1 or 2 depending on the type of search channel.
Firms are maximizing the surplus value Ji, i = 0, 1, 2 so the rent sharing conditions become:
J0 =
(1− β)
β
(W0 − U0) Ji = (1− β)
β
(Wi − U1), i = 1, 2 (2.6)
where we impose the free-entry conditions V = V2 = 0, therefore in the equilibrium firms are
indifferent between a formal vacancy in the regular market and an informal vacancy through
referrals. The corresponding wage equations are given by:
w0 = βy0 + (1− β)rU0 w1 = w2 = βy1 + (1− β)rU1 (2.7)
Denote S0 = J0 +W0 − U0 the total job surplus in a match between a firm and a low ability
worker, similarly let S = Ji +Wi − U1, i = 1, 2 the total job surplus in a match between a firm
and a high ability worker. Note that S is independent of the search channel, so that J1 = J2
and W1 = W2. This is because bargaining is an ex-post wage setting mechanism so the sunk
costs of open vacancies are not directly reflected in wages. Surplus values S0 and S are given by
the following system of equations:
S0(θ) =
y0 − z
r + δ + βλ(θ)
S(u1) =
y1 − z
r + δ + βδ(1 − µ− u1)/u1
where in the last expression we make use of the steady-state condition λ(θ) + λ2 = δ(1 − µ −
u1)/u1. Intuitively, a higher market tightness θ improves the outside opportunities of low ability
unemployed workers rU0 = z+βλ(θ)S0, so the total job surplus S0(θ) is decreasing in θ. At the
same time, in the equilibrium a higher number of unemployed high ability workers u1 can only
be attributed to a lower job-finding rate λ(θ) + λ2. In this latter case the reservation wage of
high ability workers is also lower rU1 = z + β(λ(θ) + λ2)S, hence the total job surplus S(u1) is
increasing in u1.
The free-entry conditions in each of the two submarkets are then given by:
c2
q2(u1)
= (1− β)S(u1) c
q(θ)
= (1− β)[γ(θ, u1)S0(θ) + (1− γ(θ, u1))S(u1)]
Both of these equations suggest that the expected cost of an open vacancy in the equilibrium
should be equal to the expected present value of profits. Consider first the referral market.
Expression c2/q2(u1) is decreasing in u1 since more high ability unemployed workers make it
easier for firms to fill informal vacancies. At the same time a higher unemployment level u1
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worsens the bargaining position of workers. This leads to lower wages w2 and higher profits
J2 = (1 − β)S(u1) in the referral market. Consequently the free-entry condition in the referral
market defines a unique equilibrium value of u1 if c2/a < (1−β)(y1−z)/(r+δ). In the following
we assume that this condition is satisfied. Now consider the regular labour market. The right
hand side of the corresponding free-entry condition is an expected firm profit from an open
vacancy in the regular job market. Indeed, bargaining implies that firms obtain a fraction 1−β
of the total surplus and with probability γ(θ, u1) the firm is in contact with a low ability worker.
Define the equilibrium with social contacts in the following way:
Definition 2.1. Search equilibrium with social contacts is a vector of variables {U0, U1, Wi, Ji,
V , V2, wi, θ, u1}, i = 0, 1, 2 satisfying the asset value equations for workers (2.1) and (2.2), for
firms (2.3) and (2.4), the rent-sharing equations (2.6) as well as the free-entry conditions V = 0
and V2 = 0.
Further note that existence of the equilibrium with social contacts implies
v2 ≥ 0 ⇔ λ2 ≥ 0 ⇔ λ(θ) ≤ δ(1 − µ− u1)/u1 for a given u1
which imposes an upper bound on the equilibrium market tightness θ. This means that existence
of the equilibrium with referrals is not always guaranteed. Our results concerning this question
are summarized in proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1. Define the upper bound θ¯(u1) implicitly from equation λ(θ¯(u1)) ≡ δ(1 − µ −
u1)/u1. Then there exists an equilibrium with referrals if the following condition is satisfied
2:
Condition A:
c
q(θ¯(u1))
> (1− β)
(µy0 + (1− µ)y1 − z
r + δ + βλ(θ¯(u1))
)
where u1 is determined from the job creation condition in the referral market (JC2):
c2
a[1− (1− u1
1− µ)
l]
=
(1− β)(y1 − z)
r + δ + β(1 − µ− u1)δ/u1
and θ ≤ θ¯(u1) is given by the job creation condition in the regular market (JC):
c
q(θ)
= (1− β)
(γ(θ, u1)(y0 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
+
(1− γ(θ, u1))(y1 − z)
r + δ + β(1− µ− u1)δ/u1
)
Moreover, wage dispersion ∆w = w2 − w0 = w1 −w0 is decreasing in θ and u1.
Proof: Appendix 2.8.1.
Suppose condition A is satisfied for some l > 0, which means there exists an equilibrium
with referrals. A higher number of social contacts makes information transmission more effi-
cient in the referral market. Therefore the equilibrium unemployment of high ability workers is
unambiguously decreasing in the number of contacts. Moreover in the limiting case l →∞ the
job-filling rate in the referral market approaches its upper bound q2 → a, hence u1 asymptotically
converges to its minimum value c2βδ(1 − µ)/[a(1 − β)(y1 − z)− c2(r + δ(1 − β))].
2λ(θ¯(u1)) ≡ δ(1− µ− u1)/u1 implies that θ¯(u1) =
1
m
[
δ (1−µ−u1)
u1
] 1
1−η
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In the opposite case a lower number of social contacts raises the equilibrium unemployment
of high ability workers u1. So there is a negative impact on the upper bound of the equilibrium
market tightness θ¯(u1). With respect to condition A this means that the difference between the
left hand side and the right hand side is diminishing with a lower number of social contacts l
(see figure 2.2). Therefore there exists a threshold value l0 > 0 such that condition A is satisfied
with a strict equality. This automatically implies that the equilibrium with referrals does not
exist for l ≤ l0. These results are summarized in corollary 2.1:
Corollary 2.1. For l < l0 there exists a unique search equilibrium without referrals, where the
market tightness θ∗ is given by:
c
q(θ∗)
= (1− β)
(µy0 + (1− µ)y1 − z
r + δ + βλ(θ∗)
)
The threshold number of social contacts l0 can be obtained from θ
∗ = θ¯(u1(l0)) and is given by:
l0 =
ln
(
a(1− β)(y1 − z)− c2(r + δ + βλ(θ∗))
)
− ln a(1− β)(y1 − z)
lnλ(θ∗)− ln (δ + λ(θ∗))
Figure 2.2: Existence of the decentralized equilibrium
Intuitively, if the number of social contacts is low l ≤ l0 it is not profitable for firms to
rely solely on referrals. This means that social contacts are not valuable and wage dispersion is
purely attributed to differences in the productivity: ∆w = β(y1−y0). Moreover, the equilibrium
unemployment is the same for both types of workers: u0/µ = u1/(1 − µ) = δ/(δ + λ(θ∗)).
2.3.3 Participation decisions
In the previous section, we have investigated the decision of firms to use referrals as a hiring
channel. In this section we consider the decision of workers to apply for regular vacancies, which
is a costly search channel for both types. Recall from before that z = ζ − h, where h is the
cost of searching for regular vacancies. Intuitively, one would expect that a high search cost
may lead to situations when some workers don’t search in the regular market. Consider first
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the decision of unemployed high ability workers. For given variables λ(θ) and λ2, their present
value of unemployment is given by:
rU1 = ζ − h+ (λ(θ) + λ2)β
( y1 − ζ + h
r + δ + β(λ(θ) + λ2)
)
versus ζ + λ2β
( y1 − ζ
r + δ + βλ2
)
where the last term is a hypothetical present value of unemployment if high ability workers
stopped searching in the regular market. Comparing these two values reveals the threshold
search cost h1 for a given vector {λ(θ), λ2}:
h1 =
λ(θ)β(y1 − ζ)
r + δ + βλ2
(2.8)
Thus, for high ability workers searching in the regular market is gainful only if the cost is not
too high, i.e. h < h1. Next consider the decision of low ability workers. Their present value of
unemployment is then:
rU0 = ζ − h+ λ(θ)β
( y0 − ζ + h
r + δ + βλ(θ)
)
versus ζ
Comparing ζ with rU0 allows us to find the threshold search cost of low ability workers h0:
h0 =
λ(θ)β(y0 − ζ)
r + δ
(2.9)
These results imply the following. If productivity differences are small, for example, y1 = y0,
then h1 < h0. This means that high ability workers would stop searching for jobs in the regular
market if h1 < h < h0. Intuitively, these workers have better outside opportunities, which is
associated with a lower rent from finding jobs. Thus high ability workers would stop searching
already at moderate levels of search costs, whereas low ability workers would continue searching
even if h1 < h < h0. Low ability workers have similar productivity in this case but their outside
opportunities are worse, which is associated with a higher job rent. And a higher expected job
rent makes low ability workers more likely to pay the search cost in the regular market. This is
the equilibrium with a full segregation of workers, where only low ability workers search in the
regular market, whereas high ability workers rely exclusively on referrals. In order to find the
first threshold value h1, consider an equilibrium where it holds that h = h1. In this situation
high ability workers become indifferent between continuing or stopping the search in the regular
market. The market tightness θ is then given by:
c
q(θ)
= (1− β)
[
γ(θ, u1)
(y0 − ζ + h1)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
+ (1− γ(θ, u1)) (y1 − ζ + h1)
r + δ + βδ(1 − µ− u1)/u1
]
where the unemployment rate u1 and the cost threshold h1 are given by:
c2
q2(u1)
=
(1− β)(y1 − ζ + h1)
r + δ + βδ(1 − µ− u1)/u1 and h1 =
λ(θ)β(y1 − ζ)
r + δ + β(δ(1 − µ− u1)/u1 − λ(θ))
For any h larger than h1, it’s not optimal for high ability workers to incur the search cost in
the regular market, which gives rise to the segregated equilibrium. Next consider the cost h0
for which even low ability workers stop searching in the regular way. For the case h = h0, the
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market tightness in the segregated equilibrium is given by:
c
q(θ)
= (1− β) (y0 − ζ + h0)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
where h0 =
λ(θ)β(y0 − ζ)
r + δ
In the numerical example below, we explicitly derive the two threshold values h0 and h1 and
analyze their implications for the existence of the segregated equilibrium. Finally, note that
h0 doesn’t depend on the productivity y1, whereas h1 is increasing in this productivity. Thus
hypothetically there is also a possibility that y1 is so high that h1 becomes larger than h0. If this
condition is satisfied, then there exists an equilibrium where high ability workers are incurring
the cost h1 and sending their applications in both markets, whereas low ability workers can
not cover the cost and stop searching altogether. However, numerically this case arises only for
unrealistically high values of y1 and, therefore, it is only of minor relevance.
2.4 Social optimum
This section investigates efficiency properties of the decentralized equilibrium. Consider the
problem of a social planner, whose objective is to maximize the present discounted value of
output minus the costs of job creation:
max
θ,v2
∫
∞
0
e−rt((1− µ− u1)y1 + (µ− u0)y0 + (z − cθ)(u0 + u1)− c2v2)dt (2.10)
In addition, the social planner is subject to the same matching constraints as firms and workers,
therefore the dynamics of unemployment is described by the following differential equations
u˙0 = δ(µ− u0)− λ(θ)u0 and u˙1 = δ(1− µ− u1)− (λ(θ) + λ2)u1. The next proposition presents
solution of the planner’s optimization problem.
Proposition 2.2. Consider a social planner choosing the market tightness θ in the regular
market and the number of vacancies v2 in the referral market. Let φ = (∂m1(u1, v2)/∂u1) ·
(u1/m1(u1, v2)) be the elasticity of the matching function m1(u1, v2). Then the optimal job
creation is:
c
q(θ)
= (1− η)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1) and c2
q2
= k1 (2.11)
where the costate variables k0 and k1 (∆k = k0 − k1) are obtained as:
k0 =
y0 − z − λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ)
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
k1 =
y1 − z + λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ + (η − φ)λ2k1
r + δ + ηλ(θ) + ηλ2
Proof: Appendix 2.8.2.
Costate variables k0 and k1 can be interpreted as shadow prices or marginal gains associated
with a unit decrease in unemployment u0 and u1 respectively. Thus k0 and k1 are the present
values of net output in the socially optimal allocation (social surplus from the job). These
variables should be compared to S0 and S which are the private surplus values of workers and
firms in the decentralized economy. Comparing k0 with S0 for low ability workers and k1 with
S for high ability workers reveals that the decentralized equilibrium is not constrained efficient.
Consider first the situation when k0 > k1 which means that high ability workers create a lower
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job surplus than low ability workers. This situation is possible since high ability workers have an
additional possibility of employment in the referral market. Hence their outside opportunities
are better and their reservation wages are higher. Therefore, if k0 > k1 every additional high
ability worker searching in the regular market reduces the expected profits of firms. To see
this let J¯ = (1 − η)(γk0 + (1 − γ)k1) be the expected firm profit at the optimum, so that
∂J¯/∂(1 − γ) = −(1− η)(k0 − k1) < 0. This implies that high ability workers impose a negative
externality on low ability workers in the regular labour market.
Next consider the opposite case when k0 < k1 which means that high ability workers are
significantly more productive and create a higher surplus than low ability workers. Then the
external effect is reversed. Every additional high ability worker searching in the regular market
increases the expected profits of firms and so high ability workers impose a positive externality
on low ability workers. From proposition 2.2 the surplus difference ∆k can be expressed as
follows:
∆k =
y0 − y1 + φc2θ2
r + δ + λ(θ)
where θ2 =
v2
u1
See appendix 2.8.2 for a more detailed derivation. ∆k is positive if y1− y0 < c2φθ2 and negative
otherwise. Intuitively, a lower difference in productivities and a larger number of social contacts
(which increase the market tightness θ2) make the first case more likely. In contrast, a large
productivity difference and a low number of social contacts contribute to the occurrence of the
second case. In addition, the above equation implies that ∆k > 0 if productivity differences
between workers are negligibly small, that is y0 = y1. In this latter case high ability workers
unambiguously impose a negative externality on low ability workers in the regular labour market.
Finally, consider the labour market without contacts, so that v2 = 0. For the traditional
Hosios value of the bargaining power (β = η) it is then true that: γk0 + (1 − γ)k1 = γS0 +
(1− γ)S, so the externality is neutralized and the market tightness θ coincides with the optimal
choice of the social planner. If v2 = 0 it follows that ∆k < 0 so more productive high ability
workers unambiguously impose a positive externality on agents with low ability. But at the same
time low ability workers produce less output which explains a negative external effect on high
ability workers. In the equilibrium without networks these two external effects are automatically
neutralized and the fact that the two worker groups are pooled in the same submarket does not
create an inefficiency. Hence the inefficiency from pooling is an artefact of referrals. In a more
general framework with referrals the two external effects are not internalized and so there is a
strong need for the optimal redistribution policy. This policy is described in proposition 2.3:
Proposition 2.3. Let the Hosios condition be satisfied, so that β = η = φ. For l > l0 the equi-
librium with social contacts is constrained inefficient but there exists a policy scheme {τ∗0 , τ∗1 , s∗}
that can restore the optimal allocation:
τ∗0 = λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ) τ∗1 = −λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ s∗ = ηc2
where endogenous variables θ, ∆k and γ are evaluated at the socially optimal allocation described
in proposition 2.2. In addition, the two transfers τ∗0 and τ
∗
1 are purely redistributive as it holds
that u0τ
∗
0 + u1τ
∗
1 = 0.
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Proof: Appendix 2.8.3.
First, observe that firms in the referral market do not impose a negative externality on other
firms because q2 does not depend on v2. This is a fundamental property of the model because
a new job opening in the referral market does not change the hiring probability of other firms.
But if other vacancies are not affected, the optimal job creation in this market is obtained at
the point where the total surplus of the job k1 is equal to the expected cost c2/q2. In contrast,
in the decentralized economy firms capture a fraction (1 − β) of the total surplus S, so the job
creation is distorted downwards. The optimal policy then includes paying employment subsidies
s to firms in the referral market. One immediate implication of this policy should be a lower
unemployment of high ability workers u1 and a higher job-finding rate λ2. As described above,
the situation is different in the regular market. These firms impose a standard search externality
on other firms which is neutralized for β = η. A more general case when this condition is not
satisfied is analyzed later in the section.
Further consider an economy with the optimal employment subsidy s∗. Proposition 2.3
describes a system of Pigouvian taxes τ∗0 and τ
∗
1 . When ∆k > 0 high ability workers impose
a negative congestion externality on low ability workers in the regular market, so the optimal
policy implies a negative value of τ∗1 < 0. These transfers are supposed to reduce the reservation
wage of high ability workers and increase the expected profit J¯ . In a similar way, low ability
workers create more profits and impose a positive congestion externality on high ability workers.
So the optimal policy implies a positive value of τ∗0 > 0, these transfers are supposed to increase
the reservation wage of low ability workers. Finally, note that this policy should increase the
wage w0 and decrease both wages w1 and w2, so a lower equilibrium wage dispersion is a positive
side effect of this policy.
For ∆k < 0, proposition 2.3 implies τ∗0 < 0 and τ
∗
1 > 0. In this case the bargained wage of
low ability workers is too high and the wage of high ability workers is too low. Wages are then
compressed in the decentralized equilibrium and the planner needs to raise the reservation wage
of high ability workers and reduce the reservation wage of low ability workers. These predictions
coincide with the results of Blazquez and Jansen (2008), however they do not describe the
possibility of the reverse policy when ∆k > 0. Identifying and characterising this latter case is
the primary contribution of this paper.
Now let’s return to the more general case when the Hosios condition is not satisfied (β 6= η).
In this situation both sides of the market suffer from the underlying search externality (see Hosios
(1990) and Pissarides (2000)). This externality distorts the market in addition to the congestion
effects described above and is not specific to the model with heterogeneous workers. By this we
mean that the external effects from searching would exist even in a labour market with identical
workers. When β < η, the job-filling rate in the regular market q(θ) is too sensitive to the market
tightness and so an additional vacancy in the regular market makes other vacancies significantly
worse off. Therefore, both transfers τ0 and τ1 should be increased to achieve a lower expected
profit. Intuitively, lower profits make vacancies less sensitive to the new entrants and so the
negative externality is mitigated. Thus low ability types will unambiguously obtain a positive
overall transfer, let it be denoted by τ˜0.
In the opposite case when β > η, the job-finding rate in the regular market λ(θ) is too
sensitive to the market tightness and so an additional searching worker makes other workers
20
significantly worse off. Therefore, both transfers τ0 and τ1 should be reduced to achieve a
lower expected worker rent. Intuitively, a lower expected gain from the job makes unemployed
workers less sensitive to the size of the unemployment pool and so the negative externality is
again mitigated. Thus high ability types will unambiguously get a negative overall transfer, let
it be denoted by τ˜1. The following proposition is summarizing our results:
Proposition 2.4. If the Hosios condition is not satisfied, so that β 6= η = φ. For l > l0
the equilibrium with social contacts is constrained inefficient but there exists a policy scheme
{τ˜0, τ˜1, s∗ = ηc2} that can restore the optimal allocation:
τ˜0 = λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1− γ) + (η − β)
(1− β)k0(r + δ + λ(θ))
τ˜1 = −λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ + (η − β)
(1 − β)k1(r + δ + λ(θ) + λ2)
where endogenous variables λ(θ), λ2, k0, k1 and γ are evaluated at the socially optimal allocation
described in proposition 2.2.
Proof: Appendix 2.8.4.
Note that both transfers are reduced in the case when β > η and increased otherwise, which
allows the policy maker to balance the negative external effects on workers and firms. However,
when standard search externalities are internalized, the optimal policy should still address the
asymmetric congestion effects that the two groups of workers impose on each other. And so the
vector {τ˜0, τ˜1} coincides with {τ∗0 , τ∗1 } for the case β = η.
To complete this section we also compare the minimum number of contacts l0 in the de-
centralized equilibrium and l∗0 in the social optimum. In the equilibrium without referrals the
labour market tightness is equal to θ∗ (see corollary 2.1) and the corresponding unemployment
of high ability workers is u1 = δ(1 − µ)/(δ + λ(θ∗)). In this economy opening a vacancy in the
referral market is associated with a present value of profits J2 = (1−β)(y1− z)/(r+ δ+βλ(θ∗))
and is independent of the number of social contacts l (see figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: Choice of l0 in the decentralized equilibrium and in the social optimum
In contrast, expected costs from an open referral vacancy are equal to c2/q2 which is a
decreasing function of l. Intuitively, expected duration of an open vacancy is lower with a
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larger number of social links. The threshold value l0 can then be found as a minimum number
of contacts with positive net profits from referral vacancies J2 = c2/q2, which is equivalent
to θ∗ = θ¯(u1(l0)). If the optimal policy is implemented, firms’ expected profits are larger as
y1 − τ∗1 − z > y1 − z, while the expected costs are lower (c2 − s < c2). Therefore, referral
vacancies become attractive for firms at a lower number of social contacts l∗0 < l0. So the
decentralized decision of firms not to use referrals may be inefficient from a social perspective.
2.5 Numerical example
This section parameterizes the model to match the average labour market indicators in the
OECD countries. Without loss of generality, we normalize the productivity parameter y0 to 1.
The productivity of high ability workers y1 is taken to be 1.25 for the benchmark case and we also
consider the cases y1 = 1 (workers differ only in social capital) and y1 = 1.5. For comparison,
Gautier (2002) uses the value of 0.5 for the productivity of the low-skilled workers and 1 for the
high-skilled. In Albrecht and Vroman (2002) productivity values of the high-skilled workers are
set in the interval from 1.25 to 1.6 which is similar to our range.
We choose a unit period of time to be one quarter and set r = 0.012 which corresponds to the
annual discount rate of 5%. Further, we follow Shimer (2005) and set the net value of leisure z
equal to 0.4. Fontaine (2008) uses the value of 0.15 for the U.S. economy and 0.4 for the French
economy. Gautier (2002) and Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) set z equal to 0.2. At the same time,
Hall and Milgrom (2008) obtain a larger value of 0.71. Therefore, our choice of z is in the middle
range of values in the literature. We also take δ = 0.1 and η = 0.72 as in Shimer (2005). This
choice of δ implies an average employment duration of 2.5 years. Shimer (2005) obtains these
estimates from the monthly US transition data for the period 1960-2004. The same value of the
separation rate is also used in Pissarides (2009).
The cost of an open vacancy in the regular market c is chosen to be 0.4. Intuitively, this
parameter captures the costs of traveling and accommodation of job applicants at the place of
the interview. It exactly coincides with the Cahuc and Fontaine’s (2009) value of this parameter.
Shimer (2005) has chosen the value of 0.213 for the cost of vacancies while Fontaine (2008) uses
the value of 0.3. As a starting point we also set c2 = 0.4. Further in section 2.5.2 we deviate
from this benchmark constellation and present comparative statics results for lower values of c2
to capture the fact that referral vacancies are cheaper for firms. Next, the fraction of low-ability
workers is set to 60% of the overall population so that µ = 0.6. Albrecht and Vroman (2002)
choose a similar value of 0.67 for the proportion if low-skilled workers in their model, while
Gautier (2002) uses the value of 0.5 for this parameter.
With respect to the bargaining power, we assume β = η = 0.72 to satisfy the Hosios con-
dition. Moreover, we make a similar assumption in the referral market and set φ = η in the
benchmark case where φ is the elasticity of the job-finding rate in the referral market. Com-
bining φ = η with a = 4 and solving equations (2.11) for l, we find that l∗ = 40. Therefore,
the implied number of professional contacts in a network of high-ability workers is equal to 40.
Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) use l = 50, while Fontaine (2008) uses l = 40 in a benchmark model
of his paper. These numbers are in line with the empirical evidence, for example, in their recent
study Cingano and Rosolia (2012) find that the median number of professional contacts in Italy
is equal to 32. This number is higher in Germany and is equal to 43 according to Glitz (2013).
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y0 y1 r δ z η β φ m µ c c2 a l
1 1.25 0.012 0.1 0.4 0.72 0.72 0.72 1.22 0.6 0.4 0.4 4 40
Table 2.1: Values of the model parameters
Finally, we set m to 1.22 which is an efficiency multiplier in the Cobb-Douglas matching
function: λ(θ) = mθη. This parameter yields the following equilibrium unemployment rates:
u0/µ = 0.0924 and u1/(1−µ) = 0.0388 for the two groups of workers. So the average unemploy-
ment rate in the economy is equal to 0.07 which is close to the long-term unemployment rate
in the U.S. For comparison, Blazquez and Jansen (2008) set m equal to 1, while Shimer (2005)
uses the value of 1.355.
2.5.1 Comparative statics
First, the model shows that it is not profitable for firms to open vacancies in the referral job
market when the number of workers’ contacts is low enough. Numerically solving the system of
equations (JC), (JC2) and λ2 = 0 we can find the threshold value l0 after which firms begin to
create vacancies in the referral job market. In the benchmark case, l0 is approximately equal
to 5 and it is decreasing in y1 or a. Hence when the number of contacts is less than 5 it is not
profitable for firms to use referrals.
In all our simulations the decentralized equilibrium is unique as can be seen from figure
2.4. The curve (JC) is decreasing for low values of u1 and then increasing, while (JC2) is
parallel to the θ-axis. It can also be shown that S0 > S which means that firms obtain higher
profits in a match with low ability workers. When u1 is low and increases, the probability of
hiring a low ability worker γ(θ, u1) falls, the average firm profits decrease and so the market
tightness θ is reduced. In contrast, when u1 is already high and increases further, the fall in
γ(θ, u1) is dominated by the increase in the total surplus value S. Intuitively, a more pronounced
unemployment u1 puts a downward pressure on the reservation wage of high ability workers.
This dampens the wage w1 and leads to a higher profit J1 = (1− β)S.
What are the implications of a higher productivity y1 for θ (u0) and u1? The model predicts
that both unemployment rates decrease. This result is intuitive as firms expect higher profits and
open more vacancies in both job markets (because high ability workers search in both markets).
Figure 2.4 (right) illustrates this effect for the benchmark case ∆y = 0.25 and the other two
cases when ∆y = 0 and ∆y = 0.5: (JC2) moves to the left and (JC) to the up-left with the
increase in ∆y. This result is similar to Gautier (2002) where the author finds that low-skilled
workers gain from the increased productivity of high-skilled workers in simple jobs.
What is the impact of the increase in the number of social contacts l on the equilibrium
unemployment? First, the model predicts that a larger number of contacts reduces u1 and raises
u0. This effect is illustrated in figure 2.4 (left) where the decentralized equilibrium values of
u1 and θ for l = 5, l = 40 and l = ∞ are compared. As only (JC2) depends on the number
of contacts, there is a parallel shift of this line to the left (right) with the increase (decrease)
in l. The larger is the number of contacts the smaller is the shift. We can also calculate the
asymptotic value of u1 which is equal to 0.012.
Changes in the unemployment rates u0 and u1 with the increase in the number of contacts
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Figure 2.4: Left panel: Job creation curves determining the equilibrium values of θ and u1 when
l = 5 (blue), l = 40 (black) and l =∞ (red). Right panel: Job creation curves determining the
equilibrium values of θ and u1 when y1 = 1 (blue), y1 = 1.25 (black) and y1 = 1.5 (red).
are illustrated in figure 2.5. For l ≤ 5 there exists a unique equilibrium without referrals and
so the two unemployment rates coincide. However, if the number of social links is more than 5
firms rely on social contacts to fill their open vacancies. The two unemployment rates are then
diverging. On the one hand, as high ability workers are better connected, their equilibrium rate
of unemployment is reduced. On the other hand, there is an adverse effect on the equilibrium
unemployment of low ability workers which is increasing in l. If high ability workers are better
connected, their outside opportunities are improved as finding jobs becomes easier. At the
same time, better outside opportunities strengthen the bargaining position of these workers
and increase their wages in the regular market. Therefore, firms’ profits from regular vacancies
and the number of such vacancies are both reduced. Finally, a lower number of vacancies in
the regular market worsens the bargaining position of low ability workers and reduces their
employment and wages. This latter change is illustrated in figure 2.6.
u0 u1 ∆w l0
∆y ↑ - - + -
l ↑ + - +
a ↑ +/- - + -
Table 2.2: Comparative statics
Our comparative statics results are summarized in table 2.2. Overall, the model predicts that
a larger number of social links is associated with a more pronounced wage dispersion between the
two groups of workers and a higher unemployment rate of low ability workers. Such predictions
are compatible with the observed empirical evidence in the U.S. documenting an increase in the
inequality of earnings (see Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008)). This allows us to conclude that a
part of this inequality may be generated by a stronger growth and utilization of social networks
in the U.S. and other countries in the recent decade3.
3For example, there exist labor market policies trying to encourage the establishment or the improvement of
social networks (McClure (2000), OECD (2001)). One of them is Australian Working Together program which
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Figure 2.5: Left panel: Change in u0/µ with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue), y1 = 1.25 (black)
and y1 = 1.5 (red). Right panel: Change in u1/(1 − µ) with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue),
y1 = 1.25 (black) and y1 = 1.5 (red)
2.5.2 Search costs and participation decisions
In this section we consider the implications of search costs for workers and firms. First, consider
the case y1 = y0 = 1 and recall that z = ζ − h denotes the net value of leisure, whereas ζ is the
gross value of leisure before subtracting the flow search cost h. For example, if the search cost
of workers h is equal to 0.2, then ζ = z+h = 0.4+0.2 = 0.6. We consider these parameters as a
benchmark cost constellation. From equation (2.8) we find that the threshold cost of searching
in the regular market for high ability workers is h1 = 0.31. This means that high ability workers
prefer to search in both markets if the search cost h is below h1 = 0.31 and stop searching in
the regular market for the search cost higher than 0.31. This is illustrated on the left panel of
figure 2.7 where y1 is measured on horizontal axis. Note that h1 is an increasing function of the
productivity y1. For instance, h1 is increasing from 0.31 to 0.45 for productivity y1 increasing
from 1 to 2 (blue curve). The fact that h1 is increasing in the productivity of high ability workers
is intuitive as higher productivity implies higher wages which makes high ability workers more
tolerant to higher costs.
Further, we consider changes in the firms’ search cost c2 in the referral market. Reducing
this cost is beneficial for high ability workers as the number of referral vacancies v2 is rising,
leading to lower unemployment u1 and a higher job-finding rate λ2. This is illustrated on the
right panel of figure 2.7. At the same time, note from equation (2.8) that a higher referral
job-finding rate λ2 has a negative effect on the threshold search cost of high ability workers h1.
Thus more frequent referrals reduce the willingness of high ability workers to pay the cost of
searching in the regular market. This is illustrated on the left panel of figure 2.7, for instance,
for a lower c2 the threshold value h1 falls down to 0.24 (in the case y1 = y0 = 1) and further
down to 0.17 for c2 = 0.2 (black curve). This means that our benchmark equilibrium will not
exist anymore if posting referral vacancies has a low cost c2 = 0.2 because high ability workers
aims at providing people the incentives to stay together with their communities even if they are economically
disadvantaged (OECD (2003)).
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Figure 2.6: Left panel: Change in w0 with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue), y1 = 1.25 (black)
and y1 = 1.5 (red). Right panel: Change in w1 = w2 with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue),
y1 = 1.25 (black) and y1 = 1.5 (red)
would stop searching in the regular market for any search cost h higher than 0.17.
2.5.3 Optimal policy
This subsection investigates the effect of optimal policy {s, τ0, τ1} on endogenous variables in
the labour market. Consider first the case y1 = y0 = 1 when the productivity of the job is not
sensitive to worker’s ability. The optimal vector of policy instruments is given by: s = 0.288,
τ0 = 0.017, τ1 = −0.160. For the ease of exposition policy changes are implemented in two steps:
only employment subsidies s = ηc2 in the referral market and the final policy. In addition, we
introduce two new welfare variables Ω0 and Ω1 for low- and high-ability workers respectively
(with social transfers from the budget):
Ω0 = u0(z + τ0) + (µ− u0)y0 − cθu0
Ω1 = u1(z + τ1) + (1− µ− u1)y1 − cθu1 − (c2 − s)v2
where the first term is the flow income of unemployed workers and the second term is the flow
output of employed workers net of the costs of job creation4. The net welfare gain of the policy
can then be obtained as a gross welfare gain ∆Ω0+∆Ω1 minus the cost of this policy BC. The
total cost BC is a sum of budget expenses:
BC = u0τ0 + u1τ1 + sv2
Our results for the first case y0 = y1 = 1 are presented in table 2.3. Note that high ability
workers earn the same wage w1 = w2 which is independent of the search channel.
4More precisely, Ω0 is a part of total welfare attributed to low ability workers which includes net leisure and
transfers of low ability workers u0(z + τ0), wages of employed low ability workers (µ− u0)w0 and net firm profits
from hiring low ability workers (µ−u0)(y0−w0)−cθu0. In a similar way, Ω1 is a part of total welfare attributed to
high ability workers and includes net leisure and transfers of high ability workers, wages of employed high ability
workers and net firm profits from hiring high ability workers in both markets. So the total welfare is Ω0 + Ω1
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Figure 2.7: Left panel: Search cost threshold h1 as a function of y1 when c2 = 0.4 (blue), c2 = 0.3
(red) and c2 = 0.2 (black) relative to the benchmark search cost h = 0.2 (black dash). Right
panel: Job creation curves determining the equilibrium values of θ and u1 when c2 = 0.4 (blue),
c2 = 0.3 (red) and c2 = 0.2 (black).
Optimal policy θ u0/µ u1/(1 − µ) w0 w1 = w2 Ω0 Ω1
Without policy 0.4432 0.0933 0.0504 0.9768 0.9872 0.5565 0.3822
Only subsidy {s} 0.4527 0.0928 0.0211 0.9769 0.9945 0.5565 0.3919
Final policy {s, τ0, τ1} 0.4475 0.0931 0.0182 0.9775 0.9940 0.5574 0.3914
Table 2.3: Optimal policy s = 0.288, τ0 = 0.017, τ1 = −0.160 in a labour market with y1 = 1
As expected, employment subsidies s reduce the equilibrium unemployment of high ability
workers u1/1 − µ and raise their wages. The unemployment rate of low ability workers u0/µ
is slightly decreased as a consequence of a higher market tightness θ. This is an outcome of a
lower competition between agents in the regular labour market (lower 1− γ). Overall, one can
conclude that subsidizing referrals is associated with a large welfare gain for high ability workers
(Ω1 is higher) and no significant welfare changes for low ability workers (Ω0 is unchanged).
Table 2.3 further shows that the optimal transfers τ0 = 0.017 and τ1 = −0.160 internalize
congestion externalities in the regular market. This finding is in contrast to Blazquez and
Jansen (2008) as we find that ∆k > 0 for the chosen parameter values. Firm profits are lower
in a match with high ability workers and so every additional high ability unemployed imposes
a negative externality on workers with low abilities making it more difficult for them to find a
job. Therefore, the optimal transfer policy favours low ability workers at the cost of the other
group (Ω0 is higher in the second step, while Ω1 is lower). The wage of low (high) ability workers
becomes higher (lower), so the wage inequality is slightly reduced. The total welfare is increasing
with policy from 0.9387 to 0.9488. After subtracting the cost BC = 0.0042 the new welfare level
is reduced to 0.9446. The net welfare gain of the policy is then calculated as 0.6% of the total
welfare. Similar tables for y1 = 1.25 and 1.5 are presented in Appendix 2.8.5 and confirm our
predictions.
Next we ask a question whether a welfare gain of 0.6% is economically significant. In order to
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answer this question, let us discount the net annual wage in Germany (2200*12.5=27500 EUR)5
over 50 years with an annual discount rate of 5%. We get an amount of 502000 EUR which is an
average present value of wages per worker. Therefore, a welfare gain of 0.6% is approximately
equivalent to the lump sum transfer of 3000 EUR per worker.
Another interesting question is a change in optimal policy if the Hosios condition is not
satisfied, i.e. β 6= η. The optimal transfers to unemployed workers are then modified to account
for the standard search externalities on other workers and firms. When β < η, equilibrium wages
are lower than socially optimal, although there are too many vacancies in the regular labour
market. Therefore, both transfers should be increased to improve the bargaining position of
workers. Thus low ability types will unambiguously get a positive payoff τ˜0. In the opposite
case, when β > η, equilibrium wages are higher than socially optimal but the job creation is
inefficiently low in the regular market. In this case high ability types will unambiguously get a
negative budget payoff τ˜1. Table 2.4 below presents the list of optimal policy instruments and
the resulting change of the social welfare for high and low values of β. Note that both Ω0 and
Ω1 have unique maximal values for β ∈ [0, 1].
β = 0.4 β = 0.49 β = 0.61 β = 0.69 β = 0.72 β = 0.8
τ˜0 0.4259 0.3679 0.2363 0.0920 0.0166 -0.2949
τ˜1 0.3903 0.3124 0.1356 -0.0583 -0.1596 -0.5783
Ω0 without policy 0.5496 0.5534 0.5561 0.5566 0.5565 0.5554
Ω0 with final policy 0.5806 0.5770 0.5697 0.5616 0.5574 0.5400
Ω1 without policy 0.3847 0.3851 0.3845 0.3831 0.3822 0.3780
Ω1 with final policy 0.3955 0.3949 0.3936 0.3922 0.3914 0.3884
Ω0 +Ω1 without policy 0.9344 0.9385 0.9405 0.9396 0.9387 0.9334
Net welfare gain (%) 1.1004 0.6548 0.4354 0.5306 0.6327 1.2009
Table 2.4: The values of τ˜0 and τ˜1, Ω0 and Ω1 with and without final policy as well as Ω0 +Ω1
without policy for different values of β in the case of y1 = 1
To perform this comparison, we consider deviations of β around the Hosios value and capture
in table 2.4 those outcomes, for which the equilibrium values of Ω0, Ω1 or Ω0+Ω1 are maximal,
as well as the benchmark case β = η = 0.72. In addition, socially optimal values of Ω0 and Ω1
are provided. Both τ˜0 and τ˜1 as well as Ω0 and Ω1 at the optimum are decreasing in β. For
y1 = 1.25 and y1 = 1.5 the numbers are presented in Appendix 2.8.6.
The equilibrium values of Ω0 (red) and Ω1 (blue) for different β-points are presented in figure
2.8 (left panel). These curves, indeed, have a unique maximum in β. As follows from table 2.4,
the maximal value of Ω0 is achieved for β = 0.69 and is approximately equal to 0.5566. Low
ability workers are only searching in the regular submarket, moreover the profits of firms in this
submarket are reduced due to the presence of high ability/wage job applicants. Therefore, low
ability workers would obtain a higher level of welfare if the bargaining power of all workers was
reduced below the Hosios value. This change would increase the equilibrium profits of firms and
so low ability workers would gain from a more intensive job creation in the regular market.
The situation is potentially different for high ability workers due to the simultaneous job
search in both submarkets. On the one hand, high ability workers gain from the presence of low
ability workers in the regular market. So their desired bargaining power in the regular market
5Average monthly salary in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt yearly report, 2013), multiplied by 12.5 months.
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should be above the Hosios value. But on the other hand, the total output/welfare in the referral
market is maximized for a zero value of the bargaining power. Hence, Ω1 is maximized for some
β which can be above or below the Hosios value depending on which of the two effects dominates.
In the numerical example, we find that the maximal value of Ω1 is achieved for β = 0.49 and
is approximately equal to 0.3851. So the marginal welfare gain from a lower β in the referral
market outweighs the welfare loss in the regular market.
The maximal value of Ω0 + Ω1 is equal to 0.9405 and is reached for β = 0.61, which is in
between 0.49 and 0.69 and is smaller than η (black solid curve on the right panel of figure 2.8).
This value is lower than 0.9446=∆Ω0 + ∆Ω1 − BC + Ω0 + Ω1, which is the new welfare level
reached after implementing the policy (dashed black line). Thus the decentralized economy
is inefficient for any value of β. However, the total welfare gain of the policy varies with β.
It is minimized at β = 0.61 where the two black curves come closely together, but it can be
sufficiently large where the two curves are diverging. For example, the total net welfare gain of
the optimal policy is equal to 1.1% for β = 0.4 and 1.2% for β = 0.8.
Next, let us compare our benchmark economy with social networks versus the case without
networks. The red solid curve on the right panel of figure 2.8 illustrates welfare in the decen-
tralized economy without networks, whereas the dashed red line corresponds to the maximum
welfare in this restricted economy. As it was already mentioned in the theoretical part, welfare
in the economy without networks is maximized for the Hosios value of the bargaining power
β = η. We find that the level of welfare at this point is equal to 0.9276, which is lower than the
maximal welfare in the economy with referrals: 0.9387 without policy and 0.9446 with policy.
The total net gain of referrals can then be estimated as 1.2% before the policy and 1.8% after
the policy.
Figure 2.8: Left panel: Ω0 (red) and Ω1 (blue) for different values of β. Right panel: Ω0 + Ω1
(solid) and the new welfare level reached after implementing the policy (dashed) with (black)
and without (red) allowing for networks for different values of β.
In the final step we investigate the robustness of our results. This can be done by considering
the sign of ∆k = k0− k1 with a variation in the key parameters y1, l and a. Figure 2.9 confirms
our theoretical conclusion from section 2.4 that the case ∆k < 0 is more likely with a higher
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difference in productivities and a lower number of social contacts. Every curve on this figure
shows the values of ∆k for l in the range from 5 (lower line) to 14 (higher line) and for y1 taking
values from 1.05 to 1.95. Moreover a = 2 on the left panel of the graph and a = 4 (benchmark)
on the right panel. It is easy to see that ∆k is non-negative when a = 4 and y1 ≤ 1.95. Although,
when a = 2, ∆k can become negative for low values of l and a high productivity y1. This is
precisely the case when our result is in line with the finding of Blazquez and Jansen (2008) and
the equilibrium exhibits a wage compression in the regular labour market.
Figure 2.9: Left panel: Values of ∆k for l = [5...14], y1 = [1.05...1.95] and a = 2. Right panel:
Values of ∆k for l = [5...14], y1 = [1.05...1.95] and a = 4.
Figure 2.10 compares the threshold number of social contacts in the decentralized economy
l0 with the optimal planner’s choice l
∗
0. In particular, it illustrates our result from section 2.4
that l∗0 is always lower than l0 for every a from 2 to 10. Thus, the decentralized decision not to
use referrals may be suboptimal from the social perspective. Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) have
already found in their setting that for low values of β formal search methods can be used instead
of social networks and this allocation can be inefficient. Our paper extends this result in the
sense that it holds for every β and depends on the number of contacts in the networks.
Figure 2.10 additionally illustrates how the threshold l0 depends on the cost of referral
hiring c2. In line with our theoretical results, a lower cost makes referrals a more attractive
search channel for firms, so the necessary threshold number of network contacts is reduced for
every value of a. Hence there is some complementarity between the size of the network and
the flow cost of hiring as ∂l0/∂c2 > 0. If the network size is sufficiently large firms will open
referral vacancies even with a high cost c2. In contrast, if the network size is small firms will
only open referral vacancies if the hiring cost c2 is also small. This mechanism is similar from
the perspective of social planner but it doesn’t eliminate the difference between l0 and l
∗
0
2.6 Conclusions
This paper develops a labour market matching model with heterogeneous workers and two chan-
nels of job search: formal methods and social networks. Entering firms have an option to post
a vacancy in the regular job market or in the referral market, where job information is exclu-
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Figure 2.10: Comparison between l0 (solid) and l
∗
0 (dashed) for a = [2...10], case c2 = 0.4 (blue),
case c2 = 0.3 (red), case c2 = 0.2 (black)
sively transmitted by employees. The paper proves existence of the decentralized equilibrium
in this framework and then shows that this equilibrium is inefficient. There are two reasons
for the inefficiency. First, firms obtain a fixed fraction of the total job surplus in the referral
market which is below the social gain. Therefore, the number of referral vacancies is low and the
equilibrium unemployment of high ability workers is inefficiently high. This inefficiency can be
corrected by means of employment subsidies in the referral market. Second, high ability workers
congest the market for low ability workers. Moreover, this congestion externality is increasing
in the number of social contacts. The optimal policy then includes a positive income transfer
to low ability workers and a negative transfer to high ability workers. This policy reduces the
equilibrium wage dispersion which is different from the result of Blazquez and Jansen (2008)
reporting a compressed equilibrium wage distribution in a similar framework without contacts.
Finally, we examine the effect of a larger number of social contacts. High ability workers
rely strongly on their networks, thus their unemployment falls and their wages rise with a
larger density of the network. In contrast, low ability workers are adversely effected by this
change. Their wages fall and the unemployment rate is increased. Overall, the equilibrium wage
dispersion is increasing in the number of social contacts.
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2.8 Appendix
Appendix 2.8.1: Proof of Proposition 2.1. The right-hand side of equation (JC2) is
monotonically increasing in u1, while the left-hand side of (JC2) is monotonically decreasing in
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u1:
lim
u1→1−µ
(1− β)(y1 − z)
(r + δ + βδ 1−µ−u1u1 )
= (1− β)y1 − z
r + δ
lim
u1→1−µ
c2
a[1− (1− µ− u1
1− µ )
l]
=
c2
a
Therefore, (JC2) will determine a unique value of u1 when
c2
a
< (1− β)y1 − z
r + δ
.
Condition A: the left-hand side of condition (JC2) is monotonically increasing in θ:
lim
θ→0
c
q(θ)
= 0 lim
θ→θ¯(u1)
c
q(θ)
=
c
q(θ¯(u1))
The right-hand side of this condition is not necessarily monotonic in θ, however:
lim
θ→0
γ(θ, u1)(y0 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
+
(1− γ(θ, u1))(y1 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2
=
µ(y0 − z)
(µ+ u1)(r + δ)
+
u1(y1 − z)
(µ + u1)(r + δ + βλ2)
> 0
where we use that γ(0, u1) = µ/(µ+ u1) and
lim
θ→θ¯(u1)
γ(θ, u1)(y0 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
+
(1− γ(θ, u1))(y1 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2
=
µy0 + (1− µ)y1 − z
r + δ + λ(θ¯(u1))
where γ(θ¯(u1)) = µ. Then there exists an equilibrium with θ(u1) < θ¯(u1) if:
(1− β)y0µ+ y1(1− µ)− z
r + δ + βλ(θ¯(u1))
<
c
q(θ¯(u1))
Wage dispersion ∆w is given by:
∆w = β(y1 − y0) + (1− β)
( β(y1 − z)(1− µ− u1)δ
(r + δ)u1 + β(1− µ− u1)δ −
β(y0 − z)λ(θ)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
)
Differentiation of ∆w with respect to u1 and θ gives
∂∆w
∂u1
= −(1− β) β(y1 − z)δ(ru1 + δ(1 − µ))
((r + δ)u1 + β(1− µ− u1)δ)2 < 0
∂∆w
∂λ(θ)
= −(1− β)β(y0 − z)(r + δ)
(r + δ + βλ(θ))2
> 0
Appendix 2.8.2: Proof of Proposition 2.2.
First, we solve the problem following an approach by Pissarides (2000, p. 184). The social
planner wants to maximize expression (2.10) subject to the dynamic unemployment equations
u˙0 = δ(µ − u0)− λ(θ)u0 and u˙1 = δ(1 − µ − u1)− (λ(θ) + λ2)u1. Let k0 and k1 be the costate
variables corresponding to u0 and u1 respectively. The current value Hamiltonian is then:
H = (1− µ− u1)y1 + (µ− u0)y0 + (z − cθ)(u0 + u1)− c2v2
−k0[δ(µ − u0)− λ(θ)u0]− k1[δ(1 − µ− u1)− (λ(θ) + λ2)u1]
Note that we use the negative sign in front of k0 and k1 to define these two varibles as positive-
valued functions. The first order conditions are then given by:
∂H
∂θ
= −c(u0 + u1) + λ′(θ)(k0u0 + k1u1) = 0 ⇒ c = λ′(θ)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1)
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Since we know that λ′(θ) = q(θ)(1− η) and q(θ) = λ(θ)/θ, we get:
c
q(θ)
= (1− η)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1) ⇔ cθ = λ(θ)(1− η)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1)
Next we differentiate with respect to v2 and u0:
∂H
∂v2
= −c2 + ak1[1− (1− u1
1− µ)
l] = 0 ⇒ c2
q2
= k1
∂H
∂u0
= −y0 + (z − cθ) + k0(λ(θ) + δ) = −rk0
Note that cθ = λ(θ)(1− η)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1) = −λ(θ)(1− η)(1− γ)(k0 − k1) + λ(θ)(1− η)k0, so
that (r + δ + λ(θ))k0 = y0 − z − λ(θ)(1− η)(1 − γ)∆k + λ(1− η)k0. This yields:
k0 =
y0 − z − λ(θ)(1− η)(1 − γ)∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
Next we differentiate with respect to u1:
∂H
∂u1
= −y1 + (z − cθ) + k1(λ(θ) + alv2
1− µ(1− u1/(1 − µ))
l−1 + δ) = −rk1
Again we use that cθ = λ(θ)(1− η)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1) = λ(θ)(1− η)γ(k0 − k1) + λ(θ)(1− η)k1
[
r + δ + λ(θ) +
alv2
1− µ(1−
u1
1− µ)
l−1
]
k1 = y1 − z + λ(θ)(1− η)γ(k0 − k1) + λ(θ)(1− η)k1
k1 =
y1 − z + λ(θ)(1− η)γ∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ) + φλ2
or k1 =
y1 − z − φλ2k1 + λ(θ)(1− η)γ∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
The difference ∆k = k0 − k1 can then be obtained in the following way:
∆k =
y0 − z − λ(θ)(1− η)(1 − γ)∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
− y1 − z − φλ2k1 + λ(θ)(1− η)γ∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
=
y0 − y1 − λ(θ)(1− η)∆k + φλ2k1
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
⇒ ∆k = y0 − y1 + φc2θ2
r + δ + λ(θ)
where we make use of the fact that λ2k1 = λ2c2/q2 = c2v2/u1 = c2θ2.
The same solution can be obtained in an alternative way which is used by Blazquez and
Jansen (2008), who define the Hamiltonian as:
H =
λ(θ)(u0y0 + u1y1) + λ2u1y1
r + δ
+ (z − cθ)(u0 + u1)− c2v2 +
+Λ0(δ(µ − u0)− λ(θ)u0) + Λ1(δ(1 − µ− u1)− λ(θ)u1 − λ2u1)
where Λ0, and Λ1 are costate variables corresponding to u0 and u1 respectively. The optimal
social planner solution must satisfy:
∂H
∂θ
=
λ′(θ)(u0y0 + u1y1)
r + δ
− c(u0 + u1)− λ′(θ)u0Λ0 − λ′(θ)u1Λ1 = 0
⇒ c
λ′(θ)
= [γ
y0 − Λ0(r + δ)
r + δ
+ (1− γ)y1 − Λ1(r + δ)
r + δ
]
33
where γ = u0/(u0 + u1). Further, note that λ
′(θ) = (1 − η)q(θ) and define ki = [yi − Λi(r +
δ)]/(r + δ), i = 1, 2. This gives a counterpart of the free-entry condition in the regular market
from the perspective of the social planner:
c
q(θ)
= (1− η)[γk0 + (1− γ)k1] ⇒ cθ = λ(θ)(1− η)[γk0 + (1− γ)k1]
Differentiating with respect to v2 we get:
∂H
∂v2
= a[1− (1− u1
1− µ)
l]
y1
r + δ
− c2 − a[1− (1− u1
1− µ)
l]Λ1 = 0 ⇒ c2
q2
= k1
which should be compared to the free-entry condition in the referral market. Next we take
derivatives with respect to u0 and u1:
∂H
∂u0
=
λ(θ)y0
r + δ
+ z − cθ − δΛ0 − λ(θ)Λ0 = rΛ0
Λ0(r + δ) = z + λ(θ)
y0 − Λ0(r + δ)
r + δ
− cθ = z + λ(θ)k0 − λ(θ)(1− η)[γk0 + (1− γ)k1]
= z + ηλ(θ)k0 + λ(θ)(1− η)(1− γ)(k0 − k1)
∂H
∂u1
=
(
λ(θ) +
alv2
1− µ(1−
u1
1− µ)
l−1
) y1
r + δ
+ z − cθ − Λ1[λ(θ) + alv2
1− µ(1−
u1
1− µ)
l−1 + δ] = rΛ1
Λ1(r + δ) = z +
(
λ(θ) +
alv2
1− µ(1−
u1
1− µ)
l−1
)y1 − Λ1(r + δ)
r + δ
− cθ
= z + (λ(θ) + φλ2)k1 − λ(θ)(1− η)[γk0 + (1− γ)k1]
= z + (ηλ(θ) + φλ2)k1 − λ(θ)(1− η)γ(k0 − k1)
From the above equations we can finally find the surplus values k0 and k1 (∆k = k0 − k1):
k0(r + δ) = y0 − Λ0(r + δ) = y0 − z − ηλ(θ)k0 − λ(θ)(1− η)(1 − γ)∆k
k1(r + δ) = y1 − Λ1(r + δ) = y1 − z − (ηλ(θ) + φλ2)k1 + λ(θ)(1− η)γ∆k
k0 =
y0 − z − λ(θ)(1− η)(1 − γ)∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
k1 =
y1 − z + (η − φ)λ2k1 + λ(θ)(1− η)γ∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ) + ηλ2
Comparing rU0 in the decentralized economy with (r + δ)Λ0 of the planner when the Hosios
condition is satisfied, we get that:
τ0 = λ(θ)(1− η)(1 − γ)(k0 − k1)
= λ(θ)(1− η)(1 − γ)
[
Λ1 − Λ0 − (y1 − y0)
r + δ
]
, where Λ1 > Λ0
If productivity differences between the two types of workers are small, i.e. y1 = y0, then τ0 > 0
which implies that the planner would want to give subsidies to low ability workers and impose
taxes (τ1 < 0) on high ability workers. It is because high ability workers have better outside
opportunities (due to their parallel search in the referral market) but this is not reflected in
their productivity. Instead they demand higher wages which dampens the job-creation in the
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regular market and hurts the job-finding chances of low ability workers (negative externality on
low ability workers). This is a negative spillover effect between the two markets. However, this
result is reversed if y1 is sufficiently large. In this latter case high ability workers are relatively
productive and impose a positive externality on low ability workers by fostering job creation in
the regular market. This is a positive spillover within the same (regular) market. So the planner
would want to give subsidies to high ability workers (τ1 > 0) and finance them by taxes on low
ability workers (τ0 < 0).
Next we compare our findings to Blazquez and Jansen (2008). The main difference between
the two models is that in our model firms decide ex-ante before matching, whether they post an
official vacancy in the regular market or they don’t post a vacancy and try to fill the position
through a referral. Thus all vacancies are separated between the two markets: regular and
referral. And there are two matching processes, one between all unemployed workers and regular
vacancies, and second between high ability unemployed and referral vacancies. In contrast, in
the model of Blazquez and Jansen (2008) firms do not decide in advance about the type of the
vacancy, rather all unemployed workers are matched with all vacancies, so there is one matching
process/market. After the match the firm and the worker learn whether the vacancy is simple
(with probability φ) or complex (with probability 1− φ) and decide if the match continues.
The planner’s job creation condition in their model is given by (see equation (35)):
cθ = θ1−α(1− α)σ¯ = θ1−α(1− α)[φγσ(l, n) + (1− γ)σ¯(h)]
where σ(l, n) = y(n)− λ(l)(r+ δ)/(r + δ) which is comparable to the total surplus k0 generated
by low ability workers in our model. And σ¯(h) = φσ(h, n) + (1 − φ)σ(h, s) which should be
compared to surplus k1 generated by high ability workers in our model. Next, the present value
of unemployed low ability workers according to the planner is given by (see equation (30)):
(r + δ)λ(l) = b+ φθ1−ασ(l, n)− cθ = b+ φθ1−ασ(l, n)− θ1−α(1− α)[φγσ(l, n) + (1− γ)σ¯(h)]
= b+ αφθ1−ασ(l, n)− θ1−α(1− α)(1− γ)[σ¯(h) − φσ(l, n)]
This should be compared to the present value in the decentralized market (see eq. (60)):
rU(l) = b− τ(l) + αφθ1−αS(l, n) ⇒
−τ(l) = θ1−α(1− α)(1− γ)[φσ(l, n) − σ¯(h)]
= φθ1−α(1− α)(1 − γ)
[
λ(h)− λ(l)− 1− φ
φ
σ(h, s)
]
, where λ(h) > λ(l)
Note that planner’s transfers to low ability workers τ0 and τ(l) in the two papers are defined in
the opposite way. τ0 > 0 in our model implies subsidies to low ability workers, whereas τ(l) > 0
is defined as a tax on low ability workers in (BJ). Thus we compare the sign of τ0 in our model
with the sign of (−τ(l)) in (BJ). Specifically, they prove that the term in the square bracket
is always negative, hence −τ(l) < 0, which implies taxes on low ability workers in their model
and subsidies to the high ability workers. Intuitively, this is because firms with open vacancies
anticipate to form a highly productive match with a surplus σ(h, s) if they are matched with
high ability workers and the job turns out to be a complex one, so these workers always impose
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a positive externality on low ability workers. Since there is only one large market in (BJ), they
can only identify a positive spillover of high ability workers on low ability workers within this
market, but they do not have (by construction) the negative spillover between the two markets
which is present in our model if productivity differences between the two types of workers are
not too large, for example, y1 = y0.
Appendix 2.8.3: Proof of Proposition 2.3. Consider the decentralized economy with a
vector of policy instruments {s = ηc2, τ0 = λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1− γ), τ1 = −λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ}:
S0 =
y0 − z − τ0
r + δ + βλ(θ)
=
y0 − z − λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
S =
y1 − z − τ1
r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2
=
y1 − z + λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ
r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2
For the case when β = η = φ the free-enrty conditions become:
c
q(θ)
= (1− η)[γS0 + (1− γ)S] and c2 − ηc2
q2
= (1− η)S ⇒ c2
q2
= S
therefore, it follows that S0 = k0 and S = k1 and the optimal allocation can be implemented.
In addition, note that the two transfers τ∗0 and τ
∗
1 are purely redistributive:
u0τ
∗
0 + u1τ
∗
1 = u0λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ)− u1λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ
= λ(θ)∆k(1− η)[u0(1− γ)− u1γ] = λ(θ)∆k(1− η)[ u0u1
u0 + u1
− u1u0
u0 + u1
] = 0
Appendix 2.8.4: Suppose the optimal transfers (τ˜0, τ˜1) are provided to low- and high-ability
workers. In addition, we allow for employment subsidies s = ηc2, then it holds:
(r + δ + βλ(θ))S0 = y0 − z − τ˜0 = y0 − z − λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ)− (η − β)
(1 − β)k0(r + δ + λ(θ))
= k0(r + δ + ηλ(θ))− (η − β)
(1− β)k0(r + δ + λ(θ)) =
(1− η)
(1− β)k0(r + δ + βλ(θ))
this means that (1−β)S0 = (1− η)k0. In a similar way (taking into account that φ = η) we get:
(r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2)S = y1 − z − τ˜1
= y1 − z + λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ − (η − β)
(1− β)k1(r + δ + λ(θ) + λ2)
= k1(r + δ + ηλ(θ) + ηλ2)− (η − β)
(1− β)k1(r + δ + λ(θ) + λ2)
=
(1− η)
(1− β)k1(r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2)
additionally taking into account that s = ηc2, the final result is:
(1− η)[γk0 + (1− γ)k1] = c
q(θ)
= (1− β)[γS0 + (1− γ)S] and k1 = c2
q2
=
(1− β)
(1− η)S
Appendix 2.8.5: Tables for model parameters after imposing the policy for y1 = 1.25 and
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y1 = 1.5
Optimal policy θ u0/µ u1/(1 − µ) w0 w1 = w2 Ω0 Ω1
Without policy 0.4609 0.0924 0.0388 0.9770 1.2359 0.5565 0.4810
Only subsidy {s} 0.4634 0.0923 0.0171 0.9770 1.2437 0.5565 0.4911
Final policy {s, τ0, τ1} 0.4562 0.0927 0.0158 0.9775 1.2433 0.5573 0.4907
Table 2.5: Optimal policy s = 0.288, τ0 = 0.014, τ1 = −0.124 in a labour market with y1 = 1.25
Optimal policy θ u0/µ u1/(1 − µ) w0 w1 = w2 Ω0 Ω1
Without policy 0.4722 0.0918 0.0324 0.9772 1.4847 0.5565 0.5798
Only subsidy {s} 0.4702 0.0919 0.0147 0.9771 1.4930 0.5565 0.5903
Final policy {s, τ0, τ1} 0.4623 0.0923 0.0141 0.9775 1.4928 0.5572 0.5901
Table 2.6: Optimal policy s = 0.288, τ0 = 0.012, τ1 = −0.084 in a labour market with y1 = 1.5
Appendix 2.8.6: Tables for values of τ0 + τ
∗ and τ1 + τ
∗ as well as Ω0 and Ω1 with and
without final policy for different values of β in cases of y1 = 1.25 and y1 = 1.5
β = 0.4 β = 0.49 β = 0.62 β = 0.70 β = 0.72 β = 0.8
τ˜0 0.4315 0.3670 0.2200 0.0663 0.0141 -0.2989
τ˜1 0.5925 0.4818 0.2293 -0.0348 -0.1244 -0.6621
Ω0 without policy 0.5492 0.5531 0.5561 0.5566 0.5565 0.5555
Ω0 with final policy 0.5805 0.5769 0.5687 0.5602 0.5573 0.5399
Ω1 without policy 0.4837 0.4840 0.4832 0.4816 0.4810 0.4769
Ω1 with final policy 0.4953 0.4946 0.4930 0.4913 0.4907 0.4873
Ω0 +Ω1 without policy 1.0329 1.0371 1.0393 1.0382 1.0375 1.0325
Table 2.7: The values of τ˜0 and τ˜1, Ω0 and Ω1 with and without final policy as well as Ω0 +Ω1
without policy for different values of β in the case of y1 = 1.25
β = 0.4 β = 0.48 β = 0.61 β = 0.70 β = 0.72 β = 0.8
τ˜0 0.4310 0.3746 0.2338 0.0647 0.0141 -0.3016
τ˜1 0.7877 0.6703 0.3769 0.0249 -0.1244 -0.7379
Ω0 without policy 0.5489 0.5526 0.5559 0.5566 0.5565 0.5556
Ω0 with final policy 0.5804 0.5773 0.5695 0.5601 0.5572 0.5398
Ω1 without policy 0.5826 0.5829 0.5821 0.5804 0.5798 0.5756
Ω1 with final policy 0.5950 0.5944 0.5927 0.5907 0.5901 0.5864
Ω0 +Ω1 without policy 1.1316 1.1355 1.1380 1.1369 1.1363 1.1313
Table 2.8: The values of τ˜0 and τ˜1, Ω0 and Ω1 with and without final policy as well as Ω0 +Ω1
without policy for different values of β in the case of y1 = 1.5
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3 Explaining U-shape of the referral hiring pattern in a search
model with heterogeneous workers
3.1 Introduction
Several studies show that referrals are mostly used by workers in the tails of the skill distribution,
whereas all other workers in the middle are more likely to use a formal channel of job search
(Brown et al. (2012) for the US, Corak and Piraino (2011) for Canada, Boxman et al. (1991) for
the Netherlands). The purpose of this article is to explain this U-shape referral hiring pattern
in a labour market matching model with heterogeneous workers, social networks and referrals.
The ingredients of the model are as follows. Firms are homogeneous at the stage of a
vacancy, but workers differ in their productivity which we also interpret as skill heterogeneity.
There are two types of social contacts. Family contacts are exogenous in the model and serve
as a residual method of search. In addition, every worker has a fixed number of professional
contacts1. Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) report that acquired social contacts develop along
dimensions such as race, ethnicity, religious affiliation and education. Therefore, in our model
we assume a strong degree of network homophily along the productivity or the skill dimension.
Thus, the job-finding rate through the network of professional contacts is skill-specific. In this
setup, we distinguish between the three job search channels: formal applications to posted
vacancies and two informal channels - through family and professional networks. Both informal
channels of search are costless for workers, but preparing a formal application is associated with
a positive effort cost. Moreover, through the endogenous group-specific advertising intensity
firms can direct their network search towards particular groups of incumbent employees. This
contrasts with the formal search channel, which is random and undirected.
There are two key predictions of the model which can be described in the following way:
• The model exhibits a strong U-shape referral hiring pattern: workers in the right (left) tail
of the productivity distribution have the highest propensity of finding a job with a help of
professional (family) contacts, whereas the formal channel of search is mostly utilized by
workers in the middle range of the distribution;
• When the two types of social contacts are separated, family contacts are associated with
wage penalties, whereas referrals from professional contacts are associated with wage pre-
miums. The average effect of referrals on wages is ambiguous and depends on the relative
proportions of high and low productivity workers in the population.
To the best of our knowledge there are no other studies that can generate these two predictions
in a unified theoretical framework. First, we explain the mechanism which is generating the U-
shape. Low productivity workers expect low wages thus it’s not optimal for them to exert costly
search effort. At the same time hiring these workers is not profitable for firms, so that firms prefer
to direct their search towards more productive worker groups. Hence low productivity workers
rely on family referrals as a method of last resort. Further we show that due to the strong
homophily of professional networks firms correctly anticipate a high productivity applicant if
1The importance of relatives for job search is reported by Corak and Piraino (2011) and Kramarz and Skans
(2014). For the role of former co-workers see Cingano and Rosolia (2012) and Glitz (2013).
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they approach an incumbent employee of the same type. Such a behavior of firms is based on
the belief that people usually refer workers who are similar to themselves (Galenianos (2014),
Saloner (1985), Montgomery (1991)). Therefore, high productivity workers tend to find their
jobs by means of professional referrals. It also implies that average workers mostly use the formal
channel: their expected wages are sufficiently high and motivating to exert search effort but their
outside opportunities in terms of professional referrals are not yet too good. This describes the
U-shape hiring pattern as an outcome of workers’ selection across search channels. Selection
on productivity is consistent with empirical evidence, for example, when pooling data for 14
European countries, Pelizzari (2010) shows that referrals are associated with a wage penalty of
17.4% before controlling for worker characteristics. However, this effect is reduced to only 4.4%
after controlling for observable worker traits and down to 2% when controlling for unobservables.
Next we analyze the effect of referrals on wages. As low productivity types are more likely
to rely on family contacts, the equilibrium wage distribution of workers who used this channel
is first order stochastically dominated by the distribution of workers who used a formal method.
So the model predicts wage penalties associated with family contacts. In contrast, high produc-
tivity workers are more likely to rely on professional contacts. Thus the equilibrium earnings
distribution corresponding to this channel first order stochastically dominates the distribution
of workers who used a formal method. Hence the network of professional contacts is associ-
ated with wage premiums. Intuitively, wage penalties/premiums arise due to the self-selection
of workers into a specific search channel and are robust to different shapes of the productivity
distribution. This is different for the average effect of referrals on wages which is negative (pos-
itive) in a labour market with a large fraction of low (high) types. This finding may serve as an
explanation for the mixed empirical evidence on referral wages as most studies don’t distinguish
between family and professional referrals focusing on a unique informal channel2.
Yet there are several notable exceptions among empirical papers. For example, Cappellari
and Tatsiramos (2015) report that high skilled workers with a better network quality of non-
relatives experience wage premiums in the British labour market. In contrast, low skilled workers
with a better network quality of relatives are more likely to experience a wage penalty associated
with a referral. Likewise, empirical evidence presented in Meliciani and Radicchia (2011) for
Italy suggests that workers entering the labour market via professional contacts enjoy a wage
bonus, whereas those recruited via referrals from family and close friends receive on average
lower wages. Similar results are also reported by Sylos Labini (2004) for Italy and Antoninis
(2006) for Egypt which is a direct support for the second prediction of our model.
More empirical evidence in favor of the selection mechanism described by our model is
provided by Kramarz and Skans (2014) for Sweden and Kuzubas and Szabo (2014) for Indonesia.
For example, the former study finds that parental networks matter more in the job search process
for low educated youths even though there is a wage penalty in the first years of employment.
2For example, Staiger (1990), Simon and Warner (1992) and Granovetter (1995) report that referrals are
associated with wage premiums in the United States. The hypothesis of wage premiums is also supported by
Margolis and Simonnet (2003) and Goos and Salomons (2007) for France and the United Kingdom. In contrast,
Bentolila et al. (2010) report wage penalties in the United States and the European Union. This result is
supported by Delattre and Sabatier (2007), Pistaferri (1999) as well as Addison and Portugal (2002) for France,
Italy and Portugal respectively. This contradicting empirical evidence, which can be well described as a ”referral
puzzle”, is summarized in Pelizzari (2010) who writes that ”... in the European Union premiums and penalties
to finding jobs through personal contacts are equally frequent and are of about the same size”.
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Moreover, Kuzubas and Szabo (2014) report that in their sample low educated workers are more
likely to find a job through family and close friends (52%) compared to college graduates (34%).
In addition, Meliciani and Radicchia (2011) write that ”people entering the labor market via
relatives and friends contacts have lower levels of education, no specific competencies or training
than the average and seem to be generally concentrated into lower occupational groups” (p.521).
Finally, we show that due to networks there can be multiple stationary equilibria in our
model. This is particularly the case when professional networks are a dominating channel of
job search, whereas formal applications and family referrals are hardly used. We find that in
this case there is a stable equilibrium with low unemployment and many vacancies, an unstable
equilibrium with high unemployment and fewer vacancies and a stable corner equilibrium with
full unemployment. The first two equilibria coexist as firms are facing the same expected profits:
there are many (few) employees who can give a recommendation but few (many) applicants per
employee in the first (second) equilibrium. There are some other studies highlighting the point
that social networks may lead to multiple equilibria, for example, Cahuc and Fontaine (2009)
in a dynamic frictional framework as well as Cabrales et al. (2011) and Merlino (2014) in a
static network framework. However, in all three papers individual search effort is crucial for the
results, whereas in our framework networks alone give rise to the multiplicity of equilibria.
Our study is also related to other theoretical papers analyzing the role of social networks.
Early economic studies on social contacts include Simon and Warner (1992), Montgomery (1991,
1992, 1994) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). Both Simon and Warner (1992) and Mont-
gomery (1991) explain that referrals reveal the quality of the match to the employer and should
have a positive effect on wages. This result is similar to the positive wage effect of professional
referrals in our model, however, family contacts are not included in the early studies. Recent
theoretical studies generating wage premiums associated with referrals include Kugler (2003),
Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) and Galenianos (2014). Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) show
that better connected workers experience lower unemployment rates and receive higher wages.
This should be compared with our finding that more productive workers experience lower unem-
ployment rates because they have a lower proportion of unemployed contacts in their network.
Note that this result is different from Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) as all workers have the
same fixed number of network contacts in our model. So it is the endogenous proportion of
employed contacts that differs between the agents, whereas it is the total number of contacts
which is different between workers in their study.
The group of papers that can generate wage penalties in a theoretical framework includes
Bentolila et al. (2010) as well as Ponzo and Scoppa (2010). Ponzo and Scoppa (2010) argue
that recruiters may favor low ability family ties over more talented applicants. This is the
idea of favoritism in the recruiting process. Bentolila et al. (2010) find that social contacts
can generate a mismatch between occupational choices and productive advantages of workers.
This is particularly true for workers who failed to find a job in their occupation and followed
a recommendation of a close family member. Horvath (2014) extends the mismatch result of
Bentolila et al. (2010). As the probability that ties connect similar agents (homophily) increases,
the mismatch level decreases in his model. Moreover, if this probability is sufficiently high,
networks provide good matches at higher rate upon arrival than the formal market. Therefore,
referrals can generate wage premiums (penalties) if the homophily level in the society is high
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(low).
The first idea that positive and negative effects of referrals are simultaneously valid for dif-
ferent types of contacts and can account for differences in the wage effects is due to Sylos Labini
(2004) and Datcher Loury (2006) followed by Kuzubas and Szabo (2014). In a theoretical model
confirmed by empirical evidence Sylos Labini (2004) shows that workers who find their jobs
through professional referrals earn on average higher wages, whereas workers who are recom-
mended by their relatives earn lower wages. Similarly Kuzubas and Szabo (2014) develop a
theoretical model of a frictional labour marker for Indonesia with two channels of search: inner
networks (families) and outer networks defined as the ethnic language group. Using the inner
network of relatives is costless for workers, which is also the same in our model, however there is
a fixed cost of using the outer network. Thus it is mostly high skilled workers who pay this cost
and use a large outer network. These results are similar in our model if the network of profes-
sional contacts is merged with potential employers into one large outer network. Nevertheless,
our model is more specific as the formal channel is separated from professional contacts, which
explains the U-shape referral pattern observed in developed economies.
Other theoretical papers which can explain wage premiums/penalties depending on the pa-
rameters of the labour market are Tumen (2013) and Zaharieva (2015). Tumen (2013) considers
a population of workers heterogeneous with respect to the cost of maintaining connections. In
his model well integrated workers with low costs have higher reservation wages and are able to
bargain higher wages. Conversely, workers with higher costs accept wages below the market
level. Zaharieva (2015) investigates the role of referrals in a matching model with on-the-job
search. On the one hand, in her model better connected workers bargain higher wages for a given
level of job-related productivity. This is the positive effect of outside opportunities on wages.
On the other hand, employees rationally accept job offers from more productive employers and
forward other offers to the unemployed contacts. Therefore, job offers transmitted through so-
cial contacts are biased in the direction of less productive employers. This selection mechanism
can generate a negative effect of referrals on wages. To sum up, both papers by Tumen (2013)
and Zaharieva (2015) can generate wage penalties or premiums in wages associated with social
contacts, however, in each paper the mechanism is different from the present study.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains notation and the economic environ-
ment. In section 3.3 we investigate the decisions of workers and firms and explain their choice
of the search intensity. Section 3.4 illustrates our theoretical results by means of a numerical
example. Section 3.5 includes a number of robustness checks and section 3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a continuum of infinitely
lived risk neutral workers and firms discounting future at a common discount rate r. Firms are
homogeneous, while workers have heterogeneous productivity yi, i = 1..p, with p being the
number of distinct productivity groups and fi denoting a fraction of a given worker group in
the labour force, so that
∑p
i=1 fi = 1. Workers are perfectly informed about their productivity
yi and it is revealed to the firm upon the match (e.g. after screening). From the perspective of
interpretation, we think of productivity yi as a function of observable and unobservable worker
skills, hence it is positively correlated with schooling, but not directly observable by third parties
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(econometrician) without screening. The highest productivity yp is set to 1, while the lowest
productivity y1 is equal to the unemployment benefit b.
Every worker can be either employed and producing output yi or unemployed and searching
for a job. Let ui denote the mass of unemployed workers with productivity yi and ei – the mass of
corresponding employees, so that ei + ui = fi, since the total measure of workers is normalized
to 1. There are three search channels in the labour market. First, unemployed workers can
find a job by sending regular applications to open vacancies, this is the formal channel of job
search with an endogenous job-finding rate φ(s). Variable s is the individual search effort of
workers and may differ across agents belonging to different productivity groups, i.e. si. The
formal channel of search is costly in terms of effort, since it requires preparing and sending job
applications. However, a more intensive job search is associated with a higher probability of
finding employment. Let C(s) = s2/c denote the effort cost function, which is identical for all
workers in the market.
Further, let all workers have an equal number of professional contacts n > 0. Employed
workers provide referrals and transmit vacancy information to the unemployed members of
their network, this is the second channel of job search. To simplify the model we assume
that professional contacts are only formed among workers with the same productivity level
yi. Therefore, the job-finding rate through the network of professional contacts is skill-specific
and is denoted by λi. Empirical support for this assumption comes from the observation of
strong homophily in social networks reported in Rivera et al. (2010). Finally, λ0 is a constant
probability of hearing about a job from family members which is a third search channel in the
model. In section 3.5 we endogenize λ0 as a form of robustness check for the model, however, it
is constant in the rest of the paper. Job referrals from professional contacts and family are the
informal methods of search and are costless for workers3.
Firms are free to enter the labour market by opening new vacancies. Open vacancies are
associated with a flow cost z on the side of the firm4. Formal matching between unemployed
workers and vacancies is random and discussed below. To model the process of network matching
we extend the approach of Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) and assume that firms make a random
draw from the pool of incumbent employees with an advertising intensity a per unit time.
However, in our model the advertising intensity a is endogenous and can be specific to a given
group of employees, i.e. ai. Intuitively, ai is an effort level with which the manager of an
open vacancy is addressing an incumbent employee of type i to refer one of his/her contacts.
This extension allows firms to direct their search more intensively towards the more productive
group of workers. The advertising search intensity a is costly for firms with a cost function
K(a) = a2/k. Note that the advertising intensity ai is chosen after the match with an employee
3While there is strong agreement in the literature that getting help from family members is a costless method of
search, it is less obvious for professional contacts. One explanation of this assumption is that in this paper we only
focus on a group of colleagues and former coworkers of the agent which can be seen as a subgroup of all professional
contacts. Empirical studies show that former coworkers are an important source of job-related information for the
unemployed (Cingano and Rosolia (2012) and Glitz (2013)). Moreover, due to the recent IT development (such
as Facebook, LinkedIn and Xing) it became easy for workers to stay in touch with former coworkers. Therefore,
in the model we assume that the cost of keeping professional contacts is negligibly small compared to the formal
search channel and normalize it to zero. Yet another advantage of treating former colleagues as professional
contacts is a strong degree of skill homophily between coworkers.
4It can be understood as financial expenses for making vacancy information visible to the applicants. This
includes posting vacancies in the newspapers, registering on the recruitment websites and participating in the job
fairs. It may also include the cost of capital depreciation.
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and so the cost K(ai) is unrelated to the cost K(aj) for i 6= j. If the job position is filled with a
worker, the firm obtains a flow profit yi − wi, where the wage wi is bargained between the firm
and the worker upon hiring. We use the Nash bargaining rule to determine wages. Every filled
job can be destroyed for exogenous reasons at rate δ.
Let m(x, v) denote a matching function between workers and firms, where v ≤ v¯ is the
number of open vacancies and x is the number of searching workers in efficiency units (either
unemployed or employed, transmitting job offers to their unemployed contacts). Following the
approach of Gautier et al. (2010) we assume that the matching technology is quadratic, that
is m(x, v) = xv. This approach has been frequently used in the search literature, for example,
Teulings and Gautier (2004) provide a number of explanations why this technology may be the
most adequate assumption in a model with worker heterogeneity. The main reason is that this
technology avoids congestion externalities between different worker types and jobs.
Consider matching between unemployed workers and open vacancies. The total number of
searching unemployed workers weighted by their search intensity is given by x =
∑
siui, so
the number of contacts created through the formal method of search is v
∑
siui. However,
only proportion siui/
∑
siui of these contacts are the matches between open vacancies and
unemployed workers of type yi. Therefore, the number of matches between open vacancies and
unemployed workers of type yi is given by:
v
∑
siui · siui∑
siui
= vsiui
This means that the job-finding rate through the formal channel of search is equal to φi ≡ φ(si) =
vsiui/ui = vsi and is increasing in the total number of vacancies v and the individual search
intensity of unemployed workers si. In addition, from the perspective of firms, the probability
of filling a job through the formal channel with a worker of type yi is φiui/v = siui.
Next consider matching between employed workers and open vacancies. The total number of
employees in efficiency units is given by x =
∑
aiei, so the number of contacts between vacancies
and employees with productivity yi is equal to v
∑
aiei. However, only a fraction aiei/
∑
aiei
of these contacts are the matches with employees of type yi. Every contacted employed worker
transmits vacancy information to exactly one randomly chosen unemployed social contact out of
n. Here we assume that job information is only transmitted to the direct social links, so the job
offer is lost if all n contacts are employed. The probability of being employed for an arbitrary
worker of type yi is equal to 1 − µi, where µi ≡ ui/fi is the unemployment rate in a group of
workers with productivity yi. So the probability that all n contacts of the employee are also
employed is equal to (1− µi)n. This means that the number of matches between vacancies and
unemployed workers of type yi through the network of contacts is given by:
v
∑
aiei · aiei∑
aiei
· [1− (1− µi)n] = vaiei[1− (1− µi)n]
where expression in the square bracket is the probability of having at least one unemployed
contact out of n. The individual job-finding rate through the first informal search channel
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(professional contacts) is then equal to:
λi = vai
ei
ui
[1− (1− µi)n] = vai 1− µi
µi
[1− (1− µi)n]
Note that λi is increasing in the number of vacancies v and the number of social contacts n.
Moreover, a more intensive search by firms directed at workers of type yi, that is a higher
ai, is raising the probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker of this type. From
the perspective of firms, the flow probability of filling a job with a professional contact of an
incumbent employee of type yi is equal to λiui/v = aiei[1− (1− µi)n].
3.3 Analysis of the model
3.3.1 Workers and their choice of search effort
Let Ui (Wi) denote the present value of being unemployed (employed) for the worker with
productivity yi, i = 1..p. The present value equation for unemployed workers is given by:
rUi = b+ (λ0 + λi)(Wi − Ui) + vmax
s
[s(Wi − Ui)− 1
c
s2] (3.1)
and reflects simultaneous availability of the three job search channels discussed above. The
rent from employment is independent of the search channel and is denoted by Ri ≡ (Wi − Ui).
Workers choose costly effort si to maximize the present value of unemployment Ui, therefore the
optimal level of search effort si obtains at the point where the marginal gain (Wi − Ui) is equal
to the marginal cost C ′(s):
si = 0.5c(Wi − Ui) = 0.5cRi ⇒ rUi = b+ (λ0 + λi)Ri + 0.25cvR2i
The asset value of employment for type yi workers can be written as:
rWi = wi − δ(Wi − Ui) (3.2)
and so the worker rent from employment is equal to the discounted net present value of earnings:
Ri = (wi−rUi)/(r+δ). Combining this and equation (3.2) allows us to derive the optimal search
effort si ≡ s(λi, wi). These results are summarized in Lemma 3.1:
Lemma 3.1. Consider workers with productivity yi. The optimal job-finding rate φ(si) = vsi
through the formal channel of search is given by:
vsi =
√
(r + δ + λ0 + λi)2 + (wi − b)cv − (r + δ + λ0 + λi) (3.3)
The optimal search intensity s(λi, wi) is increasing in the wage wi but decreasing in λi, which
is a job-finding rate through professional contacts. The optimal search intensity s(λi, wi) is also
decreasing in the number of vacancies v.
Proof: Appendix 3.8.1.
Lemma 3.1 shows that a higher wage wi would motivate workers to exert more effort when
applying for jobs. On the contrary, a higher job-finding rate through professional contacts λi
44
improves the outside opportunities of workers, so the total rent from a job Ri is reduced. A
lower rent then has a disincentive effect on the intensity of job search. In addition, there is a
similar disincentive effect from a higher number of vacancies v, thus vacancies and effort are
substitutes in our setting.
3.3.2 Firms and the wage determination
From the perspective of firms, let Ji be the asset value of a job, filled with a worker of type yi,
and V be the present value of the open vacancy. We will come back to the determination of V
in section 3.3.5. Once matched firms learn the productivity of the applicant, so Ji is given by:
rJi = yi − wi − δ(Ji − V ) (3.4)
The equilibrium wages are determined by means of Nash bargaining with a disagreement-while-
bargaining state UDi for type yi worker and with α ∈ (0, 1) being the workers’ bargaining power,
for example, as in Gautier (2002) and Hall and Milgrom (2008). This approach is close to the
bargaining model with a risk of a negotiation breakdown by Binmore et al. (1986) and allows us
to simplify the model, while not influencing qualitatively the results. An unemployed worker gets
a present value UDi during the disagreement time, while the employer obtains a present value
V Di . We assume that during the time of negotiation neither the worker nor the firm continue
searching for other partners. This is intuitive since there are no reasons for agents to exert costly
search effort when they are already in the process of bargaining with a prospective partner. This
means that neither the worker nor the firm pays the search cost during the period of negotiation,
however, the worker still receives the unemployment benefit from the state. Thus, UDi and V
D
i
can be written as:
rUDi = b+ δ(Ui − UDi ) rV Di = δ(V − V Di )
These equations imply that vacancies have the same probability δ of being destroyed during the
bargaining as do existing jobs. Moreover, if the bargaining process breaks down for an exogenous
reason, the worker becomes unemployed with a present value Ui and the position remains vacant
with a present value V . The solution is the wage wi maximizing the Nash objective function
(Wi − UDi )α(Ji − V Di )1−α which can be written as:
max
wi
(wi + δUi
r + δ
− b+ δUi
r + δ
)α(yi − wi + δV
r + δ
− δV
r + δ
)1−α
⇒ wi = αyi + (1− α)b
This maximization problem shows that the wage is a weighted average between the unemploy-
ment benefit b and the productivity yi. Therefore, wages are heterogeneous in the economy
and resemble the productivity distribution in the population of workers. Let gi denote the
equilibrium distribution of wages, such that
∑
gi = 1. It is then given by:
gi =
ei
e
=
fi(1− µi)∑
fi(1− µi) =
fi(1− µi)
1−∑ fiµi
where e = 1 −∑ fiµi is the equilibrium employment rate in the economy. Intuitively, if the
employment rate of some worker group is smaller than the average, i.e. (1− µi) < (1−
∑
fiµi),
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then this group is underrepresented in the earnings distribution compared to the initial produc-
tivity density fi. The opposite holds when the employment rate of some worker group is larger
than the average, so this group is overrepresented.
3.3.3 Type-specific unemployment rates
Consider workers with productivity yi. The unemployment rate µi = ui/fi can be found from
the steady-state equation for unemployed workers. It can be written as:
0 = u˙i = δ(fi − ui)− (λ0 + λi + siv)ui (3.5)
and reflects the fact that the inflow into and the outflow out of unemployment are equalized in
the steady state. Thus, the equilibrium unemployment rate µi is equal to:
µi =
δ
λ0 + siv + λi + δ
=
δ√
(r + δ + λ0 + λi)2 + α(yi − b)cv − r
⇒ µi = µ(λi, yi) (3.6)
Hence the equilibrium unemployment rate can be expressed as a function of the job-finding rate
λi and the productivity yi. Next, consider a partial relationship between µi and λi for a fixed
productivity yi. A higher probability of finding a job through professional contacts (that is a
higher λi), has an indirect disincentive effect on the search intensity s(λi, yi). Consequently, a
lower level of search effort through the formal channel raises the equilibrium unemployment rate
µi. This is an indirect effect which is operating through the outside opportunities of workers. At
the same time a higher λi reduces the unemployment rate µi. This is a direct effect since more
unemployed workers find jobs by means of referrals. Equation (3.6) shows that the direct effect
is dominating and describes a negative relationship between the unemployment rate µi and the
job-finding rate through professional contacts λi:
∂µ(λi, yi)
∂λi
< 0 lim
λi→0
µi =
δ√
(r + δ + λ0)2 + α(yi − b)cv − r
≡ µ¯i > 0 lim
λi→∞
µi = 0
This is illustrated in figure 3.1, where µ¯i denotes the upper limit of the unemployment rate µi
for a given fixed level of yi. The corresponding curve is denoted by (UC).
Further, recall from section 3.2 that the job-finding rate by means of referrals λi depends on
the unemployment rate in the network µi. In particular, it holds that:
λi = vai
1− µi
µi
[1− (1− µi)n] ⇒ λi = λ(µi, ai) (3.7)
If more workers of a given type are employed (that is a lower µi) the possibilities for firms
to communicate with this group of employees arise more frequently. And hence the contact
rate between firms and unemployed workers of type yi is increased. But on the other hand, a
lower unemployment rate µi implies a lower number of unemployed contacts in the network and
therefore, a lower probability that the contacted employee will recommend someone for a job
[1−(1−µi)n]. Lemma 3.2 shows that the indirect network effect is dominated by the direct effect
of a higher contact rate between firms and unemployed workers and so equation (3.7) describes a
negative relationship between variables λi and µi. The corresponding curve is denoted by (NC).
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Figure 3.1: Intersection between µ(λ, y) and λ(µ, a) for a given advertising intensity a and a
given productivity y. Left panel: changes in λ(µ, a) and µ(λ, y) given a positive shift in y. Right
panel: changes in λ(µ, a) and µ(λ, y) given a positive shift in a.
Lemma 3.2. For a given advertising intensity ai, a lower unemployment rate µi in a group of
workers with productivity yi implies a higher job-finding rate through the informal channel of
search λi:
∂λi(µi, ai)
∂µi
< 0 lim
µi→0
λi = nvai lim
µi→1
λi = 0
Proof: Appendix 3.8.2.
Based on these results, figure 3.1 shows that there is a unique intersection between the curves
µ(λi, yi) and λ(µi, ai). This implies that µi is an implicit function of the productivity yi and the
advertising intensity ai, formally:
µi =
δ√
(r + δ + λ0 + λ(µi, ai))2 + α(yi − b)cv − r
⇒ µi = m(yi, ai)
To analyse the intuitive implications of this relationship consider workers with a higher produc-
tivity yi. More productive workers expect to get a higher wage wi, so the gain from finding a job
is increasing in the productivity. This means that more able workers invest more effort in writing
applications and preparing for a job interview. More intensive job search through the formal
channel improves the job-finding rate vs(λi, w(yi)) and so the unemployment rate µ(λi, yi) is
reduced for every value of λi. This is illustrated by the left-ward shift of the curve (UC) on
the left panel of figure 3.1. Since productivity does not enter directly into the job-finding rate
through the network, there is no shift of the curve (NC). This means that the unemployment rate
is unambiguously lower in more productive worker groups. Consequently a larger proportion of
employees facilitates informal matching between open vacancies and unemployed workers and
therefore the probability of finding a job by recommendation is increasing. These results are
summarized in lemma 3.3:
Lemma 3.3. For a given advertising intensity ai, the equilibrium unemployment rate µi =
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m(yi, ai) is lower in more productive worker groups. Further, for every productivity group yi,
the equilibrium unemployment rate falls with a higher search effort by firms, formally:
∂m(yi, ai)
∂yi
< 0
∂m(yi, ai)
∂ai
< 0 lim
ai→0
m(yi, ai) = lim
λi→0
µ(λi, yi) = µ¯i
Proof: Appendix 3.8.3.
In addition, lemma 3.3 describes consequences of a higher search intensity by firms ai. If
firms exert more effort in contacting their employees, then the probability of finding a job by
means of a referral is increased for every unemployment rate µi. In figure 3.1 this is illustrated
by the up-ward shift of the curve (NC) on the right panel. Since advertising intensity does
not enter directly the unemployment equation, there is no shift of the curve (UC). This means
that the job finding rate λi is unambiguously higher and the equilibrium unemployment rate is
reduced.
3.3.4 Endogenous advertising rate for referral hiring
Let us now consider the optimal behavior of a firm with an open vacancy. Apart from formal ap-
plications the firm may also fill its vacancy through the informal channel of search. In particular,
the firm should choose the optimal advertising intensity ai for every worker type yi. Intuitively,
at rate ai the firm is asking type-yi incumbent employees whether they can recommend a friend
for the open vacancy. Similarly to the effort choice of the unemployed, there is a gain and a cost
from advertising activity. The expected firm rent from contacting the incumbent employee of
type yi is equal to a(1 − (1 − µi)n)(Ji − V ), which is the probability that the job offer will be
transmitted to the unemployed worker of this type times the present value of profits. This gives
rise to the following maximization problem:
max
a
[a(1− (1− µi)n)(Ji − V )− 1
k
a2]
The optimal ai is, thus, given by:
ai = 0.5k(1 − (1− µi)n)(Ji − V ) where Ji − V = (1− α)(yi − b)− rV
r + δ
(3.8)
This first order condition defines the level of advertising ai as a function of µi and yi, that is
ai = a(µi, yi). Therefore, for a given yi, firms exert more advertising effort if they expect a
higher proportion of unemployed workers in the network of the incumbent employee. In the
following we consider the economy in the steady-state with a free-entry of firms, which means
that V = 0. Figure 3.2 shows equilibrium for advertising effort and unemployment. Recall
that µi = m(yi, ai) slopes down in the space (µ, a): finding jobs becomes easier for unemployed
workers if firms increase their advertising activities. Let this curve be denoted by (MA) (see
figure 3.2). Equation (3.8) is the advertising curve and slopes up, let it be denoted by (AC).
Group-specific equilibrium (µ(yi), a(yi)) is at the intersection of the two curves and it is unique.
Next compare the equilibrium vector of variables (µ(yi), a(yi)) across different productivity
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Figure 3.2: Determination of the type-specific unemployment rate µ(a, y) with the endogenous
advertising intensity of firms a(µ, y). Arrows indicate higher values of y.
groups. On the one hand, more productive workers exert more effort in sending applications and
preparing for the job interview, so their unemployment is lower for any advertising intensity ai.
This is illustrated by the inward shift of the curve (MA) (see figure 3.2). On the other hand,
for a given µi, firms expect to earn higher profits from more productive network applicants,
and so their advertising effort is higher when the firm is communicating with a more productive
incumbent employee. This implies an upward shift of the advertising curve (AC) since firms’
effort is increasing for every level of the unemployment rate µi. Considering both changes as a
combination shows that the equilibrium unemployment rate is lower in more productive worker
groups. This result is described in proposition 3.1:
Proposition 3.1. (i) The group-specific equilibrium unemployment rate µi is decreasing in the
productivity yi and vacancies v. (ii) The job-finding rate λi and the network advertising intensity
ai are both increasing in yi if the elasticity of referral probability ρ(yi) ≡ [1− (1 − µ(yi))n] with
respect to the net productivity yi − b is less than 1, formally:
− ∂ρ(yi)
∂(yi − b) ·
(yi − b)
ρ(yi)
= −n(1− µ(yi))
n−1
1− (1− µ(yi))n ·
∂µ(yi)
∂yi
· (yi − b) < 1 (3.9)
Proof: Appendix 3.8.4.
Proposition 3.1 shows that there are two counteracting effects of yi on the network advertising
intensity a(yi). On the one hand, firms anticipate higher profits from more productive network
applicants and direct their search towards worker groups with a higher yi. But on the other
hand, the equilibrium unemployment µ(yi) is decreasing in yi which means that the average
proportion of unemployed workers in the network is lower in less productive worker groups. From
the perspective of firms this means a lower probability of referral hiring. Condition (3.9) then
implies that the first direct effect of higher profits is dominating if the equilibrium unemployment
rate is sufficiently inelastic. In a similar way we can show that unemployment is a decreasing
function of vacancies v. This is because more vacancies imply higher job-finding rates vsi and
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λi, thus the model can reproduce a negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies
(the Beveridge curve) which is a standard property of any search model.
Finally, the job-finding rate through professional contacts λ(yi) can be now rewritten as:
λ(yi) =
a(yi)v(1 − µ(yi))
µ(yi)
ρ(yi) =
v(1− µ(yi))
µ(yi)
0.5kρ2(yi)J(yi) (3.10)
Recall that λ(yi) = λ(µ(yi), a(yi)). If the elasticity condition in proposition 3.1 is satisfied than
more productive employees are more intensively approached by firms. So the probability of
finding a job through professional contacts is increasing in the productivity. In addition, since
the unemployment rate is decreasing in yi, the probability that a randomly chosen employee
is of type yi is increasing in the productivity. Both of these factors imply that the probability
of finding a job by recommendation is an increasing function of yi, that is ∂λ(yi)/∂yi > 0 if
∂a(yi)/∂yi > 0.
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze which groups of workers are more likely to
use family and professional contacts in the process of job search. To address this question we
define the following new variables d0(yi) and d(yi). The former variable is an average proportion
of workers with productivity yi using family contacts in order to find a job. In contrast, the
latter variable is an average proportion of workers using professional contacts. This means:
d0(yi) =
λ0
λ0 + φ(yi) + λ(yi)
d(yi) =
λ(yi)
λ0 + φ(yi) + λ(yi)
The last possibility to find a job in the model is the formal channel of job search, so the
average proportion of type yi workers finding jobs by means of this channel can be found as
1 − d0(yi) − d(yi). Which worker group is relying most on family contacts? To answer this
question observe that:
d0(yi) =
λ0
λ0 + φ(yi) + λ(yi)
=
λ0√
(r + δ + λ0 + λ(yi))2 + α(yi − b)cv − r − δ
Therefore, d0(yi) is decreasing in yi if the elasticity condition (3.9) is satisfied. On the one hand,
more productive workers anticipate a larger present value of wages and exert more effort when
preparing applications and, on the other hand, firms are searching more intensively for more
productive applicants. Both of these factors imply that the proportion of workers finding jobs
through family contacts is a decreasing function of yi. In addition, observe that d0(b) = 1 (since
λ(b) = 0 and φ(b) = 0) which means that least productive workers rely exclusively on family
contacts. Finally, it is not possible to predict in general whether variable d(yi) is increasing or
decreasing in yi. We investigate this relationship numerically in section 3.4.
3.3.5 Wage distribution and the free-entry condition
The second purpose of our paper is to analyze the effect of referrals on wages. As mentioned
in the earlier part of our paper the equilibrium wage distribution is given by gi = ei/e and
shows the relative proportion of yi-workers in the pool of employees. So the average wage in the
economy can be found as w¯ =
∑
giwi. Next we find average wages conditional on the specific
channel of search. To do so let w¯o, w¯s and w¯n be the corresponding average wages conditional
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on the search method being the family, the formal application or the network of professional
contacts. In addition, let hoi , h
s
i and h
n
i , ∀i = 1..p, be the respective wage distributions so that∑
hoi = 1,
∑
hsi = 1 and
∑
hni = 1. For example, h
s
i is the equilibrium distribution of wages
among employed workers who found a job by using the formal method of search. Each of these
three distributions can be obtained as:
hoi =
gid0(yi)∑
gid0(yi)
hsi =
gi(1− d0(yi)− d(yi))
1−∑ gi(d0(yi) + d(yi)) hni = gid(yi)∑ gid(yi) ∀i = 1..p
Variable
∑
gid0(yi) is the proportion of employees who found a job with a help of a family
member. It is also the total measure of these workers since the total population size is normalized
to 1. In a similar way,
∑
gid(yi) is the fraction of employees who found a job with a help of
a professional contact. And the remaining part 1 −∑ gi(d0(yi) + d(yi)) is the proportion of
workers who found a job through the formal method of search. Therefore, the three average
wages for each of the search channels can be found as:
w¯o =
∑
wih
o
i w¯
s =
∑
wih
s
i w¯
n =
∑
wih
n
i
These equations allow us to compare the average wages w¯o, w¯s and w¯n and to predict whether
family and/or professional referrals are associated with a wage premium or a wage penalty rela-
tive to the formal method. Either of these results will depend on the self-selection of workers into
the specific channels of search. For example, we expect that family contacts will be associated
with a wage penalty as this search channel is the most prevalent among the groups of workers
with low wages. Formally, one can show that family contacts are associated with a wage penalty
if the distribution hsi first order stochastically dominates the distribution h
o
i :
w¯o =
p∑
i=1
wih
o
i = w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
∆wi(1−Hoi ) and w¯s =
p∑
i=1
wih
s
i = w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
∆wi(1−Hsi )
so that w¯o < w¯s if Hsi ≤ Hoi ,∀i = 1..p
where ∆wi = wi+1 − wi > 0 since the wage is an increasing function of the productivity,
and variables Hoi , H
s
i are the cumulative density functions so that H
o
i =
∑i
j=1 h
o
j and H
s
i =∑i
j=1 h
s
j . The proof is presented in appendix 3.8.5. In a similar way, define H
n
i =
∑i
j=1 h
n
j to
be the cumulative density function of wages obtained with a help of professional contacts. This
channel of search is then associated with a wage premium relative to the formal method, i.e
w¯s < w¯n, if the distribution hni first order stochastically dominates the distribution h
s
i , which is
equivalent toHni ≤ Hsi ,∀i = 1..p. Intuitively, this condition holds when firms rely on professional
recommendations to match with high ability workers, which is the case in our model.
Finally, the last component of the model is the Bellman equation for an open vacancy with a
present value denoted by V . Same as workers, firms are simultaneously using each of the three
search channels to fill an open vacancy. At rate λ0ui/v the firm is matched with an unemployed
worker of type yi as a consequence of a family referral and at rate φ(si)ui/v = siui the firm is
matched with a similar worker by means of a formal application. Note that a higher measure
of unemployed workers with the productivity yi and a more intensive job search si increase the
probability of filling a vacancy with this type of worker. In addition, firms may contact one of
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the incumbent employees to ask for the referral. An applicant of type yi is hired through this
channel with a job-filling rate aieiρi, where we use notation ρi = ρ(yi) = [1− (1−µ(yi))n]. This
latter term is the probability that the contacted employee will recommend an applicant for the
open position. Thus, the value of an open vacancy is given by:
rV = −z + λ0
v
∑
ui(Ji − V ) +
∑
siui(Ji − V ) +
∑
ei
(
aiρi(J(yi)− V )− a2i /k
)
(3.11)
where z is the flow cost of filling a vacancy. Note also that the choice of the advertising intensity
ai ∀i = 1..p is compatible with the maximization of the present value of an open vacancy V . The
free-entry condition of firms implies that V = 0 in the steady-state equilibrium. Substituting
the present value of profits Ji and the optimal advertising intensity ai gives us the equilibrium
number of vacancies:
v = λ0
1− α
r + δ
∑
ui(yi − b)
[
z − 1− α
r + δ
∑
siui(yi − b)− 0.25k (1 − α)
2
(r + δ)2
∑
eiρ
2
i (yi − b)2
]
−1
This is the last equilibrium equation. So the equilibrium can be defined in the following way:
Definition 3.1. Search equilibrium is a vector of variables (Ui, Wi, Ji, wi, si, ai, µi), ∀i = 1..p
as well as the number of vacancies v and the present value of an open vacancy V , satisfying the
asset value equations for workers (3.1) and (3.2), for firms (3.4) and (3.11), the wage equations
wi = αyi + (1− α)b, the optimal effort equations (3.3) and (3.8), the stationary unemployment
conditions (3.6) and the free-entry condition V = 0.
To analyze whether the equilibrium defined above is unique, consider first an economy with-
out professional referrals, that is ai = 0 ∀i = 1..p. The free-entry condition V = 0 is then:
z =
∑(λ0
v
+ si
)
µifiJi where µi =
δ√
(r + δ + λ0)2 + α(yi − b)cv − r
(3.12)
Note that a larger number of vacancies has a negative effect on the recruiting rate through
families λ0/v and on the individual search intensity si (see the result from lemma 3.1). On the
one hand, firms compete stronger for applicants, and on the other hand, workers are demotivated
and exert less effort in searching for jobs. At the same time, the unemployment rate µi is reduced,
which makes it even more difficult for firms to hire workers. So the right hand side of the free-
entry condition (expected profits) is a decreasing function of v, whereas the left hand side is a
fixed cost of hiring z. So there exists a unique equilibrium in this economy. These results are
formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. Consider the labour market described in definition 3.1. When professional
networks are not utilized, i.e. ai = 0 ∀i = 1..p, there exists a unique equilibrium, where the
number of vacancies v is given by the free-entry condition (3.12).
Proof: Appendix 3.8.6.
Corollary 3.1. In this equilibrium the number of vacancies is decreasing in the hiring cost
z, whereas all unemployment rates µi, i > 1, are increasing in z, formally ∂v/∂z < 0 and
∂µi/∂z > 0 for i = 2..p
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This corollary shows that a higher recruitment cost z leads to lower vacancies and higher
unemployment. Thus the model without professional networks captures the standard dynamics
of the labour marker even if there are many heterogeneous groups of workers. In the opposite
case when professional networks are utilized and are a dominant search channel then we find
that there is a possibility of multiple equilibria in our model. Their existence and properties are
investigated in the next section of the paper.
3.3.6 Multiple equilibria
To see that multiple equilibria can arise in our model consider a labour market with only one
worker type (yi > b), where the formal search channel is not used, that is si = 0. The free-entry
condition (V = 0) in this economy simplifies to yield:
z =
λ0
v
µiJi + 0.25k(1 − µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2J2i
The term on the right hand side is the expected profit of firms. Let first λ0 = 0, then the term
on the right-hand side is equal to zero for µi = 0 and µi = 1 with an internal maximum for
some intermediate value of µi. Intuitively, it means that a larger number of unemployed agents
raises the probability that a randomly contacted employee will recommend his/her contact for
the job, so firm profits are increasing in µi as long as µi is relatively low. But when the number
of unemployed workers is increasing further, then there are fewer employees who can give a
recommendation, which has a negative effect on profits. In the extreme case when µi = 1, no one
is employed and there is no hiring. Note that graphically expression 0.25k(1−µi)(1−(1−µi)n)2J2i
is represented by a one-dimensional hump and thus may have at most two roots at the intersection
with a horizonal line z. Let these roots be denoted by µ′i and µ
′′
i . Then we get:
z > 0.25k(1 − µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2J2i for 0 < µi < µ′i ⇒ v = 0
z < 0.25k(1 − µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2J2i for µ′i < µi < µ′′i ⇒ v = v¯
z > 0.25k(1 − µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2J2i for µ′′i < µi < 1 ⇒ v = 0
Intuitively, if unemployment is too low or too high, then the cost of creating jobs z is larger then
the expected profit and vacancies immediately drop down to zero. In contrast, for intermediate
values of unemployment the cost of creating jobs is lower than the expected profit and a maximum
number of vacancies v¯ is created. This is illustrated on the left panel of figure 3.3. Next we turn
to the investigation of the equilibrium unemployment equation, which is given by:
µi =
δ
δ + λ0 + v(1− µi)0.5k(1 − (1− µi)n)2Ji/µi
Proposition 3.1 proves that unemployment is a decreasing function of vacancies v which is also
illustrated on the left panel of figure 3.3 for λ0 = 0. Note that unemployment is a backward-
looking variable with a gradual adjustment to the new level, whereas the number of vacancies v
is a forward-looking jump variable which adjusts immediately. Figure 3.3 shows that there are
three stationary equilibria: {µ′i, v(µ′i)}, {µ′′i , v(µ′′i )} and {µi = 1, v = 0}. Let them be denoted by
A, B and C respectively. Next we analyze which of these equilibria are stable. If unemployment
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is low, that is µi < µ
′
i, then vacancies drop down to zero so that unemployment is increasing
µ˙ > 0. If unemployment is moderate, that is µ′i < µi < µ
′′
i , vacancies jump up to the maximum
level, thus µ˙ < 0. And finally, if unemployment is too high (µ′′i < µi) we get µ˙ > 0. So we find
that there are two stable stationary equilibria A and C, whereas B is unstable. These results
are summarized in lemma 3.4:
Lemma 3.4. Consider a labour market with only one worker type yi > b and professional
networks as the only channel of job search. Let condition z < kn2J2i /(1 + 2n)
2+1/n be satisfied
and 0 < µ′i < µ
′′
i < 1 denote the two roots of the free-entry condition z = 0.25k(1− µi)(1− (1−
µi)
n)2J2i . Then there exist three stationary equilibria {µ′i, v(µ′i) = (1−µ′i)0.5δJ/z}, {µ′′i , v(µ′′i ) =
(1 − µ′′i )0.5δJ/z} and {µi = 1, v = 0} if v(µ′i) < v¯. The first and last equilibria are stable,
whereas the second equilibrium is unstable.
Proof : Appendix 3.8.6.
µ′i µ
′′
i 1 1
v¯
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µi µi
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A
B
B
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C
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Figure 3.3: Stationary equilibria in the economy without formal job search and λ0 = 0 Left
panel: multiple equilibria with one worker type yi. Right panel: multiple equilibria with two
worker types yi > yj
Next we show that multiplicity of equilibria is not an artifact of a single worker type, but
can also appear in the model with several worker groups. In order to illustrate this graphically
we consider two types of workers i and j where group j is less productive than group i: yj < yi.
For λ0 equal to zero, the free-entry condition becomes:
z = 0.25k(1 − µi)(1 − (1− µi)n)2J2i fi + 0.25k(1 − µj)(1− (1− µj)n)2J2j fj
where fj = 1 − fi. Graphically expression on the right hand side is a two-dimensional hump.
Cutting this hump with a horizontal plane z creates an ellipse-like projection in the space {µi, µj}
which is illustrated on the right panel of figure 3.3. Expected profits are the same at every point
of this ellipse-like curve and equal to z. Next we consider the equilibrium unemployment equation
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for µj , express µj in terms of v and insert it into the equilibrium equation for µi (keeping λ0 = 0):
v =
δ
0.5k(1 − (1− µj)n)2Jj ⇒ µj = 1−
[
1− (1− (1− µi)n)
√
Ji
Jj
]1/n
This equation captures an indirect relationship between the two unemployment rates. Intuitively,
if there are more (less) vacancies both unemployment rates µi and µj are decreasing (increasing).
Thus the two unemployment rates are always moving in the same direction, which is illustrated
by the increasing curve on the right panel of figure 3.3. This figure illustrates that even in the
labour market with two worker groups there are at most three types of stationary equilibria.
Either both unemployment rates are low which makes hiring easy to firms as there are many
employed workers who can give a recommendation, this is a stable stationary equilibrium A.
Alternatively, both unemployment rates can be high, which is still profitable for firms as there
is a large pool of unemployed workers willing to take a job. This is the unstable stationary
equilibrium B. Finally, there is a stable equilibrium C with {µi = 1, µj = 1, v = 0}. Note that
increasing the number of worker groups does not create conceptually new equilibria.
Next we analyze the case λ0 > 0. Expressing v from the free-entry condition we get:
v = λ0µiJi/[z − 0.25k(1 − µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2J2i ] for 0 < µi < µ′i
v = v¯ for µ′i < µi < µ
′′
i
v = λ0µiJi/[z − 0.25k(1 − µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2J2i ] for µ′′i < µi < 1
This is due to the fact that µ′i and µ
′′
i are the asymptotes of the free-entry condition. The
corresponding curve and its intersection with the equilibrium unemployment curve is illustrated
on the left panel of figure 3.4. One can see that equilibria B and C move closer to each other.
Moreover C is shifted inwards and involves a positive measure of vacancies and the equilibrium
unemployment rate less than 1. This is because with λ0 > 0 workers can find jobs with a
help of their relatives (for example, in family business), thus full unemployment can never be a
stationary equilibrium with λ0 > 0. Altogether equilibrium C is a network trap for the labour
market, it is stable with low vacancies and high unemployment. Raising λ0 further we find
that equilibria B and C first coincide (this is a degenerate case with two equilibria) and then
disappear. This is illustrated on the right panel of figure 3.4. Hence we find that larger values
of λ0 are not compatible with multiple equilibria. The same effect appears if we allow for the
formal job search which is reducing the dominance of professional networks.
Closing this section, we note that the first study investigating multiple equilibria in a fric-
tional labour market framework is Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). However, our result is different
from theirs as in their model there are two equilibria with and without networks whereas in
our model professional networks are used in both equilibria A and B. Finally, several equilibria
may prevail even if all three search channels are used simultaneously, but we do not find it for
realistic parameter values in the next section.
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Figure 3.4: Stationary equilibria in the economy with one worker type yi and no formal job
search, λ0 > 0 Left panel: multiple equilibria when λ0 is small. Right panel: unique stable
equilibrium when λ0 is large.
3.4 Numerical example
3.4.1 Search effort and the equilibrium unemployment curve
This section parameterizes the model to match the average labour market indicators in the
OECD countries. We choose a unit period of time to be six months and set r = 0.01 which
corresponds to the annual discount rate of 2%. Further, we follow Shimer (2005) and set the
unemployment benefit b equal to 0.4. Fontaine (2008) uses the value of 0.15 for the U.S. economy
and 0.4 for the French economy. Gautier (2002) and Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) set b equal to
0.2. At the same time, Hall and Milgrom (2008) obtain a larger value of 0.71. Therefore, our
choice of b is in the middle range of the typical values in the literature. Given b = 0.4, the
range of productivities in the model becomes [0.4..1]. The number of worker groups p is not
relevant for the results, so we set p = 25, which corresponds to the productivity gap between
two consequent worker groups equal to 0.025. Intuitively we interpret y1 = 0.4 as unproductive
workers, y7 = 0.55 as median workers and y25 = 1 as most productive workers.
Next, we take the value of the separation rate δ = 0.15 which corresponds to the average
job duration of 1/(2 · 0.15) = 3.3 years. Pissarides (2009) and Shimer (2005) choose δ equal
to 0.1 with one unit of time being a quarter. This corresponds to the average job duration of
1/(4·0.1) = 2.5 years. Hall and Milgrom (2008) choose the value of 3%, whereas Hobijn und Sahin
(2009) report a value of 2.3% per month, so the average job duration becomes 1/(12·0.03) = 2.78
years and 1/(12 ∗ 0.023) = 3.6 years respectively, which is similar to our choice. The job-finding
rate through family contacts λ0 is chosen to be 0.3 and is defined by the unemployment rate of
the least productive workers being equal to µ(b) = δ/(δ+λ0) = 0.33. Note that the productivity
of these workers is equal to b and so the gain from finding a job is zero, and firm profits from
hiring these workers are also zero since w(b) = b. For this reason unproductive workers rely
exclusively on family referrals with a longest average unemployment duration of 1.6 years.
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We choose the number of workers’ professional contacts equal to 50 as in Cahuc and Fontaine
(2009), while Fontaine (2008) uses n = 40 in a benchmark model of his paper. These numbers
are in line with the empirical evidence, for example, in their recent study Cingano and Rosolia
(2012) find that the median number of professional contacts in Italy is equal to 32. This number
is higher in Germany and is equal to 43 according to Glitz (2013). The workers’ bargaining
power α is set equal to 0.72 as in Shimer (2005).
Variable Value Explanation, source and target
n 50 Network size (Cahuc and Fontaine (2009))
r 0.01 Annual interest rate of 2%
λ0 0.3 Unemployment of the least able worker=33%
δ 0.15 Average job duration of 3.3 years
α 0.72 Worker’s bargaining power (Shimer (2005))
b 0.4 Unemployment benefit (Shimer (2005))
p 25 Number of productivity types
cv 22.07 Unemployment of the median worker=8.7%
kv 0.24 Referral hiring of the median worker=40%
Table 3.1: Values of the model parameters
An important feature of our model is its invariance to the shape of the productivity distribu-
tion and the number of vacancies. Recall that the two key variables in the model d0(yi) and d(yi)
are defined in relative terms and are independent of the productivity distribution fi. Moreover,
the total number of vacancies only enters in the two multiplicative terms kv and cv, where k
and c are the unobservable parameters of the two cost functions. To identify variables kv and
cv we target d0(y7) + d(y7) = 0.4 and µ(y7) = 0.087. The first of these conditions implies that
40% of workers in the median group find employment by means of referrals. This assumption is
in line with the empirical observation that 30% to 60% of the employees in developed countries
rely on social contacts in order to find a job (see Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) for an
overview). The second condition implies that the unemployment rate in the median group of
workers is equal to 8.7%. This number is the average unemployment rate in the United States
in the recent years (BLS, 2009-2013). This yields kv = 0.24 and cv = 22.07. Table 3.1 presents
our parameter choices for the benchmark case.
Next we describe our results. Figure 3.5 (left panel) presents variables d0(yi), 1−d0(yi)−d(yi)
and d(yi) for every worker group i = 1..25. These are the average proportions of workers
finding employment by means of family contacts, formal applications and professional contacts
respectively. As we proved in the theoretical part of the paper the average fraction of workers
using family contacts to find a job, d0(yi), is a decreasing curve and the lowest productivity group
never finds jobs through channels other than family contacts. Therefore, the reliance on family
contacts falls down from 100% for the least able workers to only 7% for the most productive
group. Intuitively, even though family contacts become less important for more productive
workers, our model does not exclude situations when talented employees are recommended and
work for the same employer as their parents.
Now consider professional relations. Figure 3.6 (the right panel) shows that firms exert
more advertising effort a(yi) when targeting more productive groups of incumbent employees.
This means that the elasticity condition in proposition 3.1 is satisfied and the positive effect of
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Figure 3.5: Left panel: The graph for average proportions of workers using family, professional
contacts and the formal application in the job search process for different productivity levels.
Right panel: The graph for the average proportions of workers using social contacts in the job
search for different productivity levels (U-shape).
higher profits is dominating for firms. This in turn implies that the job finding rate λ(yi) is an
increasing function of productivity. On the one hand, even if firms contacted their incumbent
employees in a random and undirected manner they would be more likely to be in contact with
a more productive worker as the equilibrium unemployment rate is decreasing with yi (see the
right panel of figure 3.6). On the other hand, it is profitable for firms to direct their search
towards more productive groups of incumbent employees in the expectation of a good applicant.
Therefore, both effects are reinforcing and amplifying each other and the network job-finding
rate λ(yi) is an increasing and a convex function of yi (see the left panel of figure 3.6). Thus
the average proportion of workers using professional contacts to find a job, d(yi) is increasing
from 0% for the least productive group up to 60% for the most productive group. Moreover,
professional referrals are a dominating channel of search for workers with a productivity above
y15 = 0.75.
Finally, consider formal applications as a search channel. Figure 3.5 (left panel) shows that
the relative fraction of workers finding jobs through this channel, 1− d0(yi)− d(yi) is increasing
for productivities below y5 = 0.5 and decreasing thereafter. Intuitively, for the less able workers
the probability of being referred for a job λ(yi) is still relatively low, but the wage wi is already
sufficiently large to motivate these workers for preparing formal applications. However, as the
productivity is increasing, workers’ chances of being referred for a job are improving and the
incentives to invest costly effort and time in preparing applications are mitigated. In line with
this reasoning figure 3.6 (left panel) shows that the search effort s(wi, λi) is an increasing but
a concave function of yi as the positive effect of a higher wage is partially neutralized by the
negative effect of a higher λi. In addition, figure 3.5 (left panel) illustrates that the formal channel
of search is dominating for workers in the middle range of productivities between y2 = 0.425
and y15 = 0.75 reaching a maximum of 62% for workers with a productivity y5 = 0.5.
To sum up, our model is able to jointly replicate a number of empirical observations. First,
without separating social contacts into different types the model shows that the reliance on
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Figure 3.6: Left panel: The graphs for λ0, φ(s(yi)) and for λ(yi) for different productivity levels.
Right panel: The optimal advertising rate a(yi) by firms and the graph for the unemployment
rate µ(yi) for different productivity levels.
social contacts d0(yi) + d(yi) has a distinct U-shape pattern falling down from 100% to 38% for
workers with y5 = 0.5 and rising again to the level of 67% for the most productive workers (see
figure 3.5 (right panel)). In the next section we continue our analysis by comparing average
wages associated with each of the three search channels.
3.4.2 Wage and productivity distributions
It is a well documented empirical fact (see Neal and Rosen (2000) and Mortensen (2003)) that
a typical earnings distribution is hump-shaped and positively skewed with a mean value larger
than the median. Therefore, it is often well approximated by the log-normal distribution. In our
model the distribution fi is discrete, so we use the Negative Binomial productivity distribution
which is a discrete counterpart of the log-normal distribution. In particular, we rely on a special
case of the density which is known as the Polya distribution. Given that this distribution has
an infinite range we truncate it at i = 25. The productivity density fi is then characterized by
two parameters t and π and takes the form:
fi =
f˜i∑25
i=1 f˜i
where f˜i =
( i+ t− 2
i− 1
)
(1− π)tπi−1 = Γ(i+ t− 1)
(i− 1)!Γ(t) (1− π)
tπi−1, i = 1, 2, ...
We set t = 3 to guarantee that the earnings distribution is hump-shaped and positively skewed
in line with empirical evidence. To identify π we exploit the definition of the median worker
having the productivity y7 = 0.55, therefore, we set
∑7
i=1 fi = 0.5 which yields π = 0.717. The
productivity density function fi with t = 3 and π = 0.717 is illustrated by the solid curve on
figure 3.7 (left panel). The equilibrium wage distribution gi , defined in the theoretical part of
the paper, is shown by the dashed curve on the same figure. The wage distribution gi first order
stochastically dominates the productivity distribution fi. This is because the unemployment
rate is higher than the average among the less productive types and lower among the more
productive. Both distributions are, however, very close to each other.
59
Next, we consider the free-entry condition. To identify the cost of an open vacancy z we set
the market tightness v/u equal to 1, where u =
∑p
i=1 µifi is the equilibrium unemployment rate
in the economy. This value coincides with the calibration of Shimer (2005). We get z = 0.39
(flow cost of an open vacancy) in equilibrium, which is close to the value of 0.4 chosen for the
formal search method by Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). The choice of Pissarides (2009) is also
close to our value and is equal to 0.36.
Figure 3.7: Left panel: The graphs for the probability mass functions of the Negative Binomial
distribution and of the equilibrium wage distribution. Right panel: The graphs for the CDFs of
the Negative Binomial distribution and of the equilibrium wage distribution.
The equilibrium wage/productivity distributions conditional on the job search channel hoi , h
s
i
and hni are presented on the right panel of figure 3.7. The wage distribution of workers finding
jobs through their families, hoi , is first order stochastically dominated by the wage distribution
of employees who used a formal application, hsi . The probability mass of the distribution h
o
i
is mostly concentrated in the lower productivity range and so most of the employees in this
group are the low productivity types with low wages. The average productivity of workers using
the family channel is equal to 0.536 and the average wage is w¯o = 0.498. In contrast, the
average productivity of workers using the formal channel is equal to 0.580 and the average wage
is w¯s = 0.530. Therefore, we conclude that the family search channel is associated with a wage
penalty of 6% compared to the formal channel.
The second distribution, hsi , is in turn first order stochastically dominated by the wage
distribution of workers who used professional contacts, hni . Here the average productivity is
equal to 0.656 and the average wage is w¯n = 0.584 (see table 3.2). The probability mass of the
distribution hni is shifted to the right and so this density is mostly concentrated in the middle
range of the productivities. This is due to the fact that the proportion of high productivity
workers in the population is relatively low and almost all of them are employed. Finally, observe
that finding a job with a help of professional contacts is associated with a wage premium of
10%. Therefore, we can rank w¯o < w¯s < w¯n, which is the second prediction of the paper:
when the two types of contacts are separated, then family contacts are more likely to have a
negative effect on wages, whereas professional contacts are more likely to have a positive effect.
Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2015) confirm this result with their empirical finding for the UK
that high-skilled individuals, whose employed friends are non-relatives, earn higher wages and
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low-skilled individuals, whose employed friends are relatives, experience a wage penalty. Sylos
Labini (2004) confirm this finding for Italy.
Specific search channel
Variable Family Formal Professional All channels
Average productivity 0.536 0.580 0.656 0.590
Average wage 0.498 0.530 0.584 0.536
Proportion of employees 0.213 0.541 0.247 1
Table 3.2: Model-generated statistics for the benchmark case
Based on table 3.2 we can also calculate the average wage of employees who found a job by
means of referrals, i.e. both types of social contacts. Let this variable be denoted by w¯c:
w¯c =
w¯o
∑
gid0(yi) + w¯
n
∑
gid(yi)∑
gid0(yi) +
∑
gid(yi)
=
0.498 · 0.213 + 0.584 · 0.247
0.213 + 0.247
= 0.544
w¯c = 0.544 is higher than w¯s = 0.530. Thus, in the benchmark case the positive effect of
professional networks is dominating the negative effect of family contacts and job referrals are
associated with a wage premium of 2.6%. However, this result is sensitive to the relative pro-
portions of workers relying on family and professional relations. To elaborate on this point we
perform comparative statics analysis with respect to parameter t which is a shift parameter
of the distribution. Intuitively, a lower value of t corresponds to labour markets with a larger
proportion of low skilled workers. In the first step, we find t∗ for the neutral scenario when
the effect of referrals on wages is zero. Other parameters remain unchanged. We get the value
t∗ = 2.21. Our results for the neutral scenario are presented in table 3.3. In the second step, we
recognize that the effect of referrals should be negative for t < t∗. Therefore, we consider a wage
penalty scenario as a symmetric case around t∗: t = 1.4 = 2.2 − (3 − 2.2), subtracting from t∗
the difference between the benchmark value of t = 3 and t∗. Our results for the wage penalty
scenario (t = 1.4) are presented in table 3.4:
Specific search channel
Variable Family Formal Professional All channels
Average productivity 0.493 0.545 0.617 0.545
Average wage 0.467 0.504 0.556 0.504
Proportion of employees 0.270 0.538 0.193 1
Table 3.3: Model-generated statistics with t = 2.2
Specific search channel
Variable Family Formal Professional All channels
Average productivity 0.454 0.511 0.575 0.498
Average wage 0.439 0.480 0.526 0.471
Proportion of employees 0.371 0.496 0.134 1
Table 3.4: Model-generated statistics with t = 1.4
fi in the case of the neutral scenario (t = 2.2) is close to our benchmark productivity
distribution, although shifted to the left. Compared to the benchmark scenario, more workers
are relying on their families in the job search process (0.270 > 0.231) and less workers find
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jobs by means of professional contacts (0.193 < 0.247). From table 3.3 we also see that family
contacts have a negative effect of wages, whereas professional contacts are associated with a wage
premium: w¯o = 0.467 < w¯s = 0.504 < w¯n = 0.556. Therefore, we conclude that these results
are due to the self-selection of workers into channels and are robust to different specifications of
the productivity distribution. The average referral wage can be calculated from table 3.3:
w¯c =
0.467 · 0.270 + 0.556 · 0.193
0.270 + 0.193
= 0.504
This value is equal to w¯s and so the average effect of referrals on wages is equal to zero.
The scenario for the wage penalty (t = 1.4) is associated with a further increase in the
proportion of workers relying on families (0.371 > 0.270) and a lower importance of professional
contacts (0.134 < 0.193). As before, table 3.4 confirms that family contacts are associated with
a wage penalty, whereas professional networks with wage premium, since w¯o = 0.439 < w¯s =
0.480 < w¯n = 0.526. The average referral wage can be calculated from table 3.4:
w¯c =
0.439 · 0.371 + 0.526 · 0.134
0.371 + 0.134
= 0.462
This value is lower than 0.480 = w¯s and so there is a wage penalty equal to 1.9%.
This section shows that the negative effect of family contacts and the positive effect of
professional contacts are both robust to the exact specification of the productivity distribution
in the population. However, the average effect of referrals on wages is sensitive to the specific
distribution and can be positive or negative depending on the relative proportions of high and
low productivity groups. Thus, our model provides an additional explanation for the ambiguous
results reported in the empirical literature, which were summarized in the introduction.
3.5 Robustness checks
3.5.1 Family contacts
In this section we analyze whether the model is robust with respect to the modeling of the family
search channel. For simplicity suppose that every worker has exactly one family member, for
example, a parent or a spouse. If this family member is employed, he/she continues searching
for jobs in the formal way with a constant search intensity s0. At rate φ(s0) = vs0 this family
member is matched with an open vacancy and forwards this information to the unemployed
relative. Thus we can extend the model, where the modified job-finding rate through the family
channel, λi0, is equal to the matching rate vs0 multiplied by the employment probability of the
helping family member. Further, the probability of being employed depends on the skill level
of the helping relative. In the benchmark model of the paper we assumed that the job-finding
rate λ0 was constant across groups which can only be in the absence of skill homophily within
families. However, this case is not completely satisfactory as there exists empirical evidence of
positive skill correlation between parents and grown-up children and between spouses5. In order
5See Hertz et al. (2007) and Black et al. (2011) for the intergenerational schooling correlation and Smits
(2003) for the educational homogamy of spouses
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to account for this correlation we propose the following equation for λi0:
λi0 = vs0[βei + (1− β)e¯]
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is a mixing parameter, ei is the employment rate of group i and e¯ is the
employment rate in the median skill group (i = 7). To understand this equation consider the
two extreme cases. If β = 1, then the job-finding rate λi0 is equal to vs0ei, this is the case of
strong homophily between family members. Note that in this case family members are situated
in the same skill group i and so their employment rate is equal to ei. In the opposite case,
when β = 0, the job-finding rate is constant across groups, λi0 = vs0e¯, implying the absence
of skill homophily. This is the benchmark case of the model, so we set vs0e¯ = λ0. Following
the calibration above, the equilibrium employment rate of the median worker group (i = 7) is
equal to e¯ = 1− 0.087 = 0.913, which gives us an estimate of the formal matching rate between
firms and family members: φ(s0) = 0.33. Note that s0 is relatively low given that the individual
matching rate of unemployed workers is ranged between 0 and 1.33 for i = 1..25.
Variable β can be seen as a fraction of type i workers with family members in the same group.
Thus a larger value of β is associated with a stronger homophily of family members and a stronger
correlation of skills within families. In order to find an estimate of β we target the correlation
coefficient between family members equal to 0.46, which is the empirical estimate of Hertz et al.
(2007). This correlation coefficient can be derived from the corresponding probability matrix,
where the measure βfi of type i workers are linked to family members in the same skill group.
In contrast, a measure (1 − β)fi of these workers are linked to family members with a median
skill level y7 = 0.55. In the special case β = 1, this matrix has zero entries off the diagonal as
families are exclusively formed within the same skill group. Based on this probability matrix we
find that a correlation coefficient of 0.46 corresponds to β = 0.225.
With a stronger homophily within the family, there is a higher probability that family mem-
bers of unproductive workers are also unproductive. This makes their help in the search process
less likely, thus the job-finding rate λi0 falls below λ0 = 0.3. This drop is particularly pronounced
for the least productive group (i = 1) as the job-finding rate falls down to 0.28 for the realistic
scenario β = 0.225 and down to 0.18 for the case of full homophily β = 1. At the same time,
the unemployment rate in this worker group rises from 0.33 to 0.35 for the realistic scenario
β = 0.225 and up to 0.46 for the case of full homophily. However, we find that the change in
unemployment is relatively small for all other groups.
Further, we have calculated average wages for each of the three search channels in the model
for the extreme case of perfect skill correlation between family members (case β = 1). They are
given in table 3.5. In this scenario, unproductive workers are worse off as on average they are less
likely to get help from their family members. This is reflected in the lower proportion of workers
finding jobs through families compared to the benchmark scenario in table 3.2 (0.207 < 0.213).
As family contacts become less relevant, workers exert more effort in the formal channel, so there
is a small increase in the proportion of workers finding jobs through the formal channel (0.545 >
0.541). Despite these changes, the overall intuitive result of the model remains unchanged:
family contacts are associated with wage penalties, whereas professional contacts are associated
with wage premiums. Given that β = 1 is an unrealistic hypothetical scenario, the changes are
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even smaller for the realistic case β = 0.225. Thus we conclude that our results are robust to
the constant specification of λ0.
Specific search channel
Variable Family Formal Professional All channels
Average productivity 0.541 0.579 0.656 0.590
Average wage 0.501 0.529 0.584 0.537
Proportion of employees 0.207 0.545 0.247 1
Table 3.5: Perfect skill correlation between family members
3.5.2 Hiring costs
As a final robustness check we present comparative statics results with respect to the hiring
cost parameter z. This parameter primarily includes the costs of posting job ads in the media
(newspapers, Internet, etc.). In the benchmark case we have chosen z = 0.39 to achieve a
market tightness ratio (v/u) equal to 1. Corollary of proposition 3.2 proves that vacancies
(unemployment) are decreasing (increasing) in z without professional networks. In this section
we numerically investigate whether this relationship also holds in the presence of professional
referrals.
The left panel of figure 3.8 shows changes in v and in the average unemployment rate u.
As the cost z is increasing from 0.2 to the benchmark case 0.39, firms post less vacancies
and the average unemployment rate is increasing from 0.072 to the benchmark case 0.096.
Thus the model captures the macroeconomic dynamics of the labour market as vacancies and
unemployment are moving in the opposite directions. The right panel of figure 3.8 shows changes
in the U-shape of the referral hiring pattern. If the cost parameter is decreasing, then firms have
more vacancies which should be filled. This improves the formal job-finding rates φ(si) = vsi
and the network matching rates λi. However, as the chances of finding jobs through professional
contacts are improving (that is λi is increasing) workers optimally reduce their individual search
effort si. Thus the initial rise in φ(si) is moderated by the lower search intensity si. Overall, this
implies that the ratio of workers finding jobs through professional contacts is increasing with a
larger number of vacancies and the U-shape pattern becomes more pronounced. So the model
predicts that networks are relatively more (less) utilized in the periods of expansions (recessions)
compared to the formal search channel.
Investigating the link between vacancies and referral hiring is a relatively new research di-
rection. To the best of our knowledge there are only two other studies dealing with this issue.
First, in a theoretical model Horvath (2012) finds that in economic upturn the neighbors of an
individual are more likely to be employed in high paying jobs and hence, it is more likely that
the individual hears about a high paying job through them. This finding is intuitively similar to
our result if a higher number of vacancies in our model is understood as an economic upturn in
Horvath (2012). And second, Galeotti and Merlino (2014) find a U-shape relationship between
the job-destruction rate and the network matching rate. This is an empirical finding which is in
line with their theoretical model. It means that improving economic conditions are associated
with a higher utilization of networks in the beginning. But as economic conditions improve
further, network matching becomes less relevant. The first part of the effect is compatible with
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Figure 3.8: Left panel: Changes in the vacancy rate v and in the average unemployment rate u
with the increase in vacancy cost z. Right panel: Changes in the U-shape of the referral hiring
pattern for different vacancy costs z.
our model, even though it does not predict a lower network matching rate at the pick of the
economic expansion. Overall, we conclude that empirical evidence on this question is rather
sparse and more empirical and theoretical work should be done in the future to investigate this
issue in more details.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper develops a labour market matching model with a finite number of heterogeneous
worker groups and three channels of job search: family contacts, formal applications and profes-
sional contacts. Moreover, the model relies on the assumption of network homophily meaning
that workers connected in the network are all of the same productivity type. In this framework,
we are able to generate a significant U-shape relationship between the frequency of referral hiring
and the productivity/skill level of the worker.
We show that the gain from preparing applications is increasing in the worker type and
so it is relatively costly for low productivity workers to rely on the formal channel. On the
other hand, firms with open vacancies direct their network search towards more productive
incumbent employees in the anticipation of higher profits. Therefore, the family channel of
search is predominantly employed by unproductive workers as a method of last resort, whereas
the network of professional contacts is largely used by most productive workers. These two
mechanisms explain the U-shaped referral hiring pattern, which implies that professional (family)
referrals are associated with wage premiums (penalties) compared to the average wage. This is
due to the endogenous sorting of workers across the three channels and implies that combining
family and professional referrals into one informal channel may generate spurious empirical
findings. Our results shed some light on the contradicting empirical evidence and may serve as
a further step in the explanation of the ”referral puzzle”, at least from a theoretical perspective.
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3.8 Appendix
Appendix 3.8.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1:
The rent Ri can be obtained as a solution of the following quadratic equation:
0.25cvR2i + (r + δ + λ0 + λi)Ri − (wi − b) = 0
Since workers will only accept the job with Ri ≥ 0 it holds that:
Ri =
2
cv
[
√
(r + δ + λ0 + λ(yi))2 + (wi − b)cv − (r + δ + λ0 + λi)]
therefore the optimal effort is given by si = 0.5cRi, where Ri is increasing in wi but decreasing
in λi:
∂Ri
∂λi
=
2
cv
[√ (r + δ + λ0 + λi)2
(r + δ + λ0 + λi)2 + (wi − b)cv − 1
]
< 0
To reduce notation in the following let Di ≡ r + δ + λ0 + λi. To prove that search effort si is a
decreasing function of the number of vacancies v, differentiate it with respect to v to obtain:
∂si
∂v
=
1
v2
[ 0.5(wi − b)cv√
D2i + (wi − b)cv
−
(√
D2i + (wi − b)cv −Di
)]
The function in the square bracket takes value zero at v = 0. It turns out that there are no
other values of v delivering a zero to this function. To see this, differentiate expression in the
square bracket to get:
− 0.25(wi − b)
2c2v
(D2i + (wi − b)cv)
√
D2i + (wi − b)cv
+
0.5(wi − b)c√
D2i + (wi − b)cv
− 0.5(wi − b)c√
D2i + (wi − b)c
< 0
Thus the function in the square bracket starts at zero and is downward sloping for any v > 0.
However, this means that it is negative for any v > 0, so the derivative ∂si/∂v is also negative
for any v > 0.
Appendix 3.8.2. Proof of Lemma 3.2:
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Differentiate λi with respect to µi for a given fixed advertising intensity ai:
∂λ(µi, ai)
∂µi
= vai
[
− 1
µ2i
[1− (1− µi)n] + 1− µi
µi
n(1− µi)n−1
]
=
vai
µ2i
[
−1 + (1− µi)n + nµi(1− µi)n
]
=
vai
µ2i
[(1 − µi)n(nµi + 1)− 1]
Let σ(µ) denote the first term in the square bracket (suppressing the subindex), i.e. σ(µ) =
(1− µ)n(nµ + 1). Note that σ(0) = 1 and σ(1) = 0. Moreover, σ(µ) is a decreasing function of
µ for 0 < µ < 1:
∂σ
∂µ
= −n(1− µ)n−1(nµ+ 1− µ+ µ) + (1− µ)nn
= n[−(1− µ)n − (1− µ)n−1µ(n+ 1) + (1− µ)n] = −n(1− µ)n−1µ(n+ 1) < 0
This proves that σ(µ) = (1 − µ)n(nµ+ 1) < 1 and, therefore, ∂λ(µi, ai)/∂µi < 0 for 0 < µ < 1.
Next, applying the L’Hopital’s rule one can show that:
lim
µi→0
λi = vai
limµi→0(1− (1− µi)n)
limµi→0 µi
= vai lim
µi→0
n(1− µi)n−1 = nvai
and also limµi→1 λi = 0. This completes the proof of lemma 3.2.
Appendix 3.8.3: Proof of Lemma 3.3
First, note that at the intersection between the curves µ(λ, y) and λ(µ, a) (see figure), the latter
curve (NC) is flatter than the former curve (UC), this means:
0 >
∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
>
[∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
]
−1
⇒ 0 < ∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
· ∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
< 1
Taking a total derivative of µ(λ, y) with respect to y yields the following:
dµ =
∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
dλ+
∂µ(λ, y)
∂y
dy and dλ =
∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
dµ
Therefore, we get the following result:
∂m(y, a)
∂y
=
dµ
dy
=
∂µ(λ, y)
∂y
[
1− ∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
· ∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
]
−1
< 0
since ∂µ(λ, y)/∂y < 0 and expression in the square bracket is positive. Similarly, we can show
that ∂m(y, a)/∂a < 0.
Appendix 3.8.4: Proof of Proposition 3.1:
(i) First, note the following results from before:
∂m(y, a)
∂y
< 0
∂m(y, a)
∂a
< 0
∂a(m, y)
∂m
> 0
∂a(m, y)
∂y
> 0
Taking a total derivative of m(a, y) with respect to y yields the following:
dm =
∂m(y, a)
∂y
dy +
∂m(y, a)
∂a
da =
∂m(y, a)
∂y
dy +
∂m(y, a)
∂a
[∂a(m, y)
∂m
dm+
∂a(m, y)
∂y
dy
]
67
dm
[
1− ∂m(y, a)
∂a
∂a(m, y)
∂m
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
=
[∂m(y, a)
∂y
+
∂m(y, a)
∂a
∂a(m, y)
∂y
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dy ⇒ dm
dy
< 0
Next we show that unemployment is decreasing in vacancies v. First note that:
dµ =
∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
dλ+
∂µ(λ, y)
∂v
dv =
∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
[∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
dµ+
∂λ
∂v
dv
]
+
∂µ(λ, y)
∂v
dv
∂m(y, a)
∂v
=
dµ
dv
=
[∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
∂λ
∂v
+
∂µ(λ, y)
∂v
][
1− ∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
· ∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
]
−1
< 0
because ∂µ(λ, y)/∂λ < 0, ∂λ/∂v > 0 and ∂µ(λ, y)/∂v < 0. Then we consider the total change
in unemployment m(y, a):
dm =
∂m(y, a)
∂v
dv +
∂m(y, a)
∂a
da =
∂m(y, a)
∂v
dv +
∂m(y, a)
∂a
∂a
∂m
dm
Finally, we can show that unemployment is a decreasing function of vacancies v:
dm
[
1− ∂m(y, a)
∂a
∂a(m, y)
∂m
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
=
∂m(y, a)
∂v
dv < 0
(ii) Let ρ(yi) ≡ [1− (1− µ(yi))n] denote the probability of a referral, it then holds that a(yi) =
0.5kρ(yi)J(yi), where J(yi) = (1−α)(yi− b)/(r+ δ) given the free-entry condition V = 0. Next
differentiate a(yi) with respect to yi to obtain:
∂a(yi)
∂(yi − b) =
∂ρ(yi)
∂(yi − b)J(yi) + ρ(yi)
∂J(yi)
∂(yi − b) =
∂ρ(yi)
∂(yi − b)
(1− α)(yi − b)
r + δ
+ ρ(yi)
(1 − α)
r + δ
Therefore,
∂a(yi)
∂yi
=
∂a(yi)
∂(yi − b) > 0 if
∂ρ(yi)
∂(yi − b) ·
(yi − b)
ρ(yi)
> −1
Appendix 3.8.5. Suppose the distribution hsi first order stochastically dominates the distribu-
tion h0i , then it holds H
s
i ≤ Hoi , ∀i = 1..p. The average wage w¯o can be written as:
w¯o =
p∑
i=1
wih
o
i = w1h
o
1 + w2h
o
2 + w3h
o
3 + ...+ wp−1h
o
p−1 + wph
o
p
= w1(h
o
1 + h
o
2 + ...+ h
o
p) + (w2 − w1)(ho2 + ...+ hop) + ...+ (wp − wp−1)hop
= w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
(wi+1 − wi)
p∑
j=i+1
hoj = w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
(wi+1 − wi)(1 −
i∑
j=1
hoj) = w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
(wi+1 − wi)(1 −Hoi )
In a similar way, one can derive an equation for w¯s. So that w¯o < w¯s if Hsi ≤ Hoi , ∀i = 1..p.
Appendix 3.8.6: Proof of proposition 3.2.
Consider the free-entry condition z =
∑(λ0
v + si
)
µifiJi. In the absence of professional
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networks we get that Di = r + δ + λ0. Next, applying the L’Hopital’s rule one can show that:
lim
v→0
si =
limv→0
√
D2i + (wi − b)cv −Di
limv→0 v
= lim
v→0
0.5(wi − b)c√
D2i + (wi − b)cv
=
0.5(wi − b)c
r + δ + λ0
Similarly one can show that limv→∞ si = 0, limv→0 µi = δ/(δ + λ0) and limv→∞ µi = 0. Then
we know that the right hand side of the free-entry condition is a decreasing function such that
limv→0(
λ0
v + si
)
µi = ∞ and limv→∞(λ0v + si
)
µi = 0. Thus there exists a unique intersection
between the cost z on the left hand side and the expected profit on the right hand side.
To show that vacancies v are decreasing in the hiring cost z we find ∂v/∂z from equation
(3.12):
∂v
∂z
=
[∑(
(−λ0
v2
+
∂si
∂v
)µi + (
λ0
v
+ si)
∂µi
∂v
)
fiJi
]
−1
< 0 since
∂si
∂v
≤ 0 and ∂µi
∂v
≤ 0
Next we prove lemma 3.4. Consider an economy with only one worker type (yi > b), where
professional networks are the only channel of search. The free-entry condition (V = 0) in this
economy simplifies to yield z = 0.25k(1 − µi)(1 − (1 − µi)n)2J2i . The first order derivative of
(1− µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2 is given by:
∂(1− µi)(1− (1− µi)n)2
∂µi
= (1− (1− µi)n)[(1 − µi)n(1 + 2n)− 1]
Thus this function takes value zero at µi = 0, it is then increasing to the unique maximum point
at µ∗i = 1− (1 + 2n)−1/n and then falls down to zero for µi = 1. So there exist two roots of the
free-entry condition if z is smaller than the maximum of this function which is given by:
0.25k(1 − µ∗i )(1− (1− µ∗i )n)2J2i = 0.25kJ2i (1 + 2n)−1/n(1−
1
1 + 2n
)2 =
kn2J2i
(1 + 2n)2+1/n
Next we find the corresponding vacancies from the equilibrium unemployment equation:
v =
δ
0.5k(1 − (1− µ∗i )n)2Ji
= δ(1 − µi)0.5Ji/z
since from the free-entry condition we have 0.5k(1 − (1− µ∗i )n)2Ji = z/(1− µi)0.5Ji.
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4 Asymmetric information in a search model with social con-
tacts
4.1 Introduction
Uncertainty with respect to worker characteristics is one of the most important problems in the
hiring process and has been intensively studied in the literature since the works of Akerlof (1970)
and Spence (1973) on asymmetric information about the worker’s productivity (for instance,
Guash and Weiss (1980), Samuelson (1984), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Alonso (2014)).
In addition, there are many recent models studying the issue of asymmetric information in a
search-theoretical framework. For example, in their paper, Guerrieri et al. (2010) add search and
matching frictions to the classical problems in economies with adverse selection. Kennan (2010)
extends the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model to allow for private information about the
match productivity on the firms’ side. Moreover, Bruegemann and Moscarini (2010) investigate
the search model with two-sided private information about gains from a match. Related papers
are, for example, Dao (2009), Delacroix and Wasmer (2009), Michelacci and Suarez (2006),
Acemoglu (1995), Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004).
In addition, there is strong empirical evidence that 30 - 60% of new employees find jobs
through their social contacts (see for example Staiger (1990), Granovetter (1995), Pistaferri
(1999), Kugler (2003), Pelizarri (2010), Bentolila et. al. (2010) for different countries). More-
over, the popularity of electronic Social Network Systems (SNS) like LinkedIn, Xing or Facebook
in the last decade made it easier to maintain social connections and use them for the job search.1
These observations increase the importance of incorporating the social contacts’ aspects into the
theoretical models of labour market.
Montgomery (1991) is a first theoretical paper which includes both the uncertainty of firms
with respect to worker’s productivity and the presence of job referrals. In this model, it was found
that social contacts’ use in the job search may lead to a lower mismatch and therefore, to a higher
production efficiency. Due to the pioneering assumption that referrals reveal the quality of the
match, also emphasized, for example, in the theoretical paper of Simon and Warner (1992) and
approved in the empirical work of Hensvik and Skans (2013), firms with more ability-sensitive
technology will hire through social contacts. Therefore, there will be more good matches due to
referrals. The classical view in the models on uncertainty not including networks, however, is
that asymmetric information generally leads to more inefficiency in the economy (for example,
Akerlof (1970), Guerierri et al. (2010), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Bruegemann and
Moscarini (2010), Delacroix and Wasmer (2009)). These mixed results, thus, motivate for more
research on these issues.
In particular, it would be natural to think, that the presence of firm’s uncertainty with
respect to workers’ possibilities to find jobs through social contacts in addition to the asymmetric
information about their productivity will create even larger inefficiency. One of the present
paper’s main objectives is, thus, to investigate this question, which is novel to the literature.
More precisely, this paper studies the consequences of the former uncertainty while allowing the
1According to Statista (2014), 87% (23%) of U.S. Internet users, who are 18-29 years old, 73% (31%) of 30-49
years old and 63% (30%) of 50-64 years old used Facebook (LinkedIn) in September 2014. Similar numbers are
presented also by Pew Research Center (2014). These numbers are larger than in the previous years.
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worker’s productivity to be the common knowledge for simplicity. Let us now shortly describe
the main ingredients of the theoretical model.
In this paper, the random matching model is proposed, in which homogeneous firms face
uncertainty about the social capital of job seekers, who have equal productivity and all other
observable characteristics. The term social capital denotes the number of actual contacts of a
worker, who typically can help her to find a job in addition to her own job search through the
formal channel of public offers. Thus, workers who have a larger social capital, have also larger
outside options (reservation wage) in terms of job search. This number is known perfectly to
workers. For simplicity, only two worker types are considered - with a low and high number of
actual contacts. Wages are assumed to be offered only by firms in a form of a take-it-or-leave-it
offer during the interview with a job seeker. A worker accepts a wage contract if it is at least as
large as her outside options. In addition, wages are set in such a way that workers will have an
incentive to exert an endogenous effort which increases the duration of a match.
A firm knows only the distribution of workers’ social capital (or of worker types) in the
economy and has to offer such a wage contract to a worker, so that she accepts it, otherwise
a firm is left with an open vacancy and receives zero profit in the equilibrium. An important
feature of the model is that firms also check the worker’s profile and her public number of non-
fictitious social contacts in the Social Network Systems in the Internet during the interview.
This number is assumed to be correlated to the actual number of friends and, therefore, serves
as a noisy signal of the social capital for firms when they decide about the wage offer. A worker
knows that her profile is being checked.2
This ingredient of the model is supported by the recent empirical evidence. For instance, in
the nationwide survey in the U.S., which was conducted on behalf of CareerBuilder in February
2013, and included more than 2,100 hiring managers and human resource professionals, it was
found that ”nearly 39 percent of firms use SNS to research job candidates, up from 37 percent
in 2012” (CarreerBuilder.com (2013))3. Among other general personal characteristics of an
individual, the firms pay attention, whether the job seeker has great communication skills and
whether other people posted great references about the candidate (CarreerBuilder.com (2013)).
Moreover, Roulin and Bangerter (2013) find from the 96 HR managers’ survey, that recruiters
also focus on the number of friends generated by the SNS, since it may reflect the applicants
network4.
In addition, Bohnert and Ross (2010) have conducted the laboratory experiment, where
it was found that the candidates having alcohol-oriented pictures in their profile were offered
7 percent less salary than candidates having family-oriented pictures. At the same time, Utz
(2010) proposes a sociological experiment, which shows, that the person’s profile, profile pictures
2Vicknair et al. (2010) report that 45.3% students believe that employers and recruiters look at job candidates’
social networking profiles all of the time.
3Further, Manant et al. (2014) conduct an experiment with two fictitious Facebook profiles of applicants that
differ in their origin, in which they find the strong evidence (40% difference) that employers rely on the online
information when deciding to call an applicant back for interview. ”IT is the industry using it the most, at a
whopping 52 percent. The least? Health care, at 28 percent. Employers are primarily using Facebook (65 percent)
and LinkedIn (63 percent) to research candidates” (CarreerBuilder.com (2012)). Employers are using all the tools
available to them to assure they make the correct hiring decision, and the use of social media continues to grow”,
says Rosemary Haefner, vice president of human resources at CareerBuilder (CarreerBuilder.com (2013)).
4They also report that professional SNS (e.g., LinkedIn) is perceived as a potential antecedent of Person-Job
fit and personal SNS (e.g., Facebook) - of Person-Organization fit.
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of the friends and number of friends jointly influence others’ impressions, since the number of
contacts is more likely to be manipulated.5 Hence, the public number of contacts, which a
firm can look up in an SNS is not necessarily the one generated by the system, but rather the
approximate number of contacts who would be ready and able to help the person to find a job
from the firm’s point of view6.
In the present model, it is also assumed for simplicity that all job-seekers have SNS profiles
and all firms look them up. Another simplifying assumption is that workers cannot increase
their public number of contacts (make the overall impression and social attractiveness better)
only for the signalling purpose or, equivalently, firms can identify this manipulation quite easily.
In this paper, there are two wage contracts for simplicity, that are intended at workers
with low and high number of actual friends, respectively. A (partially) separating equilibrium
is considered, which follows a threshold rule w.r.t. a signal according to a firms’ indifference
condition. In this equilibrium, the higher wage will be accepted by both worker types and the
lower wage only by the low types leading only to partial separation.
The model generates a positive relationship between the number of contacts in the Social
Network System in the Internet and the wage offered by firms in the equilibrium. Thus, there will
be a wage dispersion between equally productive workers with different number of contacts in the
Internet, which extends the classical result on wage dispersion with respect to the signal in the
literature on uncertainty about the worker’s productivity (see, for example, Spence (1973))7.
Moreover, this model gives an additional explanation for the empirically observed log wage
dispersion between workers with equal productivity and other observable characteristics of about
70% (e.g. Mortensen (2003)). In addition, this model is in line with the theoretical literature
emphasizing the positive effect of referrals on wages and the wage dispersion due to the difference
in the number of social contacts. For instance, such theoretical papers as Montgomery (1992)
and Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) incorporate the similar mechanism as in the present paper,
namely, that social contacts increase the reservation wage. This positive effect is found also in
many empirical works, for example, in Staiger (1990), Simon and Warner (1992), Granovetter
(1995), Margolis and Simonnet (2003) and Goos and Salomons (2007) for different countries.
Overall, however, the theory and evidence on the effect of social contacts on wages are mixed8.
In addition, the comparative statics w.r.t. the firms’ uncertainty level increase was conducted.
Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes were compared numerically with the two extreme cases: the
case of perfect information, when workers’ social capital is observed perfectly, and the case of a
full information asymmetry, when firms don’t have any reliable signal to make inferences about
workers’ outside options. It was found that (reservation) wages, the overall average firm’s profit
and average workers’ income levels in the benchmark case lead to those arising in the case of
5Therefore, one can conclude, that hiring managers try to get an overall impression about the candidates
personality, communal orientation, social attractiveness etc. and about her possibilities to be referred for a job.
6Indeed, among adults, on average, 37% of their total Facebook friends are reported to be actual friends
(Ellison et al. (2014)) and, among undergraduate students, 25% are their actual friends (Ellison et al. (2011)).
7The present framework can be easily changed in order to analyze the relationship between the wage offered and
the test score during the interview with a worker, where the test score is a noisy signal of a worker’s productivity. In
this case workers will be different in the productivity, but not in the job-finding rate. The present model, however,
aims at analyzing the opposite case, when workers differ in the job-finding rate, but not in the productivity.
8Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez (2010) report wage penalties in the United States and the European Union.
This result is supported by Delattre and Sabatier (2007), Pistaferri (1999) as well as Addison and Portugal (2002)
for France, Italy and Portugal respectively.
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a full information asymmetry as the firms’ uncertainty level increases. Thus, naturally, the
equilibrium outcomes in the asymmetric information case are in between of these two extreme
cases.
The overall average workers’ income is decreasing since the average workers’ income of low
types is increasing slower than that of high types is decreasing. The overall average firms’ profit
is increasing since the number of vacancies decreases. The overall social welfare is increasing and
is larger than those in the two extreme cases for the large level of uncertainty since the overall
average firms’ profit is increasing faster the overall average workers’ income is decreasing. This
result may seem counterintuitive.
One of the reasons for this is that firms anticipate that expected profits from an open vacancy
will decrease due to more mismatched wages offered and open less vacancies thus decreasing their
overall cost and leading to the welfare increase. So the information asymmetry turns out to be
welfare improving as firms, by chance, will employ less workers which they would not like to
employ. In the standard search theory with perfect information (for example, Pissarides (2000)),
the social welfare is maximized when the workers’ bargaining power is equal to the elasticity
of the job-filling rate. This result is known as the Hosios condition. Otherwise, when their
bargaining power is too low (high), firms will open too many (few) vacancies due to low (high)
wages leading to more inefficiency. Since in the present model the wage is offered only by firms,
the workers’ wages are relatively low. This gives an intuition why the social welfare in the perfect
information case is not the largest since the Hosios condition is not satisfied.
It is interesting to compare this finding to the conclusion of Montgomery (1991) that social
contacts use leads to a higher level of social welfare due to a lower mismatch between firms
and workers as referrals reveal the quality of the match. In the present paper, a higher level of
mismatched wages offered contributes to the increase in the welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains notation and the general labour
market environment. In section 4.3 the decisions of workers and firms are investigated and
the equilibrium outcome is presented. Section 4.4 compares the benchmark case of the model
to the perfect information case and section 4.5 compares it to the another extreme case of a
full information asymmetry. Section 4.6 discusses the issue of social welfare comparison between
these three cases. Section 4.7 illustrates the theoretical results and comparative statics by means
of a numerical example, while section 4.8 concludes the paper.
4.2 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a continuum of infinitely
lived risk neutral workers and firms discounting future at a common discount rate r. Firms are
homogeneous and free to enter the labour market by opening a new vacancy with the flow cost
c of travelling and accommodation of job seekers and advertising job offers in the Internet,
newspapers, job fairs etc.
All the workers in the economy have the same productivity y, but differ only in the number
of actual contacts (or social capital), which is their private information in the benchmark case
of the model. These contacts may help them in the job search (informal channel) in addition
to the formal search in a public job market and therefore, influence their outside options. It is
assumed that the search is costless through both channels for simplicity. The matching between
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workers and firms is random. Wages are assumed to be only offered by firms (take-it-or-leave-it
offer) during the interview and a worker accepts the wage contract if it exceeds or is equal to
her outside options. For simplicity, let there be only two types of workers: with low and high
social capital, i.e. with the number of actual contacts nL or nH , respectively. They are further
also referred to as type i workers, where i = L,H. Firms are aware about the values of nL and
nH and about the distribution of worker types. Denote the fraction of workers who have a low
social capital as Pr(nL). Then, the fraction of workers with the high social capital is equal to
Pr(nH) = 1− Pr(nL).
Let the total measure of workers be equal to 1. A worker can be either employed or unem-
ployed. Let ui be the mass of unemployed workers of type i (with µi = ui/Pr(ni) being their
unemployment rate) and ei - the mass of corresponding employed workers in the benchmark
case, so that ei+ui = Pr(ni). In addition, firms can see the worker’s public number of contacts
n′i in the Social Network Systems in the Internet which is correlated to ni and therefore serves
as a noisy signal of ni for firms when they decide about the wage offer during the interview. It
is assumed for simplicity that workers cannot increase their number n′i only for the signalling
purpose.
Moreover, firms intend to provide workers with correct incentives. When employed the
worker of a particular type chooses an optimal effort level g ≥ 0 conditional on the contract
wage offered her by the firm. This effort is unobservable to the firm. The cost of exerting effort
g is k(g), where it is assumed that k(0) = 0, k′(g) > 0. Every firm-worker match is subject
to the separation rate δ(g), which is modeled as a decreasing function of g (δ′(g) < 0) as in
Zaharieva (2010) in such a way inducing workers to exert more effort in order to increase the
match duration. Let us consider throughout the paper the example when the separation rate
δ(g) takes the following form: δ(g) = 1/(
√
g + d0) (diminishing returns of effort to the job
duration). The constant d0 > 0 denotes the minimal job duration corresponding to zero effort.
Let also the effort cost function take a usual quadratic form, i.e. k(g) = k0g
2, where k0 > 0 is a
constant multiplier.
Let m(u, v) denote a matching function between workers and firms, where v is the number of
open vacancies and u =
∑
i ui is the overall number of unemployed workers. For simplicity, let
us assume that the matching technology is quadratic, that is m(u, v) = uv.9 Consider first the
formal search channel. The number of matches between open vacancies and unemployed workers
of type i is given by vu · ui
u
= vui, meaning that their job-finding rate through this channel of
job search is equal to
vui
ui
= v.
In addition, unemployed workers can hear about open vacancies through their actual social
contacts. First, an employee hears about a new job opening at an exogenous rate a per unit
time as in Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). Then, this employee transmits the vacancy information
to one randomly chosen unemployed friend out of a pool of her actual contacts. Thus, the
firm is not aware whether the person has found a job in the formal way or received vacancy
information through the network. Let us introduce the additional parameter γ denoting the
level of homophily between the actual social contacts of a worker, i.e. when γ = 1 all the
workers with low (high) number of friends are in contact only with also low (high) types and
9This approach is also used, for example, in Gautier et al. (2010). Moreover, this technology may be, due to
Teulings and Gautier (2004), the most adequate assumption in models with heterogeneous workers.
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when γ = 0.5 there is no homophily. In general, for γ ∈ [0.5, 1], γni contacts of a type-i worker
are of the same type and (1− γ)ni contacts are of the opposite type.
For the special case of the full homophily, γ = 1, the job finding rate of a type-i worker
λi = avei
[1− (1− µi)ni ]
ui
= av(1 − µi) [1− (1− µi)
ni ]
µi
as in Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2015).
The expression in square brackets is the probability that there is at least one unemployed worker
among the ni contacts of an employed worker. This case will be taken as a benchmark throughout
the paper for the sake of simplicity. According to Rivera et al. (2010), social networks tend to
exhibit a high level of homophily with respect to such characteristics as age, gender, religion,
ethnicity, values, intelligence, and education. Indeed, this case may, for instance, capture the
situation when foreigners (natives) are more likely to be in contact with other foreigners (natives)
and, thus, to be members of a network with low (high) number of contacts. Thus, in this case,
the larger is the number of actual contacts of the worker of type i the larger is her λi. The
expression for λi can be also easily modified for the case of γ < 1.
10
As it is mentioned above, firms don’t observe the actual number of contacts ni of a worker
but look up the number of contacts n′i in the Internet during the interview in order to make an
inference about ni (and, hence, about her outside options) and to offer on this basis such a wage
contract that a worker of type i will accept. This noisy signal n′i is assumed to be correlated to
ni, i.e. n
′
i = ni + ǫ, where the observation error of the firm ǫ is normally distributed with the
mean 0 and the standard deviation σǫ, i.e. N(0, σ
2
ǫ ).
Therefore, a worker with ni actual contacts knows that a firm will draw the number of
contacts n′i from the conditional distribution with the c.d.f. F (n
′|ni) and the density f(n′|ni)
having the mean ni and the standard deviation σǫ:
F (n′|ni) : N(ni, σ2ǫ )
On the other hand, a firm infers the probability that the unemployed worker has nL actual
contacts conditional on the observed signal n′. It can be found from the Bayes’ rule:
Pr(nL|n′) = 1− Pr(nH |n′) = f(n
′|nL) · β
f(n′|nL) · β + f(n′|nH) · (1− β)
where β =
uL
uL + uH
is the probability that the worker met is of type-L and 1− β = uH
uL + uH
is
10Let us denote the type opposite to the type i by j. The probability that there is at least one unemployed
worker among the ni contacts of a type-i employed worker is equal to [1 − (1 − µi)
γni(1 − µj)
(1−γ)ni ] as (1 −
µi)
γni (1−µj)
(1−γ)ni is the probability that all her contacts are employed. Let the average unemployment rate in
the network of type-i workers be equal to µ¯i = γµi+(1−γ)µj . With the probability
γµi
µ¯i
the unemployed worker,
to whom the vacancy information is transmitted, is also of type i and with the probability
(1− γ)µj
µ¯i
this worker
is of the opposite type. The probability that there will be a match between a firm and a given type-i unemployed
worker through any of her type-i employed contacts is then equal to avei[1 − (1 − µi)
γni (1 − µj)
(1−γ)ni ]
γµi
µ¯i
.
Analogously, the probability that there will be a match between a firm and this worker through any of her type-j
employed contacts is then equal to avej [1− (1−µj)
γnj (1−µi)
(1−γ)nj ]
(1− γ)µi
µ¯j
. The job finding rate of a type-i
worker, λi, through this channel is then the sum of these two expressions divided by ui:
λi = av[(1− µi)[1− (1− µi)
γni(1− µj)
(1−γ)ni ]
γ
µ¯i
+ (1− µj)[1− (1− µj)
γnj (1− µi)
(1−γ)nj ]
(1− γ)
µ¯j
]
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the probability that this worker is of type-H.
Assume for simplicity that, when offering wage contracts, firms follow the threshold rule
w.r.t. a signal according to the ex-post indifference condition and then let us check whether
there will be such a separating equilibrium in this economy. Denote the two wage contracts
that are intended at the workers with nL and nH number of actual friends by wL and wH ,
respectively. If the outside options of type-H workers are larger than those of type-L workers
only because of the higher job-finding rate for a given wage, the wage wH offered must be larger
than wL (which itself must be less than the reservation wage of high types in the separating
equilibrium) for the workers with nH contacts to accept. Otherwise, the position which met the
high type worker remains vacant and the firm receives zero profit in the equilibrium. Denote
the threshold value of the signal n′, for which firms are indifferent between offering the wage wL
and wH , by n¯
′. This means that after observing n′ ≤ n¯′ a firm will offer the wage wL and, in the
opposite case, it will offer wH . Thus, there will be a positive correlation between the number
of contacts in the Social Network System and the wage offered by firms in the equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, the wage wH will be accepted by both worker types and the wage wL - only by
the low types leading only to partial separation. In order to fully characterize this equilibrium
outcome, let us first consider the workers’ and then the firms’ side.
4.3 Analysis of the model
4.3.1 Workers: effort choice
Consider first the partial equilibrium case when the number of vacancies v is exogenously given.
Let Ui denote the present value of an unemployed worker of type i = L,H or her outside options.
In addition, let WL and WLH denote the asset value of a type-L worker employed at the wage
wL and, by the firm’s mistake, at the wage wH , respectively, and let WH be the present value
of a type-H worker employed at wage wH .
Both firms and workers are interested in more effort to be exerted on the job, since it increases
the match duration, which is profitable for workers as well as for firms as in Zaharieva (2010).
Denote the effort level of the type-i worker induced by the wage wi offered as gi and the effort
level of type-L worker in response to the wage wH offered as gLH in case when the firm has made
a mistake. Wi and WLH then also denote the asset values of an employed worker exerting the
optimal effort level gi and gLH , respectively. The Bellman equations for the employed workers
choosing different effort levels can be then written as:
rWi = max
gi
{wi− k(gi)− δ(gi)(Wi−Ui)} rWLH = max
gLH
{wH − k(gLH)− δ(gLH )(WLH −UL)}
(4.1)
Equations (4.1) show that workers face a tradeoff between the gain from a lower separation
rate δ(g) and the cost of exerting effort k(g). A worker of type i employed at the wage wi
maximizes the rent Wi−Ui w.r.t. gi given Ui and a worker of type L employed at the wage wH
maximizes the job surplus (WLH −UL) w.r.t. gLH given UL. The first order conditions for these
two problems can be written as:
Wi−Ui = wi − k(gi)− rUi
r + δ(gi)
= |k
′(gi)
δ′(gi)
| WLH−UL = wH − k(gLH )− rUL
r + δ(gLH)
= |k
′(gLH)
δ′(gLH)
| (4.2)
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Thus, from equations (4.2) (incentive compatibility constraints) the optimal effort level gi
can be expressed as a function of wi−rUi and gLH as a function of wH−rUL. Then, analogously
to Lemma 1 in Zaharieva (2010) one can show that for the convex cost function k(g), gi (gLH) is
increasing in wi− rUi (wH− rUL) for a given Ui (UL) when δ′′(gi) < 0 (δ′′(gLH) < 0). Moreover,
the optimal effort level gi (gLH) is equal to 0 when wi = rUi (wH = rUL). These conditions
hold for the assumed functional forms of k(g) and δ(g).
This mechanism of the optimal effort choice ensures that conditions Wi − Ui > 0 ⇔ rUi <
wi − k(gi) and, therefore, rUi < wi hold. Hence, for the existence of the semi-separating
equilibrium discussed above assume that the condition wL < rUH , which prevents high types
from accepting the low wage, holds. To summarize, for this equilibrium to exist, the following
condition should hold:
rUL < wL < rUH < wH (4.3)
In the numerical example (section 4.7) it is checked that the condition wL < rUH holds
for the realistic parameter values and that it will be indeed optimal for firms to offer wages
according to the threshold rule.
All unemployed workers receive the unemployment benefit z and can find a job through the
both search channels with the rate λi + v depending on the type. In the equilibrium, workers
correctly anticipate the threshold value n¯′. A type-L unemployed, therefore, expects to be
employed at the wage wL when the signal n
′ drawn by the firm is less than n¯′ and at the wage
wH otherwise. The Bellman equation for UL can be, thus, written as follows:
rUL = z + (λL + v)[Pr(n
′ ≤ n¯′|nL)(WL − UL) + (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))(WLH − UL)] (4.4)
where the probability Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) is equivalent to F (n¯′|nL).
A type-H unemployed accepts only the wage wH in the equilibrium. However, this wage
is offered by a firm only when the signal n′ drawn is larger than n¯′. The present value of
unemployment for the worker with nH contacts can, thus, be written as follows:
rUH = z + (λH + v)(1 − Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH))(WH − UH) (4.5)
where the probability Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH) is equivalent to F (n¯′|nH).
4.3.2 Firms: wage determination
Let V denote the present value of the open vacancy, which will be defined later. In the equilibrium
it is equal to 0 (the free-entry condition). Assume that, when choosing wages, firms maximize
their ex-ante expected profit (before the realization of a signal) with respect to wages wL and
wH and the threshold value of the signal n¯
′ subject to their ex-post indifference condition (after
the realization of a signal):
maxwL,wH ,n¯′{β(Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)JL + Pr(n′ > n¯′|nL)JLH) + (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH)JH}(4.6)
s.t. Pr(nL|n¯′)JL = Pr(nL|n¯′)JLH + (1− Pr(nL|n¯′))JH (4.7)
Firms take β parametrically.
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JL denotes the firm’s present value of profits from a worker employed at wage wL and
therefore exerting the effort level gL, which results in the separation rate δ(gL). JH (JLH) is
the firm’s present value of profits from the high (low) type worker employed at wage wH and,
thus, exerting the effort level gH (gLH). The Bellman equations for JL, JLH and JH can be then
written as follows11:
rJL = y − wL − δ(gL)(JL − V ) (4.8)
rJLH = y − wH − δ(gLH )(JLH − V ) rJH = y − wH − δ(gH )(JH − V ) (4.9)
The maximization problem of a firm is intuitive. With probability βPr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) the worker
met by the firm is of type L and the signal n′ drawn by the firm is lower than the threshold value
n¯′. In this case, the firm receives the asset value JL from the job filled by the low type worker
who gets the wage wL. With probability βPr(n
′ > n¯′|nL) the worker met by the firm is of type
L, but the signal n′ drawn by the firm is higher than n¯′. In this case, the firm receives the asset
value JLH from the job filled by the low type worker who gets the wage wH . With probability
(1− β)Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH) this worker is of H-type and the signal drawn is smaller than n¯′. In this
case, the firm offers the wage wL and is left with an open vacancy (receives zero profit) since
the high type will not accept. With probability (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH) this worker is of H-type
and the signal was correctly drawn larger than n¯′. In this case, the firm receives the asset value
JH from the job filled by the high type worker who gets the wage wH .
The left hand side of the indifference condition is the ex-post expected profit of a firm (after
the realization of a signal) from offering the low wage wL to a worker with a signal n¯
′, which
will be accepted only when the worker is a low type. The right hand side is the expected profit
from proposing the high wage wH to a worker with a signal n¯
′, which is always accepted. With
the probability Pr(nL|n¯′) this worker will be of type L and with the opposite probability - of
type H.
In the numerical example (section 4.7) the values for optimal wL, wH and n¯
′ are found.
4.3.3 Steady-state equations and the free-entry condition
Denote the number of low types employed at high wage by eLH and at low wage by eLL so that
eLL + eLH = eL. Expressions for eLH and eLL can be found from the respective steady-state
equations:
e˙LH = 0 = uL(λL + v)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))− δ(gLH )eLH (4.10)
e˙LL = 0 = uL(λL + v)Pr(n
′ ≤ n¯′|nL)− δ(gL)eLL (4.11)
The mass of unemployed workers with nL actual contacts, uL, can find a job with probability
λL + v through both search channels and with probability (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)) this job pays a
high wage due to the firm’s mistake. This is the inflow into the state eLH . At the same time,
the mass of workers of type L employed at a high wage, eLH , can loose the job with probability
δ(gLH). This is the outflow out of this state. On the other hand, with the opposite probability
Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) the job found by these unemployed workers pays a low wage. This forms the
inflow into the state eLL. Similarly, the mass of workers of type L employed at a low wage, eLL,
11It is easy to see that gLH is always larger than gH in the equilibrium, and therefore, JLH is always larger
than JH .
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can loose the job with probability δ(gL) determining the outflow out of this state.
The steady-state equation for the number of unemployed low types can be then written as:
u˙L = 0 = δ(gL)eLL + δ(gLH )eLH − uL(λL + v) (4.12)
The mass of workers of type L employed at a low and high wage, eLL and eLH , can loose
a job with probabilities δ(gL) and δ(gLH ), respectively, leading to the inflow into the state uL.
However, the unemployed low types, uL, can find any job with probability λL+ v through both
search channels and form in such a way the outflow out of this state.
Therefore, from these three equations, the expressions for eLL, eLH and uL can be written
as:
eLL =
Pr(nL)δ(gLH )(λL + v)Pr(n
′ ≤ n¯′|nL)
(λL + v)[(1 − Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))δ(gL) + Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)δ(gLH )] + δ(gL)δ(gLH )
eLH =
Pr(nL)δ(gL)(λL + v)(1 − Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))
(λL + v)[(1 − Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))δ(gL) + Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)δ(gLH )] + δ(gL)δ(gLH )
uL =
Pr(nL)δ(gL)δ(gLH )
(λL + v)[(1 − Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))δ(gL) + Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)δ(gLH )] + δ(gL)δ(gLH )
On the other hand, the steady-state equation for workers with nH actual contacts can be
written as follows:
u˙H = 0 = (Pr(nH)− uH)δ(gH )− uH(λH + v)(1 − Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH)) (4.13)
The mass of employed workers of type H can loose a job with probability δ(gH ) leading to
the inflow into the state uH . However, the unemployed high types can find a job with probability
λL + v through both search channels and accept it with probability (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH)) when
a high wage is offered. This determines the outflow out of this state. Thus, the number of
unemployed type-H workers, uH , is equal to:
uH =
Pr(nH)δ(gH )
(λH + v)(1 − Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH)) + δ(gH )
Finally, a present value of an open vacancy denoted by V can be defined as follows. To fill an
open vacancy, firms are also using both search channels at the same time. At rate qi = λiui/v =
aPr(ni)(1 − µi)[1 − (1 − µi)ni ] a match between a firm and an unemployed worker of type i is
formed due to her social contacts and at rate ui the firm is matched with an unemployed worker
of type i through a formal channel. Since firms don’t know the worker’s type and whether
the worker has found a job in a formal way or through the network information transmission,
they expect to be matched with some unemployed worker with a rate qL + qH + u. Then, with
probability β this will be a low type. The firm will offer her the wage wL with probability
Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) and the wage wH with the opposite probability, and a worker will always accept.
On the other hand, with probability 1 − β this will be a worker of high type, and a firm will
employ her at a wage wH only with probability Pr(n
′ > n¯′|nH), i.e. when it infers her type
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correctly. The asset value of an open vacancy is then equal to:
rV = 0 = −c+ (qL + qH + u)[β(Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)(JL − V ) + (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))(JLH − V )) +
+(1− β)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH))(JH − V )]
The expression in the square brackets is the expected profit of a firm from the maximization
problem (4.6). Hence the optimal firm strategy is chosen so that it maximizes the present value
of a vacancy V . In the equilibrium, V is equal to 0 (the free entry condition). This allows us to
find the last equilibrium variable, the number of vacancies v entering through the unemployment
rates. Thus, the described equilibrium can be formally defined in a following way:
Definition 4.1. Search equilibrium with asymmetric information and with the partial separation
of types is a vector of variables (Ui, Wi, WLH , Ji, JLH , gi, gLH , n¯
′, wi, µi, eLL, eLH), i = L,H
as well as the number of vacancies v and the present value of an open vacancy V , satisfying
the asset value equations for workers (4.4), (4.5) and (4.1), for firms (4.8) and (4.9), the
firm’s maximization problem (4.6), the optimal effort equations (4.2), the steady-state conditions
(4.10), (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13), the condition (4.3) and the free-entry condition V = 0.
In the numerical example (section 4.7) it is checked that this equilibrium exists for the
realistic parameter values.
4.4 Perfect information case
Let us now compare the equilibrium outcomes in a model with asymmetric information from the
previous section to those arising in the situation when firms are perfectly informed about the
worker type, i.e. when σǫ = 0. When the actual number of contacts is observed perfectly, the
wage w1i , i = L,H, inducing the optimal effort level g
1
i is offered to the workers with ni actual
contacts, which they always accept. To characterize these equilibrium variables, let us consider
the workers’ and the firms’ side for the case of perfect information.
Let v1 be the number of open vacancies in this case. Hence, analogously to the asymmetric
information case, the job-finding rate through the formal channel is now equal to v1. In addition,
let u1i and e
1
i denote the amounts of unemployed and employed workers of type i, respectively,
so that u1i + e
1
i = Pr(ni) and the unemployment rate of a worker of this type µ
1
i = u
1
i /Pr(ni).
Let the overall number of unemployed in this case be u1 =
∑
i u
1
i . Then, the job finding rate
through the social contacts’ channel is equal in this case to:
λ1i = av
1(1− µ1i )
[1− (1− µ1i )ni ]
µ1i
Hence, the equation for the present value of unemployment for type i workers can be written
in this case similarly to the equation for Ui as follows:
rU1i = z + (λ
1
i + v
1)(W 1i − U1i ) (4.14)
where, analogously toWi for the case of asymmetric information, W
1
i denotes the asset value
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of employment at the wage w1i for the workers with ni actual contacts and is equal to:
rW 1i = max
g1i
{w1i − k(g1i )− δ(g1i )(W 1i − U1i )} (4.15)
Thus, from the first order conditions, one can show that the optimal effort level chosen by
type i workers, g1i is a function of w
1
i − rU1i with the similar properties as gi, i.e.:
W 1i − U1i =
w1i − k(g1i )− rU1i
r + δ(g1i )
= |k
′(g1i )
δ′(g1i )
| (4.16)
From the point of view of the firms, let V 1 denote the present value of the open vacancy,
defined later. Moreover, let J1i denote the firm’s present value from hiring the type i worker at
wage w1i and, thus, inducing the effort level g
1
i leading to the separation rate δ(g
1
i ). The Bellman
equation for J1i can be then written as follows:
rJ1i = y − w1i − δ(g1i )(J1i − V 1) (4.17)
The values of w1L and w
1
H offered by firms can be found from the firm’s expected profit
maximization problem:
max
w1
L
,w1
H
{β1J1L + (1− β1)J1H} (4.18)
where β1 is the analogue of β for the perfect information case. Firms take β1 parametrically.
Thus, the solution to this problem gives rise to the following Proposition:
Proposition 4.1. The wage w1i , i = L,H offered by firms is equal to:
w1i = y −
(r + δ(g1i ))
2(k′′(g1i )δ
′(g1i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
δ′(g1i )
3
Proof: Appendix 4.10.1.
Since this wage is always accepted by a worker with ni number of contacts, the steady-state
condition for this worker type can be written as follows:
u˙1i = 0 = (Pr(ni)− u1i )δ(g1i )− u1i (λ1i + v1) (4.19)
Therefore the unemployment rate of type i workers, µ1i , is equal to:
µ1i =
δ(g1i )
λ1i + v
1 + δ(g1i )
To find the last equilibrium variable, the number of vacancies v1 from the free-entry condition,
let us define a present value of an open vacancy V 1 analogously to V from the previous section.
The job-filling rate through the social contacts in this case, q1i , is the analogue of qi and is equal
to λ1i u
1
i /v
1. When a worker met is of low type (with probability β1), a firm will always figure it
out correctly and offer her the wage w1L. On the other hand, when a firm meets a worker of high
type (with probability 1 − β1), it offers her the wage w1H . The asset value of an open vacancy
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in the perfect information case is then equal to:
rV 1 = 0 = −c+ (q1L + q1H + u1)(β1J1L + (1− β1)J1H)
Thus, the perfect information equilibrium can be formally defined in a following way:
Definition 4.2. Search equilibrium with perfect information is a vector of variables (U1i , W
1
i ,
J1i , V
1, g1i , w
1
i , µ
1
i , v
1), i = L,H, satisfying the asset value equations for workers (4.14) and
(4.15), for firms (4.17), the wage determination equation (4.18), the optimal effort equations
(4.16), the steady-state conditions (4.19) and the free-entry condition V 1 = 0.
This equilibrium is the special case of the equilibrium in the asymmetric information case
for σǫ = 0. In section 4.7 below, it is checked that this equilibrium exists for the realistic
parameter values and the equilibrium outcomes in the perfect and asymmetric information case
are numerically compared.
4.5 Case of a full information asymmetry
This section now compares the benchmark model with asymmetric information to the other
extreme case when firms do not have any reliable signal about the worker type, i.e. when
σǫ →∞. This is the case of a full information asymmetry. In this case, the only one wage w0 is
offered by firms to all workers, which induces the workers with ni, i = L,H actual contacts to
exert the optimal effort level g0i .
Let v0 be the number of open vacancies in this case. Hence, analogously to the benchmark
case, the job-finding rate through the formal channel is now equal to v0. In addition, let u0i
and e0i denote the amounts of unemployed and employed workers of type i, respectively, so that
u0i + e
0
i = Pr(ni) and the unemployment rate of a worker of this type µ
0
i = u
0
i /Pr(ni). Let the
overall number of unemployed in this case be u0 =
∑
i u
0
i . Then, the job finding rate through
the social contacts’ channel is equal in this case to:
λ0i = av
0(1− µ0i )
[1− (1− µ0i )ni ]
µ0i
Hence, the expression for the present value of unemployment for type i workers, U0i , can be
written in this case similarly to the equation for Ui as follows:
rU0i = z + (λ
0
i + v
0)(W 0i − U0i ) (4.20)
where, analogously toWi for the case of asymmetric information, W
0
i denotes the asset value
of employment at the wage w0 for the workers with ni actual contacts and is equal to:
rW 0i = max
g0i
{w0 − k(g0i )− δ(g0i )(W 0i − U0i )} (4.21)
Thus, from the first order conditions, one can show that the optimal effort level chosen by
type i workers, g0i is a function of w
0 − rU0i with the similar properties as gi, i.e.:
W 0i − U0i =
w0 − k(g0i )− rU0i
r + δ(g0i )
= |k
′(g0i )
δ′(g0i )
| (4.22)
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From the point of view of the firms, let V 0 denote the present value of the open vacancy,
defined later. Moreover, let J0i denote the firm’s present value from hiring the type i worker and,
thus, inducing the effort level g0i . The Bellman equation for J
0
i can be then written as follows:
rJ0i = y − w0 − δ(g0i )(J0i − V 0) (4.23)
The steady-state condition for this worker type can be written as follows:
u˙0i = 0 = (Pr(ni)− u0i )δ(g0i )− u0i (λ0i + v0) (4.24)
Therefore the unemployment rate of type i workers, µ0i , is equal to:
µ0i =
δ(g0i )
λ0i + v
0 + δ(g0i )
The value of w0 offered by a firm which has met the type i worker can be found from the
firm’s expected profit maximization problem:
max
w0
{β0J0L + (1− β0)J0H} (4.25)
where β0 is the analogue of β for the case of a full information asymmetry. Firms take β0
parametrically.
The solution to this maximization problem gives rise to the following Proposition:
Proposition 4.2. Let x0(g0i ) = (k
′′(g0i )δ
′(g0i )−δ′′(g0i )k′(g0i ))(r+δ(g0i ))3, where i = L,H. Then,
the wage w0 offered by firms is equal to:
w0 = y −
x0(g0L)x
0(g0H) · [
β0
r + δ(g0L)
+
(1− β0)
r + δ(g0H )
]
β0(δ′(g0L))
3x0(g0H) + (1− β0)(δ′(g0H))3x0(g0L)
Proof: Appendix 4.10.2.
To find the last equilibrium variable, the number of vacancies v0, from the free-entry condi-
tion, let us define a present value of an open vacancy V 0 analogously to V 1 from the previous
section. The job-filling rate through the social contacts in this case, q0i , is the analogue of q
1
i
and is equal to λ0iu
0
i /v
0. The asset value of an open vacancy in this case is then equal to:
rV 0 = 0 = −c+ (q0L + q0H + u0)(β0J0L + (1− β0)J0H)
Thus, the equilibrium with a full information asymmetry can be formally defined in a fol-
lowing way:
Definition 4.3. Search equilibrium with a full information asymmetry is a vector of variables
(U0i , W
0
i , J
0
i , V
0, g0i , µ
0
i , v
0), i = L,H, as well as the wage offer w0, satisfying the asset
value equations for workers (4.20) and (4.21), for firms (4.23), the wage determination equation
(4.25), the optimal effort equations (4.22), the steady-state conditions (4.24) and the free-entry
condition V 0 = 0.
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In section 4.7 below, it is checked that this equilibrium exists for the realistic parameter
values and these equilibrium outcomes are also numerically compared with those in the perfect
and asymmetric information cases.
4.6 Social welfare comparison
The natural question in this model is, in which of the three cases considered above the overall
social welfare as well as workers’ income and firms’ profits are larger. First, denote by ΛWL
(ΛWH) the average income of low (high) type workers so that ΛW = ΛWL+ΛWH is the average
income of all workers. More precisely, these variables are defined as follows:
ΛWL = (wL − k(gL))eLL + (wH − k(gLH))eLH + zuL ΛWH = (wH − k(gH))eH + zuH
The average income of low types is equal to the sum of their wages net of the effort cost at
low and high wage jobs when employed plus the utility of unemployed workers of this type.
Analogously, the average income of high types is their wage net of the effort cost when employed
plus the utility of unemployed workers of this type. In addition, let ΛF be the average profit of
all firms, defined as:
ΛF = (y − wL)eLL + (y − wH)(eLH + eH)− cv
It is equal to the firms’ profits after hiring low types at both wage contracts and high types
at a high wage contract minus the cost of vacancies’ creation. It is then easy too see that
ΛW +ΛF = Λ, which is the overall social welfare level.
Analogously, let us define variables similar to ΛWL, ΛWH , ΛW , ΛF and Λ for the perfect
information case and the case of a full information asymmetry with upper indexes 1 and 0,
respectively. Expressions for average incomes of low and high types in the perfect information
case, Λ1WL and Λ
1
WH , respectively, can be written as follows:
Λ1WL = (w
1
L − k(g1L))e1L + zu1L Λ1WH = (w1H − k(g1H))e1H + zu1H
Intuitively, the average income of low (high) type workers in the perfect information case is
equal to the low (high) wage net of the low (high) effort cost when employed plus the utility of
unemployed low (high) types. Expressions for average incomes of low and high types in the case
of the full information asymmetry, Λ0WL and Λ
0
WH , respectively, can be written analogously as
follows:
Λ0WL = (w
0 − k(g0L))e0L + zu0L Λ0WH = (w0 − k(g0H))e0H + zu0H
Similarly, the average income of low (high) type workers in the case of the full information
asymmetry is equal to the wage w0 net of the low (high) effort cost when employed plus the
utility of unemployed low (high) types. Expressions for average profits of firms in the perfect
information case and in the case of the full information asymmetry, Λ1F and Λ
0
F , respectively,
can be written as follows:
Λ1F = (y − w1L)e1L + (y −w1H)e1H − cv1 Λ0F = (y − w0)(e0L + e0H)− cv0
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Λ1F equals to the firms’ profits after hiring low and high types at low and high wage, respectively,
minus the cost of vacancies’ creation. Analogously, Λ0F is equal to the firms’ profits after hiring
workers at the wage w0, minus the cost of vacancies’ creation.
Similarly, the average incomes of all workers in the perfect information case and in the case
of a full information asymmetry are Λ1WL + Λ
1
WH = Λ
1
W and Λ
0
WL + Λ
0
WH = Λ
0
W , respectively.
Moreover, the overall social welfare levels in cases of perfect information and a full information
asymmetry are Λ1W + Λ
1
F = Λ
1 and Λ0W + Λ
0
F = Λ
0, respectively.
In section 4.7 below, the overall social welfare levels, average income levels of workers and
average profits of firms in the asymmetric information, perfect information and full information
asymmetry case will be numerically compared.
4.7 Numerical example
4.7.1 Calibration
This section parameterizes the model to match the average labour market indicators in the
OECD countries. Let the productivity parameter y be normalized to 1. A unit period of time in
the model is chosen to be six months and the discount rate r is set to 0.01, which is equivalent
to the annual discount rate of 2%. Next, the flow value of leisure z is equal to 0.5, which is in
the middle range of values in the literature. Shimer (2005) sets this value to 0.4, while Fontaine
(2008) uses the value of 0.15 for the U.S. economy and 0.4 for the French economy. Gautier
(2002) and Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) set z equal to 0.2. On the other hand, Hall and Milgrom
(2008) obtain a larger value of 0.71. The cost of an open vacancy c is chosen to be 0.5 and is
also close to the average in the literature. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) set the value of 0.58
for this parameter, while Cahuc and Fontaines (2009) value is 0.4. Shimer (2005) has chosen the
value of 0.213 for the cost of vacancies while Fontaine (2008) uses the value of 0.3.
Let the number of actual contacts of type-L workers who can help in the job search be equal
to 50 and that of type H - to 90. These choices are in the middle range of numbers in the
literature. First, Ellison et al. (2014) report that, for adults in 2011, the mean number of actual
friends among their Facebook contacts was 76 out of the 207 total Facebook contacts on average
(37% are actual friends). Tong et al. (2008) report the mean of 395 total Facebook contacts
for undergraduate students. According to Statista (2014), the average number of Facebook
friends for all age groups is 350. Moreover, Ellison et al. (2011) report that, for undergraduate
students, the average fraction of actual friends on Facebook is 25%. Thus, considering relatively
younger generations, the average numbers of Facebook contacts of low and high types are equal
to 50/0.25=200 and 90/0.25=360, respectively. In addition, let the fraction of type L workers,
Pr(nL), be equal to 0.5 for easier comparability. Moreover, Rostila (2013) reports that the
percentage of people with poor social contacts varies between 21.7% and 65.1% for different
education levels in European countries. Then, the average numbers of actual and Facebook
friends are equal to 70 and 280, respectively. These numbers are naturally a bit lower than those
in the literature since not all contacts usually help in the job search, in particular, workers of the
same profession tend to help more. Cingano and Rosolia (2012) find that the median number
of only professional contacts in Italy is equal to 32. This number is higher in Germany and is
equal to 43 (Glitz, 2013). At the same time, the mean number of actual contacts is equal to 50
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in Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). Fontaine (2008) uses the number of 40 in a benchmark model
of his paper. Thus, 70 is a reasonable estimation for an average number of actual contacts who
can help to find a job. Moreover, let the standard deviation for the firms’ error σǫ take the value
of 10 in the benchmark case so that, for low types, a firm can receive a signal approximately
between 0 and 100 and, for high types, between 40 and 140 as on figure 4.1 (right panel). This
value is the maximal one for the signal to be positive in most of cases.
Figure 4.1: The densities f(n′|nL) (blue) and f(n′|nH) (red) for nL = 50 and nH = 90. σǫ = 5
(left) and σǫ = 10 (right).
In addition let the rate a with which employees hear about job vacancies be equal to 0.5.
This number is chosen for the average equilibrium job-finding rate to be close to values in
the literature. Hobijn und Sahin (2009) report using OECD (2006) ”Employment and Labour
Market Statistics” that the highest monthly job-finding rate is in the U.S. and is equal to 56.3%,
while the lowest one is in Italy, 2.58%. Therefore, the annual job finding rate varies between
0.00258 · 12 = 0.03 and 0.563 · 12 = 6.75. Parameter d0 is set to 5 so that δ(0) = 1/5 = 0.2.
This value corresponds to the average job duration without effort of 1/(2 · 0.2) = 2.5 years and
is close to the minimal value in the literature. Hall and Milgrom (2008) set the value of 3% per
month, so the average job duration is 1/(12 · 0.03) = 2.78 years. Pissarides (2009) and Shimer
(2005) choose the value of δ equal to 0.1 for a unit of time being a quarter. This corresponds to
the average job duration of 1/(4 · 0.1) = 2.5 years. Hobijn and Sahin (2009) report a value of
2.3% per month, so the average job duration becomes 1/(12 · 0.023) = 3.6 years. Let also k0 > 0
be equal to 2 · 10−5. This parameter is chosen for average job durations for equilibrium values
of effort to be large enough. Table 4.1 presents the calibration for the benchmark case. In Table
4.2, the comparison of equilibrium and social welfare outcomes in asymmetric information case,
perfect information case and the case of a full information asymmetry is presented.
In the asymmetric information case, the separation rate δ(gLH ) is equal to 0.12069 corre-
sponding to the job duration of 1/(2 · 0.12069) = 4.14285 years. The separation rate δ(gL) is
larger and is equal to 0.12922, which corresponds to the job duration of 1/(2 ·0.12922) = 3.86937
years. The separation rate δ(gH ) is the largest and is equal to 0.13188 corresponding to the job
duration of 1/(2 · 0.13188) = 3.79139 years. These high effort levels will naturally cause low
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Variable Value Explanation
nL 50 Number of actual contacts of type L workers
nH 90 Number of actual contacts of type H workers
Pr(nL) 0.5 The share of type L workers
r 0.01 Annual interest rate of 2%
z 0.5 Unemployment benefit
σǫ 10 Standard deviation for the firms’ error
δ(0) 1/5 Average job duration of 2.5 years (without effort)
k0 2 · 10−5 δ(g) is close to the minimal for equilibrium effort values
c 0.5 Vacancy cost
γ 1 Degree of network homophily
a 0.5 The rate of hearing about job openings by employees
y 1 Workers’ productivity
Table 4.1: Values of the model parameters
overall number of unemployed and a large amount of vacancies12.
For the case of the full information asymmetry, the wage offered is in between the low and
high wages in the asymmetric and perfect information cases. The overall social welfare is the
biggest in the asymmetric information case and the smallest in the perfect information case.
This may seem counterintuitive, since the asymmetric information case should naturally be in
between of the two extreme cases. In the next subsection, the reasons for this will be discussed.
Variable Asymmetric Perfect Full asymmetry
Low wage 0.84533 0.83732 0.85122
High wage 0.85829 0.8699 0.85122
Type-L reservation wage 0.8305 0.82157 0.83481
Type-H reservation wage 0.84616 0.85784 0.83946
Effort of low types at low wage 7.50096 7.76799 7.95924
Effort of low types at high wage 10.79608 - -
Effort of high types 6.67079 6.64786 6.55044
Overall unemployment rate 3.49426% 3.42372% 3.46373%
Unemployment rate of low types 4.08832% 4.02538% 4.02738%
Unemployment rate of high types 2.93084% 2.82206% 2.90009%
Threshold value of the signal 61.77651 - -
Number of vacancies 0.26662 0.26874 0.26752
Overall social welfare 0.8481 0.8475 0.8479
Table 4.2: Comparison of equilibrium and social optimum outcomes in asymmetric information
case, perfect information case and the case of a full information asymmetry
4.7.2 Comparative statics
The most important comparative statics question in this model is what happens with the change
of σǫ? Consider the case of σǫ changing from 5 to 10. The signal distributions in the cases of σǫ
equal to 5 and 10 are illustrated on figure 4.1. The threshold number of contacts n¯′ decreases
12The average unemployment rate in the United States in the recent years is 8.7% (BLS, 2009-2013). In addition,
Elsby et al. (2013) report that, for OECD countries, the unemployment rate varies between 3.3% for Japan and
15.4% for Spain in 1968-2009.
87
from 68.93801 to 61.77651. Therefore, the probability to hire a low type worker at the low wage
after a match, Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL), decreases from 0.97087 to 0.88053. Similarly, the probability not
to hire a high type worker after a match, Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH), decreases slightly from 0.01759 to
0.00238 as the change in n¯′ has the smaller effect in this case.
Figure 4.2: Left panel: Change in wL (black) with the increase in σǫ, w
1
L (blue) and w
0 (red).
Right panel: Change in wH (black) with the increase in σǫ, w
1
H (blue) and w
0 (red).
Changes in wage contracts and reservation wages are illustrated on figures 4.2 and 4.3,
respectively. The wage contract wL (wH) increases (decreases) from the value very close to w
1
L
(w1H) to the value close to w
0 and the reservation wage rUL (rUH) increases (decreases) from
the value very close to rU1L (rU
1
H) to the value close to rU
0
L (rU
0
H).
Figure 4.3: Left panel: Change in rUL (black) with the increase in σǫ, rU
1
L (blue) and rU
0
L (red).
Right panel: Change in rUH (black) with the increase in σǫ, rU
1
H (blue), rU
0
H (red).
This is intuitive, as a larger uncertainty of firms makes low types better off in terms of
reservation wages, and therefore, in wages since the probability of a low type to be considered
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as a high type is higher and they always accept. High types are worse off in terms of wages
since they have to accept more offers competing with low types more which leads also to lower
reservation wages.
Figure 4.4: Left panel: Change in gL (solid) and in gLH (dashed, right axis) (black) with the
increase in σǫ, g
1
L (blue), g
0
L (red). Right panel: Change in gH (black) with the increase in σǫ,
g1H (blue), g
0
H (red).
Changes in effort levels are illustrated on figure 4.4. The effort level gL is always larger than
gH . Therefore, JL > JH , and firms will always get more profit from more low type workers
employed.
The effort levels of low types, gL and gLH , decrease and the effort level of high types, gH ,
first increases and then decreases.
Intuitively, as the firms uncertainty increases, high type workers will be more interested in
exerting a higher effort level to increase the duration of a match, otherwise, when unemployed,
they will compete with low types more often. On the other hand, their wage will decrease, which
has a negative effect on effort. The latter effect dominates when a firm’s uncertainty is already
large. On the contrary, low types will be less concerned about loosing the job and exert less
effort. This effect dominates the effect of a wage increase.
From the pictures it can be seen that the change in gLH is much larger than in gL and gH .
The change in gL is naturally larger than the change in gH as n¯
′ decreases.
Both unemployment rates, µL and µH , increase from the values very close to µ
1
L and µ
1
H .
This is illustrated on figure 4.5.
The firms’ profit per low type worker employed at the low (high) wage, JL, (JLH) decreases
(increases slightly) from 1.17521 to 1.111 (from 1.05771 to 1.08431). On the other hand, the
firms’ profit per high type worker, JH , increases from 0.9166 to 0.9988.
In order to check whether offering of two wage contracts is indeed an equilibrium strategy
of firms let us suppose that one firm deviates and offers either the wage rUL < w˜L < rUH or
w˜H > rUH to both types.
More precisely, when a firm adopts the strategy of two wage contracts wL and wH considered
in the model, it receives the following expected profit from hiring a worker as in the maximization
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problem (4.6):
Jexp = βPr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)JL + βPr(n′ > n¯′|nL)JLH + (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH)JH
Figure 4.5: Left panel: Change in µL (black) with the increase in σǫ, µ
1
L (blue) and µ
0
L (red).
Right panel: Change in µH (black) with the increase in σǫ, µ
1
H (blue) and µ
0
H (red).
On the contrary, the expected profit from hiring a worker when a firm deviates to offering
either w˜L or w˜H is, respectively:
JexpL = βmaxw˜L
J˜L J
exp
H = maxw˜H
{βJ˜LH + (1− β)J˜H}
where J˜L =
y − w˜L
r + δ(g˜L)
, J˜LH =
y − w˜H
r + δ(g˜LH )
and J˜H =
y − w˜H
r + δ(g˜H )
.
In the first maximization problem, the wage w˜L can be found analogously to w
1
L from the
Proposition 4.1 and is numerically equivalent to wL from the maximization problem (4.6) and,
therefore, the firm receives JL > JLH instead of JLH and looses (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH)JH since
only low types accept.
In the second maximization problem, the wage w˜H can be found analogously to w
0 from the
Proposition 4.2.
From the figure 4.6 it can be seen that the strategy of offering two contracts is indeed the
optimal one for firms for σǫ from 5 to 10.
The job-finding rate λL decreases from 2.7929 to 2.73947 and the job-finding rate λH de-
creases from 4.27473 to 4.1116. The job-filling rate qL increases from 0.20918 to 0.21004 and
the job-filling rate qH increases from 0.22447 to 0.22599.
Changes in the income levels of low and high type workers are illustrated on figure 4.7. ΛWL
naturally increases from the value very close to Λ1WL and leads to Λ
0
WL. On the other hand,
ΛWH decreases starting from the value very close to Λ
1
WH and leads to Λ
0
WH , which is also
intuitive.
The change in the average income of both worker types is illustrated on figure 4.8 (left panel).
It decreases from the value very close to Λ1W and naturally leads to Λ
0
W as ΛWH decreases faster
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than ΛWL increases.
Figure 4.6: Change in Jexp (black), JexpL (red) and J
exp
H (blue) with the increase in σǫ.
The number of vacancies v decreases from the value very close to v1 (figure 4.9) (right panel).
Intuitively, firms anticipate that in the asymmetric information case they will offer mismatched
wages more often due to the larger probability of firms’ mistakes leading to lower expected
profits.
More precisely, when the firms’ uncertainty increases, as it can be seen from the free-entry
condition, there are two direct reinforcing effects influencing the number of vacancies mostly.
Both the probability to employ low types at low wages after a match, Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL), and the
profit per hiring of such a worker, JL, decrease. Other effects are rather small and are dominated.
The change in the overall average profits of firms, ΛF , is illustrated on figure 4.8 (right panel).
It increases from the value very close to Λ1F and leads to Λ
0
F . This is intuitive as the number of
vacancies decreases.
The overall social welfare, Λ, increases from the value close to Λ1, leads to Λ0 and increases
further (figure 4.9 (left panel)) since ΛF increases faster than ΛW decreases.
As it was mentioned above, the increase in the overall social welfare with the increase in the
uncertainty of firms may seem counterintuitive.
One of the reasons for this is that firms anticipate that expected profits from an open vacancy
will decrease due to more mismatched wages offered and open less vacancies. So the information
asymmetry turns out to be welfare improving as firms, by chance, will employ less workers which
they would not like to employ.
Indeed, in the standard search theory with perfect information (for example, Pissarides
(2000)), the social welfare is maximized when the workers’ bargaining power is equal to the
elasticity of the job-filling rate.
This result is known as the Hosios condition. Otherwise, when the workers’ bargaining power
is too low (high), firms will open too many (few) vacancies due to low (high) wages leading to
more inefficiency.
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Figure 4.7: Left panel: Change in ΛWL (black) with the increase in σǫ, Λ
1
WL (blue) and Λ
0
WL
(red). Right panel: Change in ΛWH (black) with the increase in σǫ, Λ
1
WH (blue) and Λ
0
WH (red).
Since in the present model the wage is offered only by firms, the workers’ wages are relatively
low. Moreover, the number of vacancies in the perfect information case is larger than in the
asymmetric information case. This gives an intuition why the social welfare in the perfect
information case is not the largest since the Hosios condition is not satisfied.
Figure 4.8: Left panel: Change in ΛW (black) with the increase in σǫ, Λ
1
W (blue) and Λ
0
W (red).
Right panel: Change in ΛF (black) with the increase in σǫ, Λ
1
F (blue) and Λ
0
F (red).
It is interesting to compare this finding to the conclusion of Montgomery (1991) that social
contacts use leads to a higher level of social welfare due to a lower mismatch between firms and
workers as referrals reveal the quality of the match. In the present paper, it is the higher level
of mismatched wages offered which contributes to the increase in the welfare.
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Figure 4.9: Left panel: Change in Λ (black) with the increase in σǫ, Λ
1 (blue) and Λ0 (red).
Right panel: Change in v (black) with the increase in σǫ, v
1 (blue) and v0 (red).
4.8 Conclusions
In this paper, the random matching model is proposed, in which firms face uncertainty about
workers’ number of social contacts defining their outside options in the sense of job search
through referrals. This number is known perfectly to workers who are homogeneous in all other
characteristics. Wages are assumed to be offered only by firms in a form of a take-it-or-leave-it
offer during the interview with a job seeker and a worker accepts a wage contract if it is at
least as large as her outside options. In addition, wages are set in such a way that workers will
have an incentive to exert effort. Firms also check the worker’s public number of non-fictitious
social contacts in the Social Network Systems in the Internet. This number is assumed to be
correlated to the actual number of social contacts and, therefore, serves as a noisy signal of the
social capital for firms. For simplicity, only two worker types are considered in the model: with
low and high social capital.
The semi-separating equilibrium with two wage contracts, which follows the threshold rule,
is considered. In this equilibrium, the higher wage will be accepted by both worker types and
the lower wage only by the low types leading only to partial separation. The model generates a
positive relationship between the number of contacts in the social media and the wage offered
by firms in the equilibrium. Thus, there will be a wage dispersion between equally productive
workers with different number of contacts in the Social Network System, which extends the
classical result on wage dispersion with respect to the signal in the literature on uncertainty
about the worker’s productivity. Therefore, this model gives an additional explanation for the
empirically observed wage dispersion between workers with equal productivity.
Moreover, the comparative statics w.r.t. firms’ uncertainty level was conducted and the
equilibrium outcomes of this model were compared numerically with the two extreme cases: the
case of a perfect information and the case of a full information asymmetry. It was found that
(reservation) wages, the overall average firms’ profit and average workers’ income levels in the
asymmetric information case lead to those arising in the case of a full information asymmetry
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as the firms’ uncertainty level increases. Thus, naturally, the equilibrium outcomes in the asym-
metric information case are in between of these two extreme cases. However, the overall social
welfare in the asymmetric information case is increasing which may seem counterintuitive.
One of the reasons for this is that firms anticipate that expected profits from an open vacancy
will decrease due to more mismatched wages offered and open less vacancies thus decreasing their
overall cost and leading to the welfare increase. So the information asymmetry turns out to be
welfare improving as firms, by chance, will employ less workers which they would not like to
employ. It is also interesting to compare this finding to the conclusion of Montgomery (1991)
that social contacts use leads to a higher level of social welfare due to a lower mismatch between
firms and workers as referrals reveal the quality of the match. In the present paper, it is a higher
level of mismatched wages offered that contributes to the increase in the welfare.
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4.10 Appendix
Appendix 4.10.1. Proof of Proposition 4.1:
In order to determine the wage w1i , i = L,H offered by firms, let us find the first order
condition to the firm’s maximization problem (4.18), taking first into account that the optimal
effort g1i is a function of w
1
i − rU1i , i.e.:
w1i − rU1i = k(g1i )−
k′(g1i )
δ′(g1i )
(r + δ(g1i ))
Thus, by differentiating this equation w.r.t. g1i taking U
1
i parametrically, the inverse of
∂g1i
∂(w1i − rU1i )
can be found:
∂(w1i − rU1i )
∂g1i
= −(k
′′(g1i )δ
′(g1i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
(δ′(g1i ))
2
(r + δ(g1i ))
Thus, the first order conditions to the problem (4.18) can be written as follows:
−(r + δ(g1i )) + (y − w1i )δ′(g1i )
(δ′(g1i ))
2
(r + δ(g1i ))(k
′′(g1i )δ
′(g1i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
(r + δ(g1i ))
2
= 0
From this equation, the expression for the optimal wage w1i can be obtained:
w1i = y −
(r + δ(g1i ))
2(k′′(g1i )δ
′(g1i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
(δ′(g1i ))
3
Appendix 4.10.2. Proof of Proposition 4.2: Taking into account the derivatives of g0L
and g0H , which can be found as in the proof of Proposition 4.1, the first order condition for the
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problem (4.25) can be then written as follows:
β0 ·
−(r + δ(g0L)) + (y − w0)δ′(g0L)
(δ′(g0L))
2
(r + δ(g0L))(k
′′(g0L)δ
′(g0L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L))
(r + δ(g0L))
2
+
+(1− β0) ·
−(r + δ(g0H )) + (y − w0)δ′(g0H)
(δ′(g0H))
2
(r + δ(g0H))(k
′′(g0H)δ
′(g0H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H))
(r + δ(g0H ))
2
= 0
Rewriting this equation leads to:
β0(r + δ(g0H ))
2 · [−(r + δ(g0L)) + (y − w0)
(δ′(g0L))
3
(r + δ(g0L))(k
′′(g0L)δ
′(g0L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L))
] +
+(1− β0)(r + δ(g0L))2 · [−(r + δ(g0H )) + (y − w0)
(δ′(g0H))
3
(r + δ(g0H ))(k
′′(g0H)δ
′(g0H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H))
] = 0
Simplifying this equation further gives the following expression:
β0(r + δ(g0H ))
3(k′′(g0H)δ
′(g0H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H)) ·
·[−(r + δ(g0L))2(k′′(g0L)δ′(g0L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L)) + (y − w0)(δ′(g0L))3] +
+(1− β0)(r + δ(g0L))3(k′′(g0L)δ′(g0L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L)) ·
·[−(r + δ(g0H ))2(k′′(g0H)δ′(g0H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H)) + (y − w0)(δ′(g0H))3] = 0
The last expression can be rewritten also as:
β0x0(g0H)[−
x0(g0L)
r + δ(g0L)
+ (y − w0)(δ′(g0L))3] +
+(1− β0)x0(g0L)[−
x(g0H)
r + δ(g0H )
+ (y − w0)(δ′(g0H))3] = 0
From this equation it is easy to receive the optimal w0:
w0 = y −
x0(g0L)x
0(g0H) · [
β0
r + δ(g0L)
+
(1− β0)
r + δ(g0H )
]
β0(δ′(g0L))
3x0(g0H) + (1− β0)(δ′(g0H))3x0(g0L)
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Summary
This dissertation studies the impact of social networks on social welfare and wage inequality
in a labour market with search and matching frictions. Social contacts are considered in the
sense of information transmission about vacancies from employed to unemployed workers (social
capital). The main chapters of this thesis are based on three independent articles. Chapters 2
and 3 are joint works with J.-Prof. Dr. Anna Zaharieva.
Chapter 2 is a revised version of the IMW working paper No. 491 with the same title.
This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks. High
ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts. Firms
can choose between a high cost vacancy in the regular market and a low cost job opening in
the referral market. The model predicts that a larger number of social contacts is associated
with a larger wage gap between high and low ability workers and a larger difference in the
equilibrium unemployment rates. The net welfare gain of referrals is estimated at 1.2%. Next
we demonstrate that the decentralized equilibrium with referrals is inefficient for any value of the
bargaining power. There are two reasons for the inefficiency. First, the private gain from creating
a job in the referral market is always below the social gain, so the equilibrium unemployment of
high ability workers is above its optimum. Moreover, high ability workers congest the market for
low ability workers, so the equilibrium wage inequality is inefficiently large. This is in contrast
to the result of Blazquez and Jansen (2008) showing that the distribution of wages is compressed
in a search model with heterogeneous workers. Finally, we show that a combination of transfers
and subsidies can restore the optimal allocation. If this policy is implemented the net welfare
gain of referrals rises up to 1.8%.
Chapter 3 is a paper published in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 119
(2015), pp. 211-233 (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.08.012) with the same title. This paper presents
a search model with heterogeneous workers, social networks and endogenous search intensity.
There are three job search channels available to the unemployed: costly formal applications
and two costless informal channels - through family and professional networks. Low produc-
tivity workers expect low wages implying low incentives for preparing formal job applications.
Hence low productivity workers rely on family referrals as a method of last resort. In contrast,
professional referrals are used by firms to hire high productivity employees. Formal hiring is
then a most frequent employment channel for workers in the middle range of the productivity
distribution. This explains a U-shape referral hiring pattern observed in empirical studies and
a strong selection of workers on productivity across the three channels. Moreover, combining
family and professional referrals into one informal channel may generate a spurious result of
wage premiums (penalties) if high (low) productivity workers are dominating in the empirical
data and their productivity is not fully observable to the econometrician.
Chapter 4 is the IMW working paper No. 548 with the same title. In this paper, the
search model is proposed, in which homogeneous firms are uncertain about the job seekers’
number of friends, who can help them in the job search (social capital). All workers have the
same productivity and differ only in the social capital. A firm offers a take-it-or-leave-it wage
contract to a worker after checking the worker’s profile and her public number of non-fictitious
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social contacts in the Social Network System in the Internet. This number serves as a noisy
signal of the social capital for firms and cannot be influenced by the worker only for signalling
purpose. The model generates a positive relationship between the number of contacts in the
Social Network System and the wage offered by firms in the equilibrium. In addition, the
presence of firm’s uncertainty with respect to workers’ possibilities to find jobs through social
contacts increases overall social welfare.
Keywords: social capital, social networks, referrals, wage dispersion, wage compression,
family contacts, professional networks, U-shape, referral puzzle, wage premiums, wage penal-
ties, asymmetric information, uncertainty, reservation wage, Social Network System, Facebook,
Linkedin, wage contract, social welfare
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